

The Graduate Faculty
New School for Social Research
Prof. Kenley Dove
Lectures on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*
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Lecture III: October 8, 1974*

The subject matter of Chs. I–III seems to be dealing with the familiar epistemological problems. The argument of the book beginning from Ch. IV becomes less and less epistemological and comes to be almost all embracing. This is a puzzle. Why is it necessary that the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness, which seems to be an epistemological question, requires us to deal with what is normally dealt with by the intellectual historian, cultural historian, aesthician, student of religions, student of politics, etc.? All this in a book that seems to be dealing with a topic that is so readily identified with epistemology. One cannot help but be surprised with that. One must not forget what the topic of the work is, and in that regard I would like to call your attention to the first sentence of the first book of the *Science of Logic*, 1812 edition (which is not identical with the 1831 edition), from the section “With What Must the Science Begin?”:

From the PhG, or the science of consciousness, namely, consciousness as spirit appearing, it will be here presupposed as the result of that study that pure knowledge as the truth of the subject matter of that book has emerged. The *Science of Logic*, which is the pure science, is our knowing in all its extent. . . . The pure knowing is certainty come to the point of truth, or it is the certainty which no longer stands over against an object. . . . It knows the object as itself. And it . . . has given up having that which is object-like over and against it, and it has externalized it. It is a unity with its own externalization.

The development of the PhG may be considered as the development toward an empirical or concrete sense of spirituality which, still throughout the course of the PhG, makes its appearance as consciousness, but which, in the end, may be understood as a plurality. Thus, as a touchstone for a comprehension of the principles of determinacy in their purest form, that is, the subject matter taken up in the *Science of Logic*, maybe the idea of an inner and an outer, of opposition and perspective, has been eliminated from this notion of spirit. That is one hypothesis in terms of which one might understand the peculiar richness of the PhG in taking up such a wide variety of subject matter and at the same time the sense that might be made of the term *Entäusserung* which usually means externalization on the part of a given subject from some kind of standpoint: *Entäusserung* may also be understood as a release from that notion of standpoint and internalization on the part of the knowing consciousness such that the call may be understood in terms of a counterpart [externalization?] and [internalization?] which is the indeterminate interaction of a plurality rather than a construction of determinations from this, that, or the other perspective.

* These lectures were transcribed by various members of the seminar, some of whom were registered as students in departments other than philosophy. Of the twenty-eight meetings of the *Phenomenology* seminar, transcripts either were not made or are not at present available for 1974: IX.25, X.1, XI.12, XI.19, XII.10; 1975: II.11, II.18, III.11. Not all transcribers were able to identify speakers other than Prof. Dove, and some did not transcribe questions or comments of any of the other participants.

Pure knowing:

The end towards which natural consciousness is striving is true knowing, but the end which is reached in this book, namely, the PhG, is pure knowing or indeterminate knowing, a kind of knowing which does not involve any determination. But of course the question “what does ‘pure’ mean” is a very difficult one. After all, the PhG as a whole is described as a purification process. In the first chapter of his *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas raises the question of whether Hegel presents us with an overcoming of the epistemological paradox or a deepening of that problem. Habermas tends to think that the latter is the case.

Shapes of consciousness:

I always have difficulty in talking about the shapes of consciousness as being personified. But to whatever degree they may be personified, they certainly cannot be grasped as having any inter-shape awareness. There is no continuity in the shapes in the way one usually speaks about the continuity of personal identity, namely, through memory, as something which ties together shapes. It is not memory; it is rather to be understood in terms of its exhibiting another shape of the form of consciousness in general which results from the self-negation of the principle which gave the antecedent shape the shape that it had. So it is not really the rejection of $n + 1$ of n which gives $n + 1$ its character as a shape, but it is n 's self-rejection of its own principle (*Wesen*), its own fundamental criterion, which in turn, so to speak, makes way upon the stage for $n + 1$.

In every shape of consciousness there will be one moment for another, which is to say, that is what consciousness is as an example of the opposition of consciousness: having a moment or aspect or stage which is to be separated from other moments, aspects, or stages. It is the thinking of the problem of true knowing in terms of such opposed moments which constitutes the subject matter under investigation, namely, the opposition of consciousness.

Truth and certainty:

There is a distinction drawn throughout the PhG between truth and certainty. Preliminarily, one may say that the moment of truth is the moment of the *in-itself*, that is, the moment of grasping, on the part of consciousness, whatever it is that is in-itself. In order to be grasped from the standpoint of consciousness, the in-itself has to be compared with that which is, in the case of any shape of consciousness, *for-it*. Any shape of consciousness involves that distinction: the attempt to move from that which is, so to speak, *the candidate for truth*, namely, what is for-it, to that which is *the truth*, namely, that which is in-itself. The strategy adopted by consciousness *qua* consciousness is to be able to demonstrate by some indirect course the conformity of that which is *for-consciousness*, when properly conceived, with that which is *in-itself*. That entire project is depicted at various stages by Hegel in the PhG; it is discussed from the very beginning as an impossible but nevertheless interesting one to follow, indeed one which is necessary to follow in order to see out the immanent logic of the self-development of consciousness, that is, in order to grasp, if at all possible, the culmination of this logical development which is allegedly the pure knowing which no longer involves this division of moments as moments of consciousness.

The question of the historical dimension of the PhG:

This is a question which will come up again and again: the degree to which the seeming references to historical events are part of the arguments of the book, that is, the degree to which the arguments are developed in the text by describing what actually went on at such and such a time. But this should not be an appropriate reading of the text. It is a very difficult task to read passages in the PhG which seem to refer (without necessarily mentioning) to such concrete events as, for example, the French Revolution, without thinking that the structure of the narrative derives from the structure of history. We have seen and will continue to make it clear that this is precisely what is demanded by Hegel. The PhG then is to be read as the kind of book that we described it to be. On the other hand, many of the commentaries on the PhG take it as their primary responsibility to make explicit what these implicit references are: e.g., here Hegel is talking about Parmenides, here he is talking about Descartes, here about Robespierre, etc. That may be very interesting but it has nothing to do with the logical structure of the book.

A criticism of Hegel's work on history is that it is an *a prioristic* philosophy of history. What we have here is some sort of idea, for example, the idea of freedom, which is then treated as somehow or other realized in the course of its development. This is regarded as an illicit mode of history because it loses track of the real events as they really happened. Clearly this is the obverse of the problem which is at question now. Whereas Hegel is accused in the philosophy of history of just seeking exemplifications for a purely *a priori*, ideational, or logical development, in the PhG the problem is to see that what is set forth is a logical development which merely takes illustrations from history, but is never derived by reference to the historical development. In moving either within a shape of consciousness or from one shape to another it is never the case that we have to rely upon reference to the empirical data or the knowledge of factual narration which the historian provides us with. If that were the case, the development within any of the shapes or that of one shape to another would be illicit. That is not to say that Hegel is necessarily successful in doing what he purports to do. But it is to say that it would be illicit to derive any of the determinations of the opposition of consciousness from another source of determinacy, namely, the actually existing past. This is Hegel's program. Whether such a program can be carried out, whether such exemplification can be exploited heuristically (which would be the degree to which this exploitation is possible), whether a mere heuristic employment of reference to history is actually made in the PhG, is a different question. But clearly one is familiar with the notion of merely heuristic references which themselves make no determinate contribution to the course of that which they are supposed to illustrate. And clearly that is what must be the case here if the PhG is the book that Hegel refers to in the *Science of Logic*.

So in the course of our discussion of the various sections of the text we will come to refer to historical events. Now, to be critical, we must ask at every instance the question whether the shapes which have come to be at every stage along the way are to be understood as deriving their determinacy from some sort of historical situation. For example, take the beginning of Ch. VI which is the most difficult in this regard (Hyppolite and other commentators call this point the transition to the "second" PhG or from phenomenology to noumenology). The question at this point is whether some sort of presupposition is made regarding an insight into the in-itself or the essential character of History or

one particular stage of the historical development (notably, in this case, the classical Greek stage and the relation between household and *polis* that takes place there). If the beginning of Ch. VI and its subsequent development were to depend upon our pre-existing knowledge of what is taken to be the determinate structure of the Greek world (because there are references to structures that have a family resemblance to the sort of thing that we know from our study of Greek antiquity), then clearly the argument, as a consecutive phenomenological discussion as described in the "Preface," the "Introduction" and the *Science of Logic*, would have to conclude. As the book which is described in the *Science of Logic*, the PhG will make sense only insofar as it has an immanent continuity, only insofar as the determinations which come up are determinations of the subject matter itself, namely, the structure of consciousness in its quest for truth and claims made about truth.

On the role of the 'we':

There is a question of whether, in the course of the self-development of the shapes of consciousness, the 'we' actually has a determinate constitution which is referred to in the text. If there were, particularly if any claims were made as to the determinate constitution of the audience or the 'we,' then clearly we could criticize Hegel for that. But that is an open question. As we get into the text there will be four points along the way when this question will become particularly appropriate. At other points I think the best hermeneutic principle to adopt is to interpret the determinacy of the 'we' with as much indifference as possible and then try to see whether one is being subjected to surreptitious determinations of the 'we' which are necessary for the possibility of the development to take place within a given shape of consciousness or from one shape of consciousness to another. That is to say, is it a condition necessary for the possibility of the development of any given shape of consciousness for the 'we' to be a determinate 'we' in any particular form? Is there a determination of the 'we' which is necessarily presupposed? In most cases at least, an argument can be made for a negative answer.

Question: Isn't there a general sense in which the 'we' is determinate from the outset in the sense of the absolute condition without which there is no development whatsoever?

Dove: You are raising the general question of determination. Clearly that question must be a little bit more precise. The determinations which are at stake in the course of the development of consciousness are those which pertain to questions of validity or, in the broadest sense of the term, juridical determinations. Now, are there any determinations of the validity determining kind which necessarily have to characterize the observing or philosophical 'we'? Is what 'we' see constituted in its determination by our seeing it, or is it just the case that this determinacy would be for anyone only if there were a set way of envisaging it as outlined by the 'we'? Is there any image whereby we can attempt to determine the mode of discourse or the mode of narration which is adopted in the text? One has to make distinctions between different modes of narration which have been worked out in the course of the history of the art of writing. Among the many modes, there is one which is a kind of self-forgetfulness on the part of the narrator, or the mode of discourse which is adopted by writers in the form of an essay in which the expression of the 'I' is involved, or the dramatic mode of discourse, the

famous example of which is the Platonic dialogues, in which there is a systematic bracketing out of the standpoint of the narrator.

Question: What is it that 'we' comprehend that is not comprehended by consciousness itself? Hegel seems to be saying that 'we' understand only the form of what consciousness comprehends as the content.

Dove: When he talks about what it is that 'we' grasp, comprehend, follow, etc., clearly it is the structural or formal aspect. Now, this structural aspect is, so to speak, illustrated by a content aspect and this content aspect is something which is only present within a given shape of consciousness, never in a transition from one shape to another. This would lead us to the possible conclusion that what it is that 'we' grasp is simply the formal, structural aspect which is indeed, in the end, that indeterminate formality. If we can draw a distinction between events which take place in time and temporality in this concrete sense, then we could distinguish the form of temporality. And when Hegel talks about eliminating time in Ch. VIII of the PhG, what we could perhaps understand by that is not the end of History, as Kojève reads it, or the end of some sort of temporal progression, but the end of the form of temporal experience, which is quite another thing. That is to say, the form of temporal experience itself is not temporal.

On the logic of the PhG:

Dove: There seems to be an analogous presumption of a single logic. This is obviously not the logic that we talk about in the *Science of Logic*. It does not begin with indeterminacy. It begins with a definite assumption—the abstract opposition of awareness and that of which it is aware—and out of that a logic develops, not logic strictly so-called, but the logic of the PhG. If the argument of the PhG does unfold immanently, as it is said, then there would have to be a kind of uniformity in the development of the determinations which this logic exhibits. If these determinations developed diversely, that diversity would have to be introduced from the outside somehow, that is, the second form of logic would have to be introduced from the outside, from history perhaps, from our knowledge of Aristotelian logic, or from our anticipation of Quinean logic, or something of that sort. But if logic is the development of the form of determination—and there is such development in the PhG (these forms are called shapes of consciousness in the broadest sense)—and if there were a diversity in the way in which this logic develops, then the PhG would not conclude with that with which it began.

On the opening paragraph of the PhG:

The first difficulty in translating the first sentence is the expression “natural *Vorstellung*” or “natural representation.” Yet we cannot say in English that “It is a natural representation that in philosophy. . . .” That is, however, what I invite you to think about: the notion of representation, which is to say, a mental determination of some sort or other. There is a tendency (or what Hegel calls elsewhere a “second nature”) which cannot be found in primitive people or even in our ordinary language but is only derived through a long process of philosophical study, when it then becomes natural to think and to imagine that a distinction can be drawn between what could be called actual knowing on the one hand and an investigation of that which engages in actual knowing on the other—

indeed when it becomes natural to have such a distinction as a determination of all the problems. Hegel talked about this topic on many occasions going back to his earliest writings. It is an assumption which he has frequently treated in connection with the epistemological presumption of modern philosophy exhibited most clearly in Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. This mental set, this presumption that one can draw a distinction between real knowing and transcendental knowing, that is, a knowing which investigates the principles which are involved in real knowing, is probably the most fundamental topic in the PhG.

We have been referring to the first sentence of the "Introduction" to the PhG (the "Preface" was written after the whole text was completed). Thus, *Vorstellung* is a notion in terms of which this distinction of the opposition of consciousness is to be understood, that is, the opposition which takes place in any case of actual knowing is not what is at stake here. That there is a distinction between awareness and that of which there is awareness in any given act of knowing undertaken by any single individual is simply not at all what is in question here. This can be seen by anyone who studies Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit where it is indeed in such terms that he gives an account of a great deal of what passes under the heading of knowing. What is at stake here, however, is that it is possible to separate this form of actual knowing within which there is indeed an opposition of consciousness (no question about that) and another mode of knowing in terms of which the principles in question in actual knowing can be investigated. One can also talk about these principles in terms of the opposition of consciousness and that is what is in question in the PhG. Maybe the distinction is elusive.

The question is whether it is possible to do philosophy without engaging in a mode of activity which presupposes this very natural *Vorstellung*. Hegel's answer to this question seems to be no. He seems to be saying that once the logic of this very natural representation or mental determination, in terms of which one can draw a distinction between real knowing and the principles in terms of which real knowing takes place, is worked out there is no possibility of philosophy. There is either common sense discourse or the positive sciences. What distinguishes philosophy from what goes on in common sense discourse or the discourse concerning positive sciences is that these, as our reading from the *Science of Logic* showed, have no problem of beginning. That is to say, they take as their determination either the accepted standard of discourse (taken as simply there) or, in the case of the natural sciences, there is a kind of in-itself which is to be investigated and characterized in various ways only insofar as the kind of investigation undertaken is *not* philosophical. What is the difference between these and philosophical investigations? Simply put, it is the progression of the law of determinations in the latter [the "uniformity in the development of the determinations," p. 5]. This really raises to a fundamental level the question of validity. Now, what Hegel is suggesting here is that these questions of validity naturally tend to be posed in terms of the same framework that we presuppose in our commonsensical discourse or in the natural and positive sciences, that is, we carry over the same structure (the opposition of consciousness)—legitimate in the case of common sense and natural or positive science—into the domain which concerns itself with ultimate principles of validation. This is to engage in a systematically misleading mode of discourse and it is the function of the first paragraph of the text to show how contradictory this is.

What comes to be the major theme here is the impossibility of talking about the fundamental principles of truth in terms of the framework adopted from common sense and positive scientific discourse. This inquiry concerning the principles of validity itself might not become the subject matter of an inquiry. Hegel then goes on to ask himself whether to do that would be to engage in another case of transcendental inquiry, that is, an inquiry into that structure in terms of which real or actual knowing takes place. His answer is no because in the case of a transcendental inquiry (or that preliminary inquiry which is supposed to provide the principles of legitimacy for actual knowing), there is a necessary contradiction on the part of the inquirer. That is to say, as a substitution instance of the shape or concept of consciousness involved, what could be known in every case would be regarded as the thing-in-itself, however many detours one takes in order to get to it. And there could be no possibility, he argues, of talking about the developmental structure of self-determination on the part of the thing-in-itself insofar as the thing-in-itself *qua* opposition of consciousness purports that it has to be regarded just as in any transcendental inquiry. What differentiates the inquiry that Hegel is proposing here, namely, the treating of science as a phenomenon or something that appears, is that it has as its subject matter a self-determining structure which is susceptible of being treated independently of any input on the part of those who are considering it. That then is the strategy in abstract form.

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Lecture IV: October 15, 1974

All the moves that are examined provisionally in the “Introduction” seem to be dodges of one sort or another which are ultimately unacceptable. However, simply to reject the problem straight away is also regarded as a dodge and is unacceptable. That is what leads us back to considering the natural representation (consciousness) in terms of which the distinction is drawn between knowing in its straightforward sense, on the one hand, and that type of knowing which will provide the principles of legitimacy for knowing in the first instance, on the other. This problem is familiar to us through the section of the *Logic* called “With What Must the Science Begin?” where it is observed that the special sciences have no difficulty in this regard. Nor indeed does geometry have any particular difficulty in this regard. Let us say, the problem is solved axiomatically; it is solved by setting forth postulates. Here, however, the natural *Vorstellung* (or the natural content in the mind of the philosopher) is that one can draw a distinction between a way of knowing which could be called actual knowing, that is, the sort of knowing which takes place either in common sense experience or in the special sciences, and a knowing of the structures—independent of any given experience—in terms of which actual knowing may be adjudicated as valid or invalid. According to the observation of the first paragraph, that is the distinction which has come to be regarded as natural. Once that distinction is drawn, then all the other solutions which are worked out in the course of the next paragraph are variations upon it, even if one rejects the notion (or the *Vorstellung* or the representation) of that kind of distinction. It is suggested that such a rejection remains within the framework of discussion which is defined by the natural *Vorstellung* itself and that is why an explicit denial of such preliminary investigations will not do insofar as the question remains, namely, the question not of knowing this, that, or the other object, but the question of knowing in general, or insofar as the question retains the kind of generality that the epistemological inquiry has. Therefore, insofar as the general question of truth is raised, it seems that one is damned to draw the distinction between actual knowing, that is, an empirical or particular mode of knowing which is instantiated in given experiences, and a type of knowing in terms of which the principles are at stake.

Now, from the very beginning it is said that this concern seems to be justified. It is of course clear that there are various modes of knowing. It is also clear that in the sphere of empirical knowing some are more adequate than others: some people are better at carrying out the work of the special sciences and some are better at working out solutions to the commonsensical problems of everyday life. Isn't it plausible, therefore, that there might be better and worse ways of carrying out this preliminary investigation which concerns itself not with this, that, or the other kind of specialized knowing, but with knowing in general? That seems to be very plausible once the distinction has been drawn between actual knowing and this preliminary investigation of the structures of knowing in terms of which any given case of knowing can be adjudicated as to its adequacy.

“It is a natural assumption that in philosophy. . . .” Hegel here is clearly only talking about philosophy; he is referring to a problem which is peculiar to philosophy. If philosophy has anything to do, then clearly it has to investigate not actual cases of knowing but the principles which are involved in actual knowing. It involves the consideration of a determinate character of knowing in general (or whether knowing in general has any determinate character). So perhaps in the long run it

could be shown how the structure of any actual knowing is to conform to the structure of knowing in general, which, once solved, could provide a touchstone for the truth, not for the truth under hypothesis but for the truth as such. What is suggested by Hegel then is that this is an assumption, a *Vorstellung*, a representation, a way of thinking which is natural to philosophy. It is, so to speak, second nature to philosophy; it is that which gives philosophy its business. Yet it is easy to see—and Hegel was not the first one to point it out, although he did so much more resolutely than others—that this attempt to show how knowing in general takes place entails that what is known is the knowable in general. Now, the knowable in general is perhaps not as horrible as Hegel's expression in the text, namely, the "absolute." But insofar as one is examining knowing in general, clearly that knowing has to be examined with respect to that which is to be known, although not with respect to any specific knowable object, content, or science, but knowable in general without any further specification. And it is that which gives rise to the problem. We don't have any problem with this way of approaching the issue regarding our knowledge of tables and chairs. What is the matter of concern here is how that which is in general knowable can be shown to enter into a mode of knowing without any further qualification such that the knowable in general has to be talked about as otherwise indeterminate. What is talked about here as the determinate is explicitly the one side of this opposition, namely, the mode of knowing. It is assumed that it has a specific limit, a specific determination.

According to Hegel, there are two basic ways of conceiving this knowing: (1) in terms of *receiving* the determinations of the otherwise indeterminate, or (2) in terms of some type of *activity* on the part of the knowing subject conceived of as the knower in general. Without going into the history of philosophy, it is perfectly clear that there are tendencies of this sort which have been exhibited, particularly in modern philosophy. There is no need of going into history because the point at issue here is very simple. The most sophisticated formulation of these tendencies is made by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; that is, if we are to consider the structure of knowing in general, we seem to be restricted to talking about either (1) the *receptive* aspect, sometimes called the *intuitive* aspect (in which case intuition is a medium, structure, or form of receptivity), or (2) forms of shaping and *activity*, sometimes referred to as *concepts*. Once again, the details are not important. Basically there are two ways of conceiving the knower of that which is in general knowable, and in the course of the first paragraph it is stated very clearly that either way is bound to disrupt what we first attempted to outline the determination of, namely, the structure of knowing in general. For to take either the receptive or the spontaneous model of the knower is to introduce the source of determination on the side of the knower attempting to know what is *ex hypothesi* indeterminate, such that the structures assumed are the structures which will be introduced into that which is to be known, namely, the absolute or the knowable in general. Once the problem is seen to have that kind of generality, there is a perfectly immediate conclusion to draw. Nevertheless, we always do make a distinction between true and untrue forms of knowing and insofar as philosophy has a business at all it does seem to be that of investigating the true forms of knowing as knowing in general.

So what is to be done? Well, before we go on to talk about the content of the second paragraph where one of the ways of getting around this (what could be called the positivist way) is introduced, we have to always remember that the natural assumption is at work in all of the opening paragraphs

of the "Introduction." The natural assumption, again, is that we can draw a distinction between the philosophical knowing which concerns itself with the general principle of determination and the mode of knowing which concerns itself with special objects (the concrete subject). It is clear that one could not have any *science*, in the sense that philosophers have a science, of knowing on the part of the concrete subject. To begin with, one cannot have a science of the highly complex organization that the individual knower is constituted by. That would fall under the general rubric of psychology or anthropology. What is the significance of that expression? What it involves, roughly, is this: taking the principles of explaining particular knowing from a science which involves particular knowing and hence, arguing in a circle. In this case, taking the principles from the particular science of psychology, which is obviously a particular science, and putting them at another level of discourse, namely, on a philosophical explanatory level, where they then become the science of explaining in general all specific modes of knowing. The circularity, however, is patent because psychology is one of the specific modes of knowing. That is why philosophy has driven again and again to a formulation in terms of far greater generality. So if philosophy still has a function and does not simply turn over its task to the psychologist and anthropologist, etc. (which has been advocated by many as Habermas has shown very nicely), particularly in the aftermath of this argument from the "Introduction," then it seems that it can only retain itself insofar as it appeals to the rational assumption of a distinction between actual knowing and transcendental knowing. That is the question. In the subsequent paragraphs we have to remind ourselves that this natural assumption cannot be got rid of simply by seeing that it leads to paradox—as it is adequately shown in the first paragraph—because most of the ways of getting rid of it will involve tacitly presupposing it.

Now, there is a section which we ought to comment on very briefly here. I mention it because it is a sentence which is stressed by the most penetrating of all the readers of this "Introduction," namely, Martin Heidegger, in his *Hegel's Concept of Experience*.

Or, were the absolute only to be brought a bit *closer* to us by an instrument, perhaps as a bird is trapped by a lime twig, without being changed at all, it would surely laugh at this ruse if it were not, in and for itself, already close to us of its own accord. For in this case knowledge itself would be a ruse, pretending through its multifarious effort to do something other than merely bring forth a relation which is immediate and thus effortless.

What Heidegger suggests is that it would be an appropriate proviso for this being ... [viz., if we let it be, being will be because it wills to be present]; that this really gives the truth or the lie of the PhG as a whole, namely, that there is an assumption on Hegel's part that the absolute (the knowable in general) wills to be present. Therefore, this knowable in general, which Heidegger tends to mistakenly call by the term 'being,' is one of the last, albeit highly rarefied, variations of the classical paradigm, namely, the interpretation of being as will. As such, the solution of the PhG—what absolute knowing is going to be at the end—will be to try to let being be so to speak. However, given Hegel's conception of being in the PhG, this cannot possibly happen. But because being is here, as in the entire history of metaphysics [according to Heidegger], conceived of as will, one might say that Hegel comes closest of all the participants in the history of being (= the history of metaphysics), to see what would be necessary if there were to be some escape from the problem of illicitly transforming the indefinite

concept of being into something definite. So despite Hegel's explicit intention there remains this presumptive identification of being with something definite conceived of as will. As a result, according to Heidegger, Hegel has simply done with greater sophistication what others have done less sophisticatedly.

I mentioned this section because this way of reading the PhG, and particularly this way of seeing the failure of the PhG, is one of the most sophisticated in the twentieth century. It is explicitly contingent upon this sentence from the "Introduction"; without it the entire Heideggerian interpretation has no textual basis whatsoever. The metaphor of the bird here is very important. The bird is being tricked. That is an empirical example. Now, I suppose we could say that just as a bird might very well want to be with us, it might want to be with us independently of the fact that we put down the lime twig. So we are really making no contribution because the bird is doing what it wanted to do all along. And it could well be that this deeper form of knowing on the part of some type of perspectival consciousness is very drastically stated. We could say that just as the bird wants to be with us, although we are making a non-contribution by bringing it to us, so too this distinctively philosophical level of knowing could be conceived of as a kind of model of what wants to be with us anyway, such that what we are doing is commensurate with what it (the absolute) would do on its own accord. That is certainly plausible. But notice that this entire plausibility would have to depend upon making a preliminary determination of that which is to be regarded as the knowable in general, namely, that which 'wants to be with us anyway.' If that were the assumption, then clearly Heidegger is right because, in terms of everything considered in the previous pages, we cannot make any preliminary determination of what the absolute is with respect to the characterization of that level of knowing which is to serve as the legitimation of the special level of knowing. To make the assumption that we can somehow "bring a bit *closer* to us" that which is "already close to us of its own accord," such that our contribution is no contribution, would be to engage in metaphysical thinking in the pejorative sense which Heidegger attached to it.

So this Heideggerian suggestion is worth thinking about precisely because it states a possible way for this entire project to go astray right from the beginning, namely, in terms of a very elusive, so to speak, predetermination concerning the structure of knowing in general. This predetermination would not pertain to knowing in general specifically, but rather to the knowable in general which is predetermined by legitimational knowing (or transcendental knowing or *a priori* knowing or whatever you want to call it). Such knowing is not supposed to make any particular statement about what is in-itself. Heidegger's interpretation is contingent upon the possibility that Hegel is assuming that the knowable in general (although Hegel himself does not make any specific determination of it) has, so to speak, a volitional character, the character of willing, indeed, the character of willing to be with us.

The question now is whether we have a complete enumeration of the basic ways in which knowing in general can be conceived, that is, in terms of the receptivity/passivity or the spontaneity/activity of the knowing subject, or, perhaps what is sought is a third way, a kind of active passivity or passive activity. Clearly, what the subsequent paragraphs indicate is that the *Vorstellung* cannot be simply cast aside or rejected. Every casting aside of it, once again, amounts to drawing a distinction between real knowledge and apparent knowledge, and to draw that distinction (indicating

that one can talk about it) is to draw a distinction between the knowledge to be investigated and the knowledge in terms of which the knowledge to be investigated is investigated. I think we can be sure that the tendency to draw this distinction remains whether or not the enumeration of the notion of knowing as an instrument or as a medium is exhausted at that level of discourse. Just as all philosophers who have thought in terms of that distinction have also drawn a distinction between what could be called the scientific way of knowing and the knowing in terms of which the scientific way of knowing is to provide the principles, so too with Hegel who sees no other way for there to be an investigation of the truth of knowing despite the fact that, at least in this preliminary sketch, there seems to be no possible solution to the problem with that degree of generality.

It is on the basis of such considerations that Hegel proposes in § 76 to consider the investigation of the justificational kind of knowing as itself an appearance, a phenomenon. We have seen that the *Vorstellung* involved in the distinction between apparent knowing and knowing in general and the basic structural consideration of the problem of knowing in general parallel. So he proposes as a kind of third knowing the quest for principles (knowing in general). Now, the obvious question is how it can escape from the paradoxes that devolved from the *Vorstellung*, such as drawing a distinction between specific knowing and knowing in general. We then see that knowing in general always involves a distinction between the knower in general and the known in general; it can also be seen that the known in general cannot be characterized as being known in the way which is isomorphically the way in which knower and known correspond to one another in the case of apparent knowing. So there is this tendency to draw a distinction between knowing in general (scientific knowing) which validates or justifies and merely apparent knowing. But since knowing in general is never able to get to the point of self-validation, why don't we consider it as apparent knowing? All of this is done without calling the natural assumption into question. What has emerged from this kind of consideration which would make the investigation of knowing in general (philosophical knowing) as a phenomenon a viable enterprise, when we have already seen that any attempt to draw a distinction between knowing in general and apparent knowing, such that we can legitimate apparent knowing, itself cannot be shown to be a viable enterprise? What is the novelty introduced when we consider the quest for epistemic principles as itself that which appears? What is introduced here such that the paradox of the natural *Vorstellung* is overcome? That is the question, I think, which is posed by the opening paragraphs of the "Introduction." But before we try to answer it, we have to be clear about what that question is. It is a very elusive question.

Berman: In the distinction you made between apparent knowing and knowing in general, does the reference to apparent knowing refer to very specific sciences?

Dove: Yes, that is right. That is, before you get down to actual knowing (you can call it apparent knowing if you like), you want to take that as a candidate for truth. How are you going to investigate actual knowing in terms of the principles of knowing in general? That is the *Vorstellung* which is natural to the philosopher because that is the kind of question which philosophers ask. As I said, if all that were at stake were simply actual knowing, then we could go about actual knowing and not ask justificational questions. But here in philosophy, as Hegel said right in the beginning, before we take up the real subject matter, we have to engage in this preliminary investigation. That is because what is

being considered here is validity in general and insofar as one is concerned with validity in general, one cannot make any hypothesis of predeterminations which will not take the form of being a mere hypothesis.

Question: Is there any identification between the natural *Vorstellung* and natural consciousness?

Dove: It seems that the natural consciousness which is being investigated is the consciousness whose naturalness is characterized by this natural *Vorstellung*. Sometimes Baillie renders 'natural' consciousness as 'naive' consciousness, but if we take 'natural' in the sense which is suggested by the initial sentence of the text, then what is meant is a kind of *second nature* in philosophy to draw this distinction, that is, the consciousness which is being investigated in the PhG draws that distinction, it has the image or the *Vorstellung* of that distinction. If the consciousness in question were simply a naive consciousness or were just in the business of doing nuclear physics or molecular biology, it would not be a natural consciousness in the sense being discussed here. So my suggestion is that yes, in both cases there is a kind of coincidence in the usage of 'natural.'

Comment: One thing that I think characterizes this natural consciousness as far as its naivety is concerned is that it takes its present standpoint as somehow final, somehow conclusive.

Dove: The natural consciousness which is talked about in the "Introduction" and in the sequel tends rather not to be that. That is to say, it takes its standpoint of knowing as being problematical and seeks out the principles in terms of which knowing from any given standpoint can be adjudicated (the expression for that is denying that natural consciousness has knowledge which is taken to be for-it, for-consciousness). But it is natural to this consciousness (which is natural because of having the natural *Vorstellung* of making the epistemic distinction between two epistemic modes: the particular and the legitimational) to distinguish between (a) any knowing it has *qua* knowing from this particular perspective or in terms of some kind of for-it relationship and (b) some sort of structure in terms of which that which is known is what it is in-itself (the *an sich*). If it is natural consciousness then it must have some sense of drawing a distinction between apparent knowing and the structure of knowing in general. It must also make some kind of assumption with respect to the determinations of both, most notably, in terms of what is in-itself so to speak (which would then be its justificational principle or its criterion). To view natural consciousness in light of this natural assumption is crucial because it is only in those terms that the distinction between the in-itself and the for-itself on the part of the subject matter of the PhG can be drawn and in terms of which the problematic of investigating the quest for the validational principles of knowing (knowing in general) may itself be regarded as a phenomenon without necessarily reduplicating on a higher level the paradoxes of the original natural *Vorstellung*.

Question: Would you apply this distinction to the chapter on Understanding?

Dove: In any case, including Ch. III on Understanding, what one would be led to expect on the basis of the considerations made in the "Introduction" is that natural consciousness, as it is shaped up to that point, would draw a distinction between actual knowing and knowing in general. The chapter on Understanding, then, should not be understood in terms of the principles outlined in—and peculiar to—the "Introduction"; it should be another example of the attempt to work out the

solution within the framework laid down by the natural *Vorstellung*. As we said, it is perfectly clear that this natural *Vorstellung* does involve what is regarded as the general problem of the PhG, namely, the opposition of consciousness. Both apparent knowing and true knowing involve a kind of opposition: in apparent knowing the *ich* is related to what is regarded as *für es*, whereas in knowing in general the opposition would be between the *ich* and the *an sich*. Once one has the structure of the *ich* and the *an sich*, one can then show how the various examples of knowing which are, so to speak, candidates of the truth, conform to that mode of knowing which is indeed knowing truth, that is, the knowing of truth is the knowing of the *an sich*. In the opening paragraphs we have seen that any way of directly showing that the *ich* knows the *an sich* tends to fall into the problematic of the *ich* vis-à-vis the *für es* because for the *an sich* to stand in an oppositional relation to the *ich*, it has *to be* either with respect to the medium in which it is related to the *ich* (in some type of perspectival position over against it), or it has to be regarded in terms of the determinacy of some kind of activity by which knowing takes place. But the preliminary statement showed how that particular assumption, when treated directly, leads immediately to parallel. So one takes a more secure route.

The investigation of epistemic knowing in the PhG is the investigation of consciousness, which itself draws this distinction between the *für es* and the *an sich* because it is engaged in the philosophical enterprise. The question then is how viewing as appearance the kind of knowing which involves this kind of distinction itself can be, if not Scientific, at least scientific. This is basically the problem of the PhG. In other words, what is the sense of a phenomenology of the mode of knowing which itself is concerned about the *ich/an sich* and the *ich/für es* opposition? Clearly, insofar as the subject of such knowing is aware of both, it is a philosophical subject. The drawing of the distinction between the two types of knowing is the natural *Vorstellung*. It gives expression to that. Now, if it gives expression to the two modes of opposition of consciousness (*ich/an sich* and *ich/für es*), how is it that a consideration of that mode of expression can proceed without any, so to speak, external reflection concerning the nature of what is under investigation? For clearly, in the case of the immediate natural *Vorstellung*, it is impossible to make any statement about the *an sich* and that is the whole point of the opening paragraph. To say anything about it such as it is known via medium or through some kind of spontaneous activity on the part of the *ich* is an illegitimate characterization of it. But is there some way in which one can regard the philosophical activity of legitimating or providing structures for legitimational knowing as itself a phenomenon? Is that conceivable? I think it is the making plausible of such a project which is the major objective of the "Introduction."

Berman: Since the PhG is taken to be a consideration of the way in which the knowing of the knower appears, while the natural assumption has as one of its aspects the project of examining knowing, can we say that in some sense the PhG itself takes up the natural assumption?

Dove: Well it certainly does ask whether a consideration of knowing as a phenomenon would *eo ipso* succumb to the same paradoxes which are immediately elicited from the consideration of the investigation of epistemic validity within the natural *Vorstellung*. That is the question which is the major topic of § 81 to the end. The problem is: granted that we cannot simply reject the natural *Vorstellung*, as the argument of §§ 73 – 80 has shown, how is it that we can consider it without *eo ipso* having our

mode of considering it fall into the same paradox which, as we have seen, the natural *Vorstellung* immediately generates?

The first eight paragraphs concern themselves largely with the impossibility of simply getting rid of the natural *Vorstellung*. In the twentieth century, for example, one repeatedly finds that everybody is anti-Cartesian. And by being anti-Cartesian philosophers have largely come to be against the basic project which Hegel talks about as the problem deriving from the natural *Vorstellung*. The question then is whether these rejections don't also involve a tacit or surreptitious repositing of the natural *Vorstellung*. The paradox which is involved in the opening paragraphs and restated repeatedly is easily grasped and in a certain sense it was set forth long ago by Heraclitus, Sextus Empiricus, St. Augustine, etc. But Hegel formulates the problem very abstractly and I think more and more philosophers have come to recognize (for example, those who regard philosophy as the handmaiden of the sciences) that they are simply taking over a pre-given *an sich* as a source of ultimate legitimating principles. That is legitimate insofar as what you are doing is philosophy. Or one could take over the basic structure of ordinary language which derives from the long period of the collective *wissen*. One can then maintain that investigating ordinary language is something which cannot be done reflectively and therefore one could simply use that as the basis for making statements—something done not so much by Wittgenstein himself but by some of his followers who take ordinary language as a principle for engaging in transcendental arguments. Strawson does a great deal of that. Of course, one has to be very cautious. What it comes down to is that ordinary language has a validational role to play; that is, an *an sich* is surreptitiously presupposed.

Thus, Hegel is trying to show in the "Introduction" that no straight away rejection or abstract elimination of the natural *Vorstellung*, however specious it shows itself to be when its most elementary abstract structures are examined, will do because it always keeps coming back. Assuming that this is true, the question is then raised how an investigation could be undertaken which does not reject the natural *Vorstellung* and which, at the same time, does not succumb to the paradoxes which are so readily seen to be entailed by it. We will discuss this problem next time.

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Lecture V: October 22, 1974

Let us say by way of anticipation (in terms of the discussion of § 86) that there is in every instance of knowing objects (from the very first discussion of any object *qua* object of knowledge), formulated in terms of the philosophical generality of knowing an object in general, an implicit conception that there are indeed two objects, namely, the one *qua* object in-itself and the other *qua* object for-consciousness. That is the peculiarity of this kind of knowing which will always involve a two-fold character. Hegel goes on to talk about the degree or type of determinacy which pertains to each object and then to see whether that type of determinacy, by the very nature of the general examination of the structure of knowing, entails (§ 81 ff.) a kind of dialectic.

Question: Is the PhG an attempt to overcome the paradox which Plato talks about in the *Meno*: how do we inquire into an object if we don't know what it is?

Dove: I would regard Plato's paradox rather as a species of the genus; the genus being the paradox in general, that is, knowledge being faced with two objects one of which will fulfill some kind of criteriological function vis-à-vis the other. Clearly, the *Meno* was one of the major attempts to solve the paradox, although Plato's solution postulates the in-itself character of the object known.

Question about Nashban's paper: How could 'we' learn something, albeit by observation, without claiming knowledge and truth? Even the very fact that 'we' know that consciousness is going to err seems to be a claim to knowledge and truth.

Nashban: It is true that 'we' claim to have knowledge of the paradox, but this claim is insightful enough to know that it cannot be its own ground, which is to say, it is not a claim. What this insightfulness entails is an educated ignorance. It knows that it does not know and at the same time wants to know and will allow that which appears as knowledge to examine itself.

Maker: But that seems to be what Hegel calls cognition as medium as opposed to cognition as instrument—the medium that just lets it appear and does not touch it at all. If you characterize it that way, then we seem to be back to the paradox.

Berman: There is a difference. One reason why it should not be understood that way is that 'we' are not allowing the in-itself to be but rather the relation to oneself of an already determinate phenomenon. That seems to be the whole difference. What is involved here is not our claiming to know the in-itself while at the same time disclaiming any determination on our part; rather it seems that what is involved is an already determinate phenomenon.

Dove: Could you explicate that "already determinate phenomenon"? What is it?

Berman: It seems that what is already determinate is the very structure of knowing itself.

Dove: For whom is it an already determinate phenomenon?

Berman: Our position as phenomenologists is mediated by a certain givenness, namely, the structure of knowing. Because phenomenology is by definition a positive science, which is to say, it has a givenness, it is not necessary to give an account of the source of that givenness (it does not really

matter where it came from). As far as the argument goes, it is simply given and I don't think it is necessary to give an account of its coming into being in order to do phenomenology. We don't have to do a preliminary investigation of knowing the way we did with cognition where such an investigation attempted to prove that cognition must indeed know truly.

Dove: In other words, that task would have a presupposition with an indeterminate character unlike the subject matter we are investigating. In the PhG we have a phenomenon which is already determinate. This then is what distinguishes the phenomenological investigation from what could be called the epistemological investigation: the latter takes its object as in some sense utterly determinable yet indeterminate, to be determined yet not to be determined strictly through an investigation of the determinations which are imposed upon the determinable by the mode of knowing, whether that be taken in the active sense (instrumentality) or in the rather more passive sense, as a medium through which the determinable makes itself something to be determined. For in both cases we have seen very clearly that setting up the question in terms of the utterly determinable entails that the determinable is *not* utterly determinable but, through the way in which the determinable comes to be known, predetermined.

Now, the question which was legitimately raised by Maker depends upon seeing the phenomenological enterprise as a variation of the epistemological enterprise. And this would be the case if it were, as the epistemological enterprise purports to be, presuppositionless, that is, without any prior determination. However, the phenomenological enterprise does not purport to be presuppositionless. It does have a presupposition which is stated very clearly in the "Introduction" and also in "With What Must the Science Begin?" So the paradoxes that Nashban has been reviewing concerning epistemology pertain to its implicit claim (it is not always explicit) to presuppositionlessness, which claim turns out to be (in terms of the structure of the epistemological enterprise) always self-vitiating. So if the phenomenological enterprise as sketched by Hegel (in § 81 ff.) were to be a presuppositionless enterprise, it would indeed succumb to the self-referential paradoxes that we talked about before. It might very well be that Hegel succumbed to some such difficulties in any case. But one of the things that the "Introduction" does is call our attention to the specific character of the object under investigation in the phenomenological enterprise, such that the claim to the utterly determinable yet indeterminate character of what is to be known is not made. We know that Hegel does indeed attempt to undertake a presuppositionless science. But what is *here* being observed is the paradoxical nature of undertaking an epistemological enterprise which, by the very nature of its claims, presupposes that it is establishing from the beginning determinacies in terms of which objects are to be known. That is to say, it purports to be a science of the sort that the *Science of Logic* purports to be. In addition to that, it also purports to develop the determinations in terms of a presupposed generic structure of opposition (the natural *Vorstellung*) according to which all specific structures of opposition can be adjudicated.

The first eight paragraphs (§§ 73–80) are variations upon the theme that the epistemological enterprise is systematically self-refuting, that it involves a self-referential paradox. Now, if we can come to the point of lowering the case of the S[cience], so to speak, of treating knowing as a phenomenon with a predetermined character and not regarding it from the outset as something to be

fully determined, this would enable us to see the PhG as something more akin to a special science than epistemology which makes the claim to be something like a general science (really, a presuppositionless science).

How is it possible to come to learn anything if our coming to learn is not done in accordance with principles which themselves are established independently of our coming to learn? Which is to say, how can we come to know something legitimately unless we learn in terms of principles which are independent of experience (*a priori*), universal and necessary? Nothing which begins with a limitation to the structure of opposition between knowing and the object [can come to learn or know something legitimately]. That is the minimal determination to be sure, nevertheless a determination. In coming to know, in learning about it, in considering it, ... and if this consideration is such that its own development can be understood as deriving from the original structure of that which is considered in the first place, then the knowing that we may be said in some sense to attain to is not a knowing that is legitimated by reference to characteristics of ourselves as knowers or characteristics of our relationship to the known, but is self-generated by the object known.

The same is not susceptible of being said in the case of an epistemological enterprise because there the object is treated in such generality as an object for a knower who is simultaneously the epistemologist. That is to say, the epistemologist views himself as the substitution instance of the mode of knowing under examination. This is most visibly (because of the articulateness of thought) and also most notoriously the case in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* where it is patently the case that the relationship between the knower and the known comes to be constitutive of what it is that is legitimately known in the case of that very sophisticated epistemology. Of course, it would be possible to consider a rather unsophisticated epistemology in which, for example, the known is taken to be determinate and the knowing would simply be a reading off of the determinacy of the knowable. But insofar as it takes place in the epistemological enterprise, that would entail all of the notorious problems of postulating, in a theory of knowing, a thing-in-itself, namely, something with determinacy which, independently of any knowing, is said nevertheless to be known. Thereby, a system is set up for reading off the determinacy of that which is antecedently postulated as the knowable, which is self-contradictory precisely because the preliminary examination of the structure of knowing purports to make no presupposition with respect to that which is to be known. But to proceed in such a fashion, namely, with a thing-in-itself *qua* determinate, is to make an antecedent presupposition which systematically inhibits the epistemological enterprise from ever legitimating the presupposition of legitimacy attached to the object to be known. That is the problem with respect to the epistemological attempt to begin, so to speak, with something determinate.

The object with which the PhG begins (the topic of § 80ff.) is never taken to be indeterminate. It is a determinate object and is accepted as such from the very beginning; it has a minimal determinacy, but a determinacy nevertheless. Our major task is to see the difference between (a) the epistemological enterprise which has to regard the knowable as, prior to any empirical act of knowing, utterly indeterminate and (b) the, so to speak, transcendental inquiry in which the object to be known is knowable without making any determinacy claim for it. In various ways that is what the "Introduction" has tried to show to be systematically contradictory. Of course, it is plausible to

attempt the undertaking because: you know, I know, Hegel knows that we all know. Sure, we all know. So we are interested in hunting for those conditions necessary for the possibility of our knowing truly. That is to say, it is not a question of facts (*quid facti*), but a question of the legitimacy (*quid juris*) of what we know. But insofar as the investigation is epistemological, the juridical question requires (a) some principle of determinacy and (b) rules out the possibility of postulating any determinacy, and therefore the epistemological investigation is caught in a systematic dilemma from the beginning. So there is plausibility in this project. No question about that. We all know that we know. We talk to each other, we share knowledge with one another, and we make truth claims. All these are perfectly fine and run into no difficulty. We can generally resolve all our problems insofar as we deal with subject matters which are from the very beginning given out as predetermined. We can carry on discussions about nitrogen, constitutions, or anything else in which the topic is from the beginning determinate. But epistemology as practiced in philosophy throughout generations does not concern itself with a topic of that sort. Notoriously, it concerns itself with the knowable in general (not with water, nitrogen, or anything specific), with something to be determined whose determinations have to be shown—somehow or other—to derive from something which, since Kant, is referred to as *a priori*, something independent of experience.

Now, insofar as we are going to treat the PhG as Hegel sets it down, we have to see that it is akin to the epistemological enterprise and yet it takes as its subject matter a determinate object: consciousness questing to determine for itself the principles in terms of which it can have legitimate knowledge, in which *de facto* knowledge can be shown to be *de jure* valid and legitimate. That is to have a peculiar object no doubt, but nevertheless a determinate object, not the object that the epistemologist is dealing with. It is, if you will, the grasping of the difference between the two which, I think, is the major objective of the “Introduction” to the PhG.

It seems to me that the difficulty of understanding the argument of the “Introduction” is that one tacitly presupposes that the PhG is another variation of epistemology. What we have to see is what a number of epistemologists could not see clearly enough, namely, that epistemology does purport to be presuppositionless. Of course, a few epistemologists have said this explicitly, among them Kant and Husserl. Kant formulates the language in terms of which this notion of determinations independent of experience can be at least talked about. We do not find this in Locke, for example, who proceeds more naively. But once one sees that this enterprise concerns not knowing this, that, or the other particular kind of object but knowing objects in general, that is, when the question is raised about knowing objects in general, the question of presuppositionlessness rears its ugly head. The PhG purports to concern itself with a very determinate object (knowing consciousness) and therefore distinguishes itself from the epistemological inquiry. Although it is true that the knowing consciousness which the PhG takes as its subject matter or object does indeed purport to engage in knowing in general. But to purport to engage in knowing in general is to purport to be something which has a determinate character, and therefore the investigation which purports to consider an object of that sort has something (at least *prima facie*) akin to epistemology, in the sense that it concerns itself with epistemological knowing. But unlike epistemological knowing, it does not purport to know objects in general.

Question: But isn't it radically different from what we ordinarily call "knowing determinate objects" such as in chemistry, etc.?

Dove: Sure. They all proceed in terms of methods which derive from the nature of the subject matter. Likewise, Hegel maintains there is—granting, presupposing, or simply positing the nature of this subject matter—a method appropriate to the consideration of that subject matter. One would not purport, for example, to deal with nitrogen using the same method one takes up for dealing with constitutions.

There is a question of whether the contribution by us is of the sort that determines the new object as, for example, the object comes to be determined in a rationalistic kind of epistemology by virtue of certain patterns of determinacy which are presupposed as innate to the knower along the lines of the Platonic paradox of learning. There we did have the basic problem in one of its possible formulations: how is it possible to come to a knowledge of anything which is, by definition, not yet known, without having some principles, on the part of the knower, in terms of which that which is known could at least be distinguished from all the other things that one might know? If that is the case, then these principles must be something like pre-existing forms or recognition patterns such that what is to be known is susceptible of being recognized in the determinacy that it has. But if that is the case, then (as Socrates and Meno observed) either knowing is redundant, that is, the attempt by the recognition pattern is the pre-condition for the possibility of knowing of an otherwise not yet determined knowledge, or learning is impossible, that is, the attempt by the recognition pattern is not present, in which case there is no possibility of acquiring it. The answer, as we know (which is not an answer at all but an appeal to myth), is that there are degrees or levels of knowing. According to the Orphic doctrine of the transmigration of the soul and the fact that there is a domain within which the knower acquires the basic principles which is separate from the domain in which we are here considering the learning process, such recognition patterns would be acquired in the other domain and then used in this one. But this does not really answer the question because the question which pertains to the domain in which knowledge is originally made problematic is not bracketed out by appeal to some other domain in which some other kind of knowing takes place, some quasi-mystical domain. The structure of the question remains the same on that level, namely, how is it that strolling in the realm of ideas is a mode of being, a mode of object? The problem is precisely parallel and could then be raised at another level. Of course, in the *Meno* this question has not become [aporetic] because an answer is given to satisfy Meno in order to continue the inquiry. As Socrates says, it is the inquiry itself which is the most important. Having given this answer—which is a sophism of the highest order—the dialogue continues.

This question comes up later in Aristotle and he squarely faces up to it. In the opening section of the *Posterior Analytics* he states it very clearly and he also has a very clear answer: to talk about a knowing that has no predetermination is nonsense. There is always a predetermined knowing. So the question of validating knowing (the problematic of knowing) will always involve validating a present knowing in terms of some antecedent knowing, which is, of course, a very clever and workable answer. Nevertheless, this way of answering the question does not, as the subsequent history of philosophy has shown, answer the question of the ultimate principles in terms of which the opposition in general

can be known. What Aristotle focuses upon is always a specific object and in that sense the Aristotelian mode of knowing does not generate the paradox of knowing because all knowing is special knowing, all science is in some respect special science. It is only in the very remote recesses of the Aristotelian corpus that one tends to reencounter this problem: Bk. III, Ch. 5 of *De Anima*, where Aristotle attempts to focus in the most abstract way on the distinction between the active and the passive aspect of the intellect. When he comes to talking about pure activity or pure form he is confronted with a dilemma from which he hastily retreats, but which would have generated the paradox (for centuries the passage was discussed a great deal and, as students of Medieval Philosophy know, it did indeed generate the paradox). As it is shown in the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle knew very well not to raise such questions. In the face of that fact, it must be said that Aristotle was sensitive to the impossibility of the epistemological problematic in much the same way Hegel was. In his various writings he simply tends to approximate to it. Now, this remarkable restraint tended to be lost in the course of the subsequent history of philosophy where the juridical question comes up again and again in various forms.

So the structure of the problem is very familiar; its very familiarity is something that Hegel clearly presupposes in the PhG. In addition to its familiarity, he also presupposes that we come to the point of being able to grasp not the rich determinacy of consciousness knowing the object, but the minimal determinacy of the structural problem of consciousness knowing. It is precisely with that minimal determinacy that the PhG begins. Unlike epistemology and the problematic set forth by Meno in Plato's dialogue, the PhG states quite explicitly that it begins with an assumption, with a presupposition. It is not presuppositionless whereas epistemology has shown, in one way or another, that it is. For insofar as a presupposition is a determinacy which is pre-accepted before the legitimacy inquiry (or court session) has begun, there is unexamined evidence. If unexamined evidence is used to determine what is then used as evidence, then this mode of proceeding called epistemology will succumb to the familiar circularity referred to in the "Introduction."

The structure of the phenomenon being investigated in the PhG is outlined in § 81ff. It is a definite (determinate) structure and it is presupposed—not deduced. There is no deduction of the structure of consciousness; it is the datum with which the PhG begins. Insofar as the attempt to see the ego does give some kind of deduction of the concept of consciousness, to that extent the investigation necessarily succumbs to the same circularity that is entailed by the epistemological theories Hegel has outlined in the first eight paragraphs.

On § 81:

Let us turn to § 81ff. and see if we can grasp—step by step—the nature of the object which is presupposed and simply given (not deduced) by the PhG:

In addition to the foregoing preliminary and general remarks concerning the manner and necessity of the progression, it may also be helpful to mention something about the *method* of carrying out the inquiry. For if this presentation is viewed as a description of the way *science* is related to *phenomenal* knowledge, and as an *investigation* and critical *examination* into *the reality of*

knowledge, it does not seem possible for it even to take place without some presupposition which will serve as the fundamental standard of measurement.

That is to say, if Hegel has some sense of science which is worked out in advance of this investigation and with which knowing as it appears, knowing as it is undertaken by consciousness, is to be related and shown in every instance to be unsatisfactory, then the preliminary characterization of that science with which phenomenal knowing is compared is to be regarded as science. In other words, the opposition in question would be between phenomenal knowing and science. If that were the character of the investigation, then clearly that which is given out to be science would have to have some sort of principle in terms of which Hegel or anybody who understands him would have to be preliminarily aware. There must be some sort of determination in terms of which the determinable (phenomenal knowledge) itself would be determined either as adequate or inadequate, that is, scientific or unscientific.

So here we have a relationship between the determinable and the determinant, the determinable being phenomenal knowing (knowing as it appears), the determinant being science. The determinant then would have to have a determinate character. "For," Hegel goes on to say, "an examination consists in applying an accepted or presupposed standard and in deciding, on the basis of final agreement or disagreement with the standard, whether what is being tested is correct or incorrect." Under this assumption phenomenal knowing will be regarded as what is to be determined, and in this sort of investigation we would then have to have something in terms of which the determinable is to be determined (otherwise you would not be able to determine the determinable). As such this standard would necessarily have to be accepted or presumed to be something essential (*an sich*), that is, something not being investigated. In short, we would have to have something which is the principle of the investigation (which itself is not under investigation) and that which is to be investigated. But if we are to follow the procedure which is motivated by the previous discussion, then we see that science cannot fulfill its role of being the principle of adjudicating the validity of our determinable (phenomenal knowing), because we have decided (based on preliminary considerations) to regard scientific knowing as itself a phenomenon. Therefore science itself falls under the heading of the determinable not the determinant. But without some determinant of that sort, without some *an sich* (something which is in-itself, independent of experience, essential, etc.), it does not seem that any kind of examination can take place even though some kind of consideration or examination of knowing as it appears was proposed. The generality with which knowing as appearance has now been taken includes not only the candidates for knowing but also that mode of knowing in terms of which the candidates themselves were to have their candidacy measured. All of them fall under the heading of being determinable. If that is the case what is going to be our determinant in terms of which our determinable is to be determined? That is the question and the basic problem of § 81.

On § 82:

How can there be an investigation without principles in terms of which the investigation can take place? How could we have a determination of a determinable without a determinant? It seems impossible. This contradiction can be removed in three steps: the first step is an invitation for us to recall as a given—not to legitimate, deduce, or transcendently justify, but simply to recall as a given—

the very abstract determinations which present themselves in any mode of consciousness which is a knowing at all, namely, knowledge and truth. Knowledge is the determinable, truth is the determinant. So within the subject matter which we are investigating (within the determinate object that the PhG takes up), there is a distinction which is simply posited as given: the distinction between knowing (which is up for investigation insofar as we are engaging in the preliminary knowledge of what knowing is) and truth (that in terms of which knowing is either going to correspond or not). This distinction is seen to be something immanent in the subject matter which is under investigation. Consciousness, knowing consciousness, consciousness making claims to know the truth, phenomenal knowing, etc., distinguishes from itself something to which it, at the same time, refers or relates itself; it makes reference to something which is *for-it*. That is to say, in order to make reference at all, consciousness has to make reference to something which is different from itself and that which is different from itself, insofar as it is susceptible of being made reference to by consciousness, is something which stands in relationship to it, which is here characterized as the relationship of for-itselfness (for-consciousness).

Now, the determinate aspect, dimension or side which is being presupposed by what is for us generically the determinable, namely, scientific knowing, is being (here Hegel takes being as something determinant). The knowing side has a determination which is simultaneously for knowing itself what is to be determined, that is, there is a determinacy which is to be determined. That determinacy to be determined is referred to here as knowing; it is regarded as that which is for-consciousness, indeed the being of something which is for-consciousness. But we distinguish from what is to be adjudicated as determinate, something else insofar as we are participating in a mode of knowing which presupposes—in addition to the adjudicable, namely, knowing—a being-in-itself in terms of which the adjudicable is to be adjudicated. So that which is referred to knowing is at the same time distinguished from knowing and is posited as existing outside of this entire referential relation. That is to say, the adjudicable is distinguished from the adjudicating and there is an assumption that the adjudicating is somehow or other independent of the knowing relationship, that it is *a priori* in some sense. The *a priori*—the aspect of knowing (our subject matter) which, for the consciousness involved in the knowing relationship, is to serve as the principle of adjudication—is here generically referred to as truth. Now, Hegel says that these determinations do not further concern us here, in the sense that they are (as we have seen) logical determinations; they are not being deduced, they are simply given. (The deduction of these logical determinations is something that we find in the *Science of Logic*.) But he goes on to say, because knowing as it appears is the object that we ourselves are investigating insofar as it has the determination, the determinations of this object (which are, so to speak, given in this reflection of the reconsideration of what this object is) are to be taken very much as they are here sketched. The point is: this is the determinacy of the subject matter being investigated—an investigation of objects in general would not, of course, be legitimate.

On § 83:

When we engage in an investigation of the truth of knowledge, that is, an investigation that concerns itself not merely with the adjudicable but with the adjudicates, it would seem that what we

really are attempting to look at is knowledge in-itself. Indeed, if we were engaged in an epistemological type of quest, that would have to be the case.

Question: Would you say here then that we are investigating knowledge *for us*?

Dove: No, not yet. What you say is true, but that is not the critical move. The critical move here is that the determinacy of the object that we are investigating derives from the fact that it itself is a determining determinable structure. It is true that in virtue of this character our object can be *for us* rather than being for a structure of the sort that we are investigating, namely, *for-consciousness*. It is also true that in any epistemology, the fundamental structure of the investigation is isomorphic with the structure of the investigated. But what is investigated here is not objects without any further qualification, but objects *qua* knowing. It is rather odd to refer to the investigated as objects knowing, but clearly that is the elementary character of the object involved. The object matter is knowing and, as knowing, it *eo ipso* involves a distinction between what is known (knowing in the positive sense) and how the knowing is to be adjudicated (knowing in the sense of attempting to formulate the fundamental principles of knowing, the epistemological consideration). “But in this investigation knowing is *our* object, it is *for us*. Therefore the *in-itself* of knowing which might emerge from our investigation would not be the *in-itself* of knowledge”—as if we were to regard ourselves as investigating something from scratch (knowing as it is in-itself), as if knowing in-itself were something indeterminate and we were trying to determine it—“but its being *for us*.” Of course, the problem that we would have investigating knowing as it is in-itself would be the same problem that any knower would have investigating any kind of otherwise not antecedently determined object. That is why it is true to say that knowledge is not being investigated insofar as it is in-itself or as we take it to be in-itself, but always as we consider, which is to say, always as involving a distinction between the determinant and the determinable or the adjudicating principle and that which is to be adjudicated.

Berman: I think a distinction is being made here between two different kinds of relation: (1) the relation of the ‘we’ to an already determinate phenomenon and (2) the relation of consciousness to its object. Thus, these two kinds of relation may be construed as two senses of the notion of *for us*. Hegel seems then to be saying that there cannot be any *for us* in the same sense that consciousness has something *for-it*. The difference is in the way he talks about the ‘object.’ There is an object *for-consciousness* in the sense that it has an in-itself character and a for-itself character. But when ‘we’ say *for us*, we say that there is a relation of ourselves as ‘considering’ a phenomenon which is already determinate and does not require any further determination on our part in order to be the phenomenon that it is, namely, knowing. So these are two completely different relations.

Question: Are you saying that the *for us* in § 83 is different?

Berman: No. I’m saying that in general there are two ways of using *for us*.

Dove: Perhaps I have been somewhat misleading in my comments on these paragraphs by always anticipating what is said explicitly in § 84. But it is the case that the *for us* in § 83 would be rightly regarded as simply a substitution instance for *for-it* or *for-consciousness* and, insofar as it were, it would succumb to all the epistemological paradoxes.

Hegel goes on to say that what we might affirm as the essence would not really be its truth but only our knowledge of it; it would be merely an assumption or a posit and therefore what is posited as a determinant would not be adjudicated but itself susceptible of adjudication. We have here an infinite regress with which we are familiar as the paradox formulated by Sextus Empiricus. It is the problem of the adjudication of the criterion: insofar as we have a criterion to be further adjudicated, how then do we adjudicate the criterion? And if that adjudication is not legitimate, then clearly the criterion for the principle of adjudication has to be adjudicated and that generates an infinite regress. Hegel simply calls attention to the fact that if we were to regard knowing as it is in-itself as our subject matter we would have the same problem. There would be no way of saying how the subject matter or the object to be investigated could develop immanently without some sort of assumption on our part which would be alien to it. As Hegel says, it would not necessarily have to recognize the criterion.

Now, the problem thereby would be: what will serve as the principle of legitimation or the adjudicating standard which is not alien to, superimposed upon or arbitrarily posited by something independent of consciousness? In the next paragraph (§ 84) he goes on to say that by its very nature this particular kind of object provides itself with both the adjudicating standard and that which is to be adjudicated. Thus, it distinguishes itself from those kind of objects which are sought to be known through investigations like Kant's in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Put another way, the objects that Hegel investigates talk and make truth claims. The most critical examination of the *Critique of Pure Reason* reveals that it would not be appropriate to think of Kantian objects as talking objects. But our objects do talk. They have a mode of manifestation which is clearly determinant. In § 84 Hegel says: "But this distinction, or this semblance of a distinction [the distinction drawn by us between truth and knowledge], is overcome by the nature of the object we are investigating." We are investigating a particular kind of object which itself draws a distinction between the adjudicated and the adjudicating. The point is not that it is setting up a bad principle of adjudicating about which we know better. That is not the point at all, because in this investigation the principles of adjudication which are necessary for any investigation at all are derived from the nature of the subject matter itself. Insofar as we ourselves posit the principles of adjudication, they would be *eo ipso* illicit because then we would fall back into engaging in an epistemological type of investigation (investigating objects of knowledge in general) as it was outlined in § 83. But insofar as consciousness is knowing, indeed is scientific knowing (purporting, giving itself out to be, linguistically expressing itself as scientific knowing), and is making truth claims—and you cannot make truth claims unless you have a distinction between the adjudicating and the adjudicable—then we already have that distinction in the nature of our kind of object.

Question: Is it also true that consciousness requires 'us' in order to make any claims at all? That is to say, if consciousness retains a solipsistic position it does not have to make any claims.

Dove: It is the specific nature of this subject matter that it concerns itself with the truth. This is not the 'man on the street' who is usually not interested in general questions of philosophical truth. Thus, the 'man on the street' is not a substitution candidate in the PhG, at least not in the beginning. To be the object matter of the PhG is to be very philosophical; it is to engage in an enterprise to determine

in general the kinds of juridical claims that have been made about knowing in general for objects of knowledge in general.

Question: Thus, can we say that the *for us* dimension guarantees the objective standard of the truth claim?

Dove: That is to say: "... the objective standard of the truth claim" on the part of knowing consciousness, which purports to know scientifically, that is, which makes truth claims not only for-it but for anybody, for its audience? In order to *consider* these truth claims we need not adjudicate them. But if we, as the addressees of the truth claims, were also to adjudicate them, it would put us on the same level of discourse as the claimant, thus succumbing to the epistemological mode of discourse.

Consciousness distinguishes between an aspect which is for-it and thus determinable (thus adjudicable) and an aspect which is independent of that relationship, the public, non-perspectival or, if you like, for-it character of its truth, in which case the *us* is not otherwise limited by any specific characteristic. Indeed, that is the case one might argue (perhaps appropriately so in the long run). But in order for us to grasp that, we have to make a distinction between being the addressee of a truth claim and being the adjudicator of a truth claim. The addressee simply considers it as a truth claim. The epistemological enterprise, however, is always concerned to determine those aspects which are legitimating and those which are to be legitimated. In other words, according to Hegel, epistemology is always concerned with that opposition (the opposition of consciousness) and always has before it a two-fold consideration. It is not merely a consideration of that which is for-it, it also considers that which is for-it *as* a candidate for the truth. If it is to be a candidate for the truth, it must be considered in terms of some principles of candidacy which are presupposed (rightly or wrongly, we are not going to judge that). By the very nature of these truth claims, that is, by the generality of the philosophical subject matter, there is *eo ipso* a distinction between standards and what is to be judged by those standards. Now, if it is the case that the investigation can only proceed insofar as there is some sort of determination, and insofar as there is some sort of movement between the determination and the determinable, then we can see right from the beginning that the investigation of scientific knowing already involves a structure or determinate character. It is the minimal determinacy involved by making truth claims in terms of the opposition of consciousness. We have already seen that the objective of this entire investigation is to give what might be called the actual deduction of the ways in which the opposition of consciousness can make truth claims (which would then enable us to remove what Nashban calls in his paper "an exhaustive category"). Next time we begin the step by step analysis of § 84.

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Lecture VI: October 29, 1974

Next reading assignment: the first chapter of the PhG ("Sense-Certainty"). One of the most obvious questions concerning the first chapter has to do with the claim made in the opening paragraph (§ 90) that the mode of knowing which first comes under investigation is in fact the first mode of knowing ("*immediate* knowing"). This will have to be taken critically.

A second question which might be useful to consider concerning chapter I has to do with Ludwig Feuerbach's 1839 text called "A Critique of Hegel's Philosophy" (Feuerbach, *The Fiery Brook*, tr. Zavar Hanfi, 1972). It raises the interesting question of whether language—the most important counterpart in the argument of chapter I—is introduced as an external reflection, as Feuerbach clearly alleges, on the part of something that is independent of consciousness. That is, if the notion of language is introduced as a determinative notion (as Feuerbach thought), then right from the beginning there would need to be an introjection by Hegel or 'us' of something that does not belong, that does not emerge from what could be called the self-determination of consciousness itself.

A final question concerns the peculiar role that the 'we' plays in chapter I. One could not help but notice that in § 95 "... *sense-certainty* itself has to be asked: *What is the this?* If we take it in the two-fold shape of its being, as the *now* and as the *here*, the dialectic it has in it will take a form no less intelligible than the *this* itself. To the question: *What is the now?* we, to give an example, therefore reply: *the now is this night.*" Does this mean that we have to distinguish between the 'we' that is "talking" [an editorial 'we'] and the 'we' in the phenomenal sense which was discussed in the "Introduction"?

So the three questions are: 1) In light of the preliminary considerations of the "Introduction," why does the text begin as it does? 2) Is the role of language in chapter I legitimate? 3) What about the 'we' in chapter I? We now turn to Harlem's well written paper. . . .

Phenomenology as science:

The goal of this science is to consider the attempts at the justification of knowledge claims and thereby to consider the attempt at providing justifications for knowledge claims in general. It does the latter by taking up seriatim the various forms of knowledge claims; it does so adequately to the extent that an initial knowledge claim leads to a subsequent knowledge claim. That is to say, this experience has the peculiar character of generating shapes in and through which or from knowledge claims made in virtue of the self-negation of antecedent knowledge claims. The methodical aspect derives from what was called earlier a determinate negation. The goal of course is implicit; it is not a *telos*. But it could be said hypothetically that if this science were to have a demonstrative scientific character, then the attempts to provide a justification of knowledge in general could only be shown if all those particular attempts come up in such a way as to exhibit their totality.

Berman: It is difficult to raise the question "How does the PhG become a science?" in the "Introduction" because the "Introduction" itself purports to be nothing more than a provisional characterization of the manner of proceeding etc. Perhaps it is more appropriate to try to answer it at this point.

Dove: In a way that is true. In § 88 Hegel says: “This, then, is the necessity in virtue of which the present road toward science is itself already a *science*. And, in accordance with its content, it may be called the science of the *experience of consciousness*.” But that is not to give the necessity itself, but simply to refer to the structure of necessity which would have to be exhibited by the subject matter (consciousness making truth claims) if this “road toward science” were to be a science. I think Berman is right. The necessity, whatever it might be, is introduced here very schematically.

Berman: The extent to which the PhG can be a science is the extent to which it can display this detailed history. Thus, it would be a mistake to want too much out of the “Introduction.”

Nashban: You said earlier that the PhG falls within the natural assumption in the sense of attempting a legitimation of knowledge. What did you mean by that? Is it that the PhG itself is necessary for the possibility of knowledge or that we phenomenologists/philosophers make truth claims ourselves but realize that we can only learn by allowing consciousness to make its own truth claims?

Dove: Is your question about the status of the attempt to justify knowledge, about how the PhG clearly does not want to cast out this attempt right from the beginning, that we should take the attempt seriously without however participating in it? To reject this whole project is what Hegel calls abstract skepticism.

On § 84:

Hegel attempts to argue that the distinction which is drawn between truth and knowledge as pertains to us is a distinction between an in-itself for us and what is for us in a straightforward sense. The only aspect of the in-itself which needs to come up is the in-itself of consciousness, or, as he puts it, the in-itself *to* consciousness. Consciousness does refer to what it takes to be independent of it. That is why it becomes possible for this sort of investigation to have a moment of the in-itself—determinative of the development under consideration—without having that mode of the in-itself for us. To put it another way, consciousness involves many representations, some of which represent what is taken to be outside consciousness. The clearest form of such representations in the Kantian sense are those under the form of sensibility called space. So there is in consciousness an element which is taken to be outside of it, but for us everything is, so to speak, internal to consciousness. Thus, there is a moment which is taken by consciousness to be outside of it, a moment in which consciousness refers to what is presumably outside of it. In another moment there are other representations which are *for* consciousness or internal to it (consciousness itself draws this distinction between what is internal to it and what is taken to be outside of it). In Kant the difference between the representations which refer to what is outside of consciousness and those which refer to what is internal to consciousness is expressed in terms of the representations of outer and inner sense, respectively.

Berman: Is it a good idea to try to understand § 84 in terms of a distinction between mind and nature (the way Harlem attempts to do in his paper)? It seems to me that that way of characterizing it leads one to believe that it is the only way to understand the general structure which is discussed in

§ 84 (or in the “Introduction” for that matter). While this relation does come up at a specific point in the PhG we cannot say that, for example, there is a relation between mind and nature in the chapter on sense-certainty. That would be absolutely false. And yet the extent to which sense-certainty is the first shape, to that extent it too must conform to the general structure of for-itself/in-itself. So I am not sure it is a good idea to formulate this general structure in terms of a mind/nature relation.

Dove: I think it is acceptable to take this as one of the possible ways of exemplifying the basic opposition discussed in the second part of § 84. Although the in-itself did not necessarily have to refer to a natural kind that obtains in nature, the characterization of in-itselfness as some sort of *eidōs* embedded in nature became generalized in the course of the history of philosophy. One of the fundamental distinctions in Cartesian philosophy is between formal and objective being. Descartes draws a distinction between objective being (the for-itself or for consciousness aspect of being) on the one hand and formal being (the in-itself aspect of being) on the other. Whether the in-itself pertains to God, Nature, or the Soul (the three major topics investigated by philosophers) is a matter of indifference. Kant formulates the basic structure of the contrast between formal and objective being differently. Both Kant (in the *Critique of Pure Reason*) and Hegel (in the PhG) take this structure as the most general form of the attempt to justify knowledge claims. Thus, it is important to return to the characterization of the two moments, the two possible ways of determining what could be called the criteriological aspect, and raise the question of whether that aspect is in every case the conceptual aspect.

The determinations made by consciousness considered in the PhG are extraordinarily minimal. This minimal sense of determination is brought out in the section which Harlem focuses on in his paper. On page 4 he says: “If we say that the essential determination in the knowledge claim is the for-itself, ...” This, I think, is problematic. It raises the question of whether the concept (*Begriff*) aspect is always the determinative, criteriological, or measuring aspect. I focus on an alternative reading: “If we call *knowledge* the *concept*, and call the essence or the *true* that-which-is or the object, then the examination will consist in looking to see whether the concept corresponds to the object” (PhG § 84). As I read it, what is determinable rather than determining here is the concept; it is the adjudicated rather than the adjudicating principle. What is presumed to be the determining aspect is simply what is, the object. It is true that the term ‘object’ has many senses. What it refers to here is not the object *qua* for us (the for-itself mode), but the object taken to be objective (which is not to take it in its for-itself character). Now, what is for us—what has this claim to be adjudicated—is knowing and that is what is called the concept. So the concept is that which has to be determined; the truth of the concept will be determined by seeing whether it corresponds to the object.

Maker: It seems that whatever is taken to be in-itself, whatever is taken to be objective, whether it is an object *qua* object or a concept, in both cases the in-itself is the determinant.

Dove: Right. The in-itself (*an-sich*) moment, or what Hegel sometimes calls the essential (*Wesen*) moment, is always the determining moment. It is the moment which is purported to be non- or a-perspectival when investigating the truth of a given knowledge claim. Somehow or other it is not involved in the for-itselfness relationship (perspectivity). Various philosophers using various languages

have worked out ways to avoid perspectivity by, for example, talking about what is “necessary” in every knowledge claim of something which is non-perspectival, sometimes also talked about as omni-perspectival (recall medieval and early modern philosophy where omni-perspectivity is in most cases attributed to God). Such knowledge is analogous to the mathematical mode of knowing which is also said to be non-perspectival. So one could say with Leibniz that as we know things mathematically, so God knows everything. It is this aspect of the non-involvement in for-itselfness (perspectivity) which is an essential ingredient in all attempts to adjudicate knowledge claims. Another way of talking about this non-perspectivity which is more common among twentieth century philosophers is in terms of a public (true for anybody) or intersubjective verifiability. These are other ways of avoiding perspectivity which nevertheless formulate a reference to the non-perspectival, intersubjective, or objective (to use the scientific expression) on the part of a form of consciousness which distinguishes between the adjudicable (perspectival) and the adjudicating (non-perspectival, non-for-itself) aspect of its knowing.

The non-perspectival, non-for-itself aspect can be regarded then as simply pertaining to the object. To put it another way, the object is that which is publicly available. This is the Lockean claim. It is that aspect of empirical philosophy according to which objects are there for everybody (an aspect emphasized by contemporary positivistic philosophy of science). As such, they are susceptible of intersubjective verification. It is the object dimension; the object is right there, not for you or for me but for anybody who might come on the scene. In adjudicating any knowledge which is taken to be in its candidate status for you, me, or anyone—while always regarding it singularly or taking each case seriatim—the comparison is between the object which is said to be in-itself (that in terms of which consciousness measures its knowledge) by the consciousness making the claim to adjudicate its knowledge and its concept. The conceptual aspect is then referred to the objective aspect (“objective” in the sense of *objektiv* not *Gegenstand*). What is to be validated in every case is something called consciousness. That is why I am critical of the formulation introduced in Harlem’s paper regarding the essential determination. According to Hegel’s characterization of the logic of the PhG, the for-itself is always that which is to be adjudicated; it is never the adjudicating principle.

Question: Why does this whole section on the terminology of the concept and the object have to be introduced? Why not simply say that knowledge is always that which must be determined?

Dove: I think because there has been a general tendency among those who have formulated the epistemological argument to differentiate between taking the object to be the determining factor, the in-itself factor, the public factor, the non-perspectival factor (a British propensity) and taking the object as it is in-itself as the determining factor (a rationalist propensity). But whether these ‘geographical’ characterizations pertain, Hegel’s point is that they are the same. To see that they are the same has proven to be rather difficult for many readers of this text. That is to say, referring to the object as determinative vis-à-vis knowing and referring to the object as the determined or determinable vis-à-vis the in-itself of the object *prima facie* seem to be quite different.

Hegel says that once we have grasped the basic distinction between that which is for consciousness and that which is in-itself it is easy to see that they are the same. It is easy to see that if the in-itself of the object is taken to be the concept and the object is taken to be the object (namely,

as it is for consciousness, as that which is to be determined), then the same distinction obtains—even though it now seems *prima facie* that the object is that which is to be determined—between that which is non-perspectival (omni-perspectival) or not involved in for-itselfness (formal being in Descartes's sense of the term) and that which is involved (objective being), in this case, in-itselfness or non-perspectivity. That distinction can be drawn in these two ways which involves two radically different senses of the term 'object': either as determining or as the determinate. Hegel maintains that we cannot follow the argument unless we grasp that they are the same. In either case the distinction, which is drawn by consciousness, is simply a substitution instance of the distinction between the in-itself and the for-itself (even though the term 'object' has been used in both senses).

Question: Can we say that they are the same because once we recognize that this distinction is part of the very structure of consciousness, we see that the in-itselfs we are always dealing with are the in-itselfs for consciousness? So it does not matter what we call in-itself because it is in-itself for consciousness.

Dove: Right, but that has not been explicated. But once we grasp that they are the same, then we can go on to say—as Hegel does in subsequent paragraphs—that the distinctions are drawn by consciousness. The first thing is to see that there is a fundamental distinction between *an sich* and *für es*. If you want to associate the *Gegenstand* with the *an sich* aspect, that is OK; if you want to associate it with the *für es* aspect (that is, object *qua* object, objective in the sense that it is for you), that is OK too. Either way it is the same.

To anticipate: Hegel goes on to say that the distinction which is drawn by consciousness between the *an sich* and the *für es* is a distinction which is of course also always *for* consciousness and therefore even within the sphere of consciousness itself the *an sich* is an *an sich für es*. But that is a subsequent point. That is to say, when considering truth claims we have to see that the making of a truth claim *eo ipso* involves a non-perspectival aspect and a perspectival aspect. When I make a truth claim, I am saying that something is true for me and I want to make clear that it is not only true for me but also true for anyone or true in-itself. One wants to legitimate a truth claim; that is what one would attempt to do. We can do this in a variety of ways but there are two basic strategies. We can say that the object provides the public aspect which is perfectly plausible. I make the claim that "John's hair is brown" and you want to know if I am right. I say "Look and see." This commonsensical illustration of a truth claim becomes an epistemological truth claim when generalized. Here we are taking the object as in-itself. Or we could take the in-itselfness of the object as the determining factor, in which case the object as it was referred to in the first instance becomes a problematic aspect because it is now taken as an object for a subject. An object is always an object for itself. But one may treat the object as an object for a singular subject or one could stress its susceptibility of being an object for any subject. These are two quite different ways of using 'object.' In the first case, the way of using 'object' provides the framework within which one can talk about it as criteriological. In the second case, it is precisely that which is to be judged by criterion. In every case, if you have something to be judged by a criterion, you have to make the distinction between what is to be judged and that in terms of which it is to be judged (which in turn is a distinction between the for-itself aspect and the in-itself aspect). And to see that in its generality is, I think, what is being stressed in this section.

Question: What Hegel seems to be doing here is avoiding the epistemological dilemma by making consciousness the object of a phenomenological investigation. We don't have to import any sort of external yardstick because no matter which way we take it—no matter which of the two alternatives we take—there is always this *an sich/für es* relationship. The yardstick is within consciousness and consciousness itself makes the comparison. So we don't have to make a comparison using an external yardstick. We could grant Hegel all this by saying that he has avoided the criteriological dilemma, but I have a problem with him then saying that, as a result, all we have to do is undertake a pure act of observation. I cannot see how he can claim this pure act of observation without some sort of neutral observer, some sort of process of purification, whereby 'we' can be this pure observer watching consciousness itself make this comparison.

Dove: Yes. It does seem that in order to be this pure observer, we would also have to draw the distinction between what is for us and what is in-itself.

Question: But the problem for me is this pure observer. What is the criterion by which we can recognize a pure observer?

Berman: Is it necessary that this pure act be interpreted as a God-like kind of act, acting from a God-like perspective?

Question: I am saying that somehow there would have to be a phenomenological *epoché* here.

Dove: There is something like an *epoché* here. I have written an article comparing Husserl and Hegel on this topic ([Die Epoché der Phänomenologie des Geistes](#)). The comparison holds up to a certain point. One might say that the phenomenological 'we' are invited to an *epoché*; but whereas the orientation of consciousness as that which is said to be ultimately adjudicating is never relinquished in Husserlian phenomenology, it is precisely that which is eliminated in Hegelian phenomenology. The reason: in Husserlian language what we have here might be called a phenomenology of phenomenology except that the determinations Hegel is trying to describe do not derive in the least from the standpoint of observation. That is, there is no aspect of spontaneity (using the Kantian expression) at all and no aspect of conceptual determination at all which is characteristic of us. As I indicated before, we are investigating a determinate object, not objects in general for which there would always have to be some kind of distinction between an in-itself dimension and a for us dimension. Here the struggle over the determination of the object, the struggle for the determinations which constitute valid knowledge, is a struggle completely immanent to the subject matter considered.

Question: I understand that. But I do not understand what sort of purification is required on our part. Doesn't a criterion problem emerge here concerning that purification.

Dove: All right. On the one hand, the purification process which Hegel describes is undertaken by consciousness as our subject matter. On the other hand, he does refer to pure observation, the purity of which is best expressed by the phrase he uses early in the "Introduction," namely, thoroughgoing and self-realizing skepticism. That is, if you will, the *epoché*, the non-participation in the *quid juris* or adjudicating aspect of the investigation. A process of adjudication is undertaken. The question is then how this process may be seen to generate *on its own* objects for successive adjudication, or objects for

the for-itselfness aspect, or how the for-itself of this process may come up, or how the principle of adjudication may come up without being introduced by us? That is the only question.

Question: But this thoroughgoing skepticism needs as much explication as does a pure act of observation. The meaning of both needs to be explained.

Dove: Hegel investigates the temptation of skepticism as epistemology in the first eight paragraphs of the “Introduction” (§§ 73–80) and he maintains that if skepticism is advocated it will take the form of the epistemological paradox on its own. So he contrasts that skepticism with thoroughgoing skepticism (self-realizing or self-generating skepticism), a skepticism which does not simply become skeptical of this or that object but one which considers claims made by the sequence of shapes of consciousness such that the possibility of the sequence being generated by itself—a self-generating sequence of shapes of consciousness—is considered. The other skepticism is *eo ipso* an epistemological position because it concerns itself with validational claims; it negates validational claims, it negates the validity of any object which comes up for it. That is not taking the object of this skepticism as an object in general, which is to say that the skepticism is so formulated that the object of its consideration is the object in general without any further determination. But the object considered in the PhG which makes thoroughgoing skepticism possible has a minimal determination, namely, the distinction between the in-itself and the for-itself, and the adjudication of one in terms of the other. Now, what gives plausibility to this pure observation or thoroughgoing skepticism? I think it is the plausibility of skepticism on the one hand and the natural *Vorstellung* on the other; it is a natural tendency to represent the problem of knowing as a problem which can be talked about in terms of (using the Kantian expression) possible experience before we move to actual experience.

Question: I admit the opposition of consciousness. It cannot be avoided unless it is overcome immanently; you cannot just overcome it by fiat. My question is whether Hegel can in fact avoid the dilemma arising from the opposition of consciousness.

Dove: Do you think it is possible to talk about the opposition of consciousness?

— Yes.

Dove: Is it possible to consider species of it?

— Yes.

Dove: In considering species of it is it necessary to engage in the activity that you are considering?

— I don't know.

Maker: As a matter of fact, ‘we’ do make a distinction between what is in-itself and what is for-itself. If there is movement and becoming going on which only appears for ‘us,’ for the ‘we,’ then don't ‘we’ somehow have to apply a standard also?

Dove: Right. And Hegel's answer is no. It is the burden of the “Introduction” to help us see why his answer is no. You ask whether it is necessary for there to be anything in-itself for us in order for the PhG to be the investigation which it purports to be (the investigation of phenomenal knowing or

knowing as it appears). The answer to that should be no. Can it be no? That is the question we have to ask. One might ask it in light of the following passage from the translation (§ 87):

When that which at first appeared as the object sinks to the level of being *to* consciousness [when Hegel uses the term “to consciousness” he is talking about the in-itself aspect] a knowledge of the object, and when the *in-itself becomes a being-for-consciousness of the in-itself*, then this *is* the new object. And with this new object [this ‘object’ is used as the criteriological aspect] a new shape of consciousness also makes its appearance, a shape to which the essence is something different from that which was the essence to the preceding shape. It is this circumstance which guides the entire succession of the shapes of consciousness in its necessity. But it is this necessity alone—or the *emergence* of the new object, presenting itself *to* consciousness without the latter’s knowing how this happens to it—which occurs *for us*, as it were, behind its back. A moment which is both *in-itself and for us* is thereby introduced into the movement of consciousness, a moment which does not present itself for the consciousness engaged in the experience itself.

I submit that this raises the question whether that in-itself is an in-itself for us. The answer to that might be no. The aspect of the in-itself which is not for consciousness is the aspect whereby the in-itself generated or determined by an antecedent shape of consciousness becomes the in-itself for a subsequent shape of consciousness. If that is the case, then we would not say that the in-itself is determined by us.

We have seen that in every case (although we have not gone through them in detail) of an in-itself within the epistemic knowing relationship, the in-itself is at least tacitly or pre-thematically posited by consciousness. Of course, consciousness does not explicitly posit the in-itself. When consciousness says that the object is the in-itself aspect because anybody has access to it, this is not taken as a posit but as a stand of reason. The public aspect of the object is not posited by me; it is there. Nevertheless, the knowledge to be adjudicated is a knowledge for it. So the essential relationship remains that of the opposition of consciousness. Insofar as that is the essential relationship, and insofar as that relationship is to be adjudicated, the question is whether an appeal to anything which is said to be in-itself can escape from the opposition of consciousness. Hegel says that it cannot. If it is the case that any opposition of consciousness—any shape of consciousness—will involve an in-itself aspect if there is to be a sequence of shapes, then clearly the in-itself which defines the beginning of the dialectic entailed by any shape of consciousness will have to be generated independently of that shape of consciousness. The transition from one shape to another within the development of the form of consciousness is of the in-itself generated by shape n (which is for shape n the reduction to for-itselfness of its in-itself), and the taking up of that by the subsequent shape regarded as being independent of the former. With respect to any form of awareness, the transition from shape n to shape $n + 1$ is something which is only *for us*. That is to say, the in-itself of the development of the form of consciousness which is not generated by us is that aspect of the in-itself which is only for us. This is not, I submit, an in-itself for us which we posit as in-itself, thematically or pre-thematically, because it is seen to be, or at least a schema has been set whereby we can see how that in-itself is generated, how it is constituted, how it is determined. And that is precisely what it is impossible to do insofar as the orientation for the investigation is the opposition of an in-itselfness for us (the

orientation of consciousness itself), in which case the investigator (Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, etc.) always tacitly regards himself as a substitution instance of the knowing which is to be adjudicated. I grant that this is terribly elusive. But the distinctive feature is that the subject matter for us is not indeterminate; it is not something which is tacitly determined by us; it is not something about which we must have a certain sense of what it really is in-itself. We are not adjudicating that at all. What we are doing is simply considering the adjudication as it transpires in terms of the opposition of consciousness.

Maker: But 'we' are making the truth claim that there is in fact a logical and necessary transition going on. We can actually speak of a change of which the in-itself (namely, consciousness, the object of our investigation) is not aware. It seems that 'we' must have a prior standard to determine what a change in shapes of consciousness consists in, then we can take this criterion to these various truth claims.

Dove: You are making a forceful argument for there having to be an in-itself for us. Now, the question I would like you to consider again—which is basically the same question we have been considering all along—is whether, in order to constitute the development which is here schematically adumbrated in the PhG, it is necessary for us to have standards for the development of the sequence of shapes of consciousness which are categorially at the same level of discourse as those standards we have seen to be necessary for any attempt to adjudicate a case of knowing in terms of an in-itself on the part of consciousness? The question is: are we the maker of standards? It is a natural assumption that in a philosophical investigation a distinction must be drawn between an in-itself and a for us. In an investigation such as the PhG it is also a natural assumption that we draw that distinction. On its own terms however, it is clear that if such a distinction were drawn in the PhG, it would be self-contradictory. Is it possible to consider an investigation which generates determinations without assigning a constitutive role to the subjects considering what is being considered? Some such constitutive role on the part of subjects is seen by Hegel to be implicit in every epistemological enterprise. Every epistemology has to adjudicate knowledge in terms of the opposition of consciousness. Is it possible to consider a subject matter which is sufficiently different from the epistemological subject matter insofar as the determinacy of such subject matter is such that it generates its own determinations and does not involve any constitutive role on the part of those who consider it? That is the question.

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Lecture VII: November 5, 1974

It is very important to stress that quite often the type of truth claim examined in an epistemological inquiry is the claim to know, for example, a stick, etc. These are familiar examples from the history of philosophy. It is important to notice that this sort of comparison of a specific act of knowing with what could be called the question of principles in terms of which that act is thereby adjudicated is not what Hegel here concerns himself with. What is at stake here are generic claims to know, the things already known at the epistemological level.

Question: Concerning the role of the 'we,' how seriously can Hegel's claim be maintained that the 'we' is involved in a purely observational activity? When he says: "the necessity involved in the process is something consciousness is not aware of ..." ["But it is this necessity alone—or the *emergence* of the new object, presenting itself to consciousness without the latter's knowing how this happens to it—which occurs for us, as it were, behind its back." (§ 87)], which means that 'we' are aware of it, how does he come to this conclusion? In order to talk about necessity in this process 'we' must go beyond pure observation.

Dove: Yes, *prima facie* it would seem so. The reason for that is that we normally detect a necessary process which involves specific determinations when those determinations move from one stage to another such that they can be seen to necessarily follow one another. Of course, in the normal epistemic situation such claims are made without awareness of the fact that the determinations are in some measure contributed by the one who is considering that which is determined (going back to the most elementary school of Kantian wisdom which Hegel presumes to have attended). The PhG begins with that consideration. In the opening paragraph of the "Introduction" (§ 73) Hegel says that for those who are giving an account of knowing to make any kind of determination ("it is a natural assumption") is *eo ipso* to embark upon a process of discussion which is self-contradictory. Part of this natural assumption has to do with the role necessarily assigned to the observer in the observing process. If we examine what is said in § 87 in terms of the natural *Vorstellung* and the whole problem of observation, particularly the problem of the observation of the necessity of that which is to be observed, then clearly it must be said that some kind of contribution by the observer is going to be necessary. So, *prima facie*, that is, in terms of a natural representation of what is at stake in philosophical knowing, you are absolutely right. And yet Hegel's discussion in the "Introduction" (which may or may not be adequate) is precisely an effort to address that question. So I don't see how we can say straight away that any observation of necessity would involve the input of a determination by an observer whereby a process which is said to be necessary will be found to be necessary.

We begin with the natural assumption of knowing as it is stated early in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The PhG makes an effort to be somewhat different. The difference, as we have attempted to formulate, has to do with the fact that there is a structure of determinacy, a structure of opposition within the subject matter we are considering whereby the determinacies are adjudicated and determined. If it were possible to show that an adjudicating or criteriological process were going on within our subject matter, then of course it would be *prima facie* absurd to claim that the observation of such a subject matter could, without any input on the part of the observer, generate the necessary

process itself. What Hegel attempts to show, however, is that this subject matter is already determinate in the most elementary, minimal sense. This becomes even more dramatically problematic when we consider the opening chapter of the PhG ("Sense-Certainty") where immediate knowing (sensible immediacy) is set forth as the truth in such a way that the opposition between knowing consciousness and what it claims to know truly is not yet established. That is to say, we have an immediacy wherein the distinction between the *ich* (the I) and the *sache* (the subject matter) is not yet established. From the beginning of the PhG, the establishment of that difference indicates to us, perhaps more clearly than the "Introduction" itself, the necessarily self-determining character of our subject matter (even against its own premisses). According to its own premisses, sense-certainty could not be the determinant knowing of anything determinate. It comes to determine when it tries to speak. Of course, there is no speaking without determination. There is no articulate speech without articulation and articulation involves determination.

So the problem of the irreducibly determinate character exhibits itself from the beginning of the PhG when we consider our subject matter and the way it appears to us. Once again, what the chapter on sense-certainty importantly indicates to us is that the specific mode whereby the subject matter (the appearance of consciousness or the appearance of experience) appears to us is linguistic; it is for us linguistically. Determinations are made then within a no doubt very cautious, very minimalist language, but a language nonetheless. This is a topic which becomes, by way of anticipation, the most important issue in the first chapter of the PhG, namely, how the subject matter we are investigating does in fact appear to us. We talk about the formal aspect of it and we have to know about its mode of appearance to us. I think we can say, by way of anticipation, that in light of the first chapter (which would accord well with the "Introduction"), the mode of appearance of experience under consideration is without further special qualification [linguistic]. Admittedly, this does address the detail that you required. But, as you can see, your question brings us back to the beginning. You are taking as a stand of reason that any observation will involve some determination on the part of the observer. Of course, that is the *natural* way of representing to oneself the problem of knowing. Whether adequately or not, Hegel tries to give an account of that.

It is true that the title of the book is *Phenomenology of Spirit* and by that Hegel means a science of the appearance of spirit, and by that he means that spirit is appearing as consciousness. No doubt about that. But if the argument were to be formulated in that way (I don't think it is), then one would naturally tend to represent the problem of such an investigation by asking: how do we arrive at our preliminary investigation?

The route taken by Hegel in the PhG is to simply consider the epistemological problematic in its fullest generality. When considered as such, it nevertheless retains a certain elementary determinacy. When that determinate structure—the structure of consciousness engaging in the epistemological enterprise *qua* philosopher at the metalinguistic level—engages in the consideration of its subject matter at the object level, there is no preliminary determination of the subject matter. At least there is no preliminary determination of what an object or an appearance is. Appearance is regarded as indeterminate; everything is regarded as indeterminate. The problem is going to be establishing the determinacy of what is under investigation. The PhG does not investigate appearance *per se*; it

investigates the appearance of the quest to determine what appearance is. By its nature that quest has an elementary structure. According to the "Introduction," it is in terms of that structure that the subsequent structures of the work are allegedly generated; they are self-generating. To use language which was popular about half a century ago, what we have here is an utterly emergent theory of the shapes of consciousness, an utterly emergent theory of the determinacies which are here investigated. However, these determinacies do not emerge out of nothing. Rightly or wrongly, they are said to emerge from the beginning out of the already determinate, albeit terribly abstract, structure of the problematic of knowing and adjudicating knowing.

I should emphasize again that this brings us back to the difference between the epistemic project and the phenomenological project. This difference dramatically indicates to us just how *natural* the natural representation of the problem of knowing really is. It is extraordinary. Hegel is by no means attempting to say that we can get rid of it. But it is possible to consider it, not judge it, just consider it. We can consider it once we grasp what it is. According to Hegel, we can have at least a preliminary grasp of what it is. And if we can grasp what it is—that our object is a determinate object—then we could conceivably embark upon a consideration of whether it will undergo self-determinations. It is only in terms of the self-determinations which it then undergoes that it is possible to say whether the subsequent shapes as they develop are emergent or are rather externally introduced. This will probably demand a great deal of skill on our part, perhaps more than we have and, inquiring through the text, more than what Hegel offers us a possibility of, in order to determine what the determinations truly are along the way. At any given point along the way we have to determine what a shape is or what a shape might be because we don't know for sure.

The term *shape* is used systematically throughout the PhG. In one sense, for example, the entirety of Chs. I – III constitute a shape. In another sense, each of those chapters is susceptible of being regarded as a shape. Hegel also uses the expression *form of consciousness* which we grasp in a certain sense as the encompassing notion when we grasp what all the shapes are. So there are levels of shapes of consciousness which pertain to the level of the determinacy with which each shape is structured. However that may be, and whatever difficulties we encounter while attempting to trace out at different stages in the development of the argument (there are many digressions) what shape is in question at that time, it will nevertheless be the implicit claim of the PhG that it is only a science to the extent that all the shapes are emergently (immanently) generated or generated through self-determination. To say that of course is not to say that Hegel is successful in showing that. I want to hold that question open. But to see the project carried through at all is to see how radically it differs [from, say, the epistemic project].

There is no other text like the PhG; it is a unique genus. Some texts may approximate it but none has ever attempted to work out an argument like this one. To some extent Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is comparable in the sense that there too the use of language which is worked out attempts to be merely elucidatory. Rightly or wrongly, I concluded that the *Tractatus* is comparable to the PhG after pondering Wittgenstein's text for a number of years. Whether that conclusion is true or false, at least it conforms with a great deal of what Hegel explicitly says in the "Introduction" and with at least

some of the things he says in the text itself. That it conforms with all that is said in the PhG is no doubt too much to ask.

Insofar as one understands Hegel's project, and insofar as one understands how it fails, then one can understand how it would be possible to write the PhG. Clearly Hegel has failed to the extent that nobody has ever been able to read through the text from the beginning to the end while keeping that project clearly in mind and give an account of how the shapes emergently develop step by step along the way and put them all together at the end. To do that would be to write a commentary on the PhG and nobody has ever written a commentary, strictly speaking, on this text. A lot has been written on the book but not a commentary that would attempt to determine what the text is attempting to do. Jean Hyppolite, for example, has written the largest book on the text (*Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*). It is very interesting, but as a matter of fact he gives us a lot of interesting allusions and factual data about the text. But it is hard to focus upon what could be called the distinctively formal aspect—which Hyppolite himself indicates as that to be considered—which undergoes the process of emergent, immanent or self-determining development (indeed it has never been done). I am not going to promise that we will be able to do that, but clearly that is what we have been purporting to do. Such a project, whether possible or not, is clearly interesting; it is also clear that such a project has never been attempted (it is an open question whether it *could* even be carried out).

Question: I have a question about the distinction between the “I” (“*Ich*”) and “*die Sache*” in Ch. I. This distinction is not clear to me at all.

Dove: We have to notice that the criterion for truth that is first brought forth by sense-certainty is of such a nature that this differentiation between the “I” and the knowable, the truly knowable (“*die Sache*”), is undifferentiated. They are both characterized by the expression “it is”; the only critical [‘determination?’] is being. Being is treated here in a very skilled way as the indeterminate: to say of something that it is, is to say of something nothing determinate. And yet it is to say [something] of that which can be said immediately; indeed [it is] that alone which can be said of something immediately, insofar as one is attempting to establish the principles for knowing immediately. That is why the claim is made that what is in the first instance known and known with certainty and truth is known *qua* immediate, *qua* indeterminate, *qua* being. There is then an undifferentiated continuum involved. There is no specification per se of the standpoint from which the knowing is to be made, the standpoint from which the known is to be understood. To put it another way, knowing, as Hegel says in § 91, is not the sort of knowing that it is because it is engaged in a certain number of relations to the subject matter, because it is engaged in a certain number of thoughts, because it has a certain structure of reference ... *it is*. And the subject matter itself is not the subject matter that it is and the object is not the object matter that it is because it is related to the other objects, etc.; no, *it is*.

This then is the problematic and the status of the claim. It is said in the beginning that the truth claim is made in such a way that it is impossible to identify anything which is claimed to be true. And insofar as the claim comes to be made, then we have the question of the example and the

differentiation between what we call the essence and the example out of which, through the claim, the differentiation between the two poles of the opposition of consciousness takes shape.

Question: It seems to me that that happens later. What seems to happen first is a distinction of poles, then the collapse of the distinction and just the positing of “it is” without excluding all opposition at that point. But this is in § 103. The first moments are only considerations of the object pole and then the subject pole. Then the question of the distinction between the “I” and “*die Sache*” becomes impossible when it is forced to take sense-certainty as a whole [“we have to posit the *whole* of sense-certainty itself”].

Dove: OK. We can take that as a possible structure of the argument.

Berman: I was wondering whether we could formulate what you were saying in the following way: the significance of the example is to show that the example is really impossible; that in pursuing the example which allows sense-certainty to be an appearance and allows us to consider it, we find that the realization of the truth of sense-certainty is absolutely impossible. Is that what you were saying?

Dove: Yes. What is given concerning this shape of consciousness is the criteriological dimension. That is the immediacy: it is. Insofar as the consciousness in question wants certainty, it says of everything, including itself, “it is.” It is only then, when the attempt is made to show that the criteriological dimension (the *an sich* dimension) pertains to the *für es* dimension, that the differentiation comes into play. So Hegel says (§ 92): “In *pure being*, however, which constitutes the essence of this certainty and which this mode of knowing claims as its truth [the essential or *an sich* dimension], there is a good deal more at play when we look on. An actual case of sense-certainty [this is the *für es* aspect, the for-itself or perspectival aspect] not only is this pure immediacy, but also plays the role of being an *example* of it.” Here we have then the first differentiation of opposition between, on the one hand, being (*Sein*), which is the essence, the truth, the in-itself for the consciousness in question, however [on the other hand], there is no for-itself relationship here (properly speaking, we have not stressed enough the important paragraphs of the “Introduction”). But I call your attention to this stated aspect (§ 91): “the subject matter *is*, and it *is* only because it *is*. It is; to sense-knowing this is what is essential, and this pure *being* or this simple immediacy constitutes its *truth*.” This is all criteriological. There is no for-itself involved. That is to say, to sense-certainty there is no for-itselfness of this criteriological *Sein*, it is, immediacy, principle of truth, etc. But then again, this is the case for any mode of consciousness not just sense-certainty. Sense-certainty is the clue only in the sense that what it claims to provide (the criteriological dimension) is so utterly indeterminate. It is only when we come to the point of contrasting what *to it* is the truth with what *for it* is the candidate for truth, namely, an example of sense-certainty which will be shown the truth insofar as it can be shown an example of the essence, that the opposition is introduced.

Concerning the second paragraph, I don't think it really talks about the candidates of knowing at all. It does not talk about the for-itself aspect, the perspectival aspect, or the examples. It just talks about the in-itself of the truth which is immediacy, being, indeterminacy. “The certainty, so far as it involves a *reference*, is likewise an *immediate*, pure reference: consciousness is ‘I,’ nothing more, a pure *this*; the *singular* ‘I’ knows a pure this, or knows *what is singular*” (§ 91). The singularity here is illicitly

introduced into the criteriological discussion. This might be regarded as the natural way of representing how any knowing would take place in terms of any criterion, including the criterion of absolute immediacy or being or indeterminacy. Namely that, despite this, the subject which is engaged in this knowing is finite. It is true, the presumption of the singular I which, at the same time, is presumed to be a pure I is a contradiction. But that contradiction is in complete conformity with the project of epistemology. That is simply the way in which the epistemological project is formulated in terms of some sort of perspective. So one might regard the unfolding of the argument in the sequel as the unpacking of this contradiction. For *prima facie* there is a combination of the *an sich/für es* here, and yet this singular I is nevertheless taken to be a pure I. That is the case as well, I submit, with Kant's transcendental I think (apperception) which is spoken of throughout the first *Critique*; it is presumed to be utterly indeterminate, yet when it comes to play a role with respect to the ontic or that to which it is receptive or that to which it makes reference, it is taken to be singular. In making that assumption Kant was not assuming anything which was alien to the spirit of the history of philosophy up to and including his time.

Question: On the other side, this reference to the singular can also be seen as a criterion of Kant's notion of intuition.

Dove: Right. That is also assumed. The beginning, it must be said, cannot be read as a gloss on Kant as such. But it is clearly a beginning from a level of philosophical articulation concerning the problem of knowing which has only been reached, according to Hegel, *recently*. And so one way to consider the beginning here is in light of the transcendental aesthetic of the first *Critique* (reminding ourselves that this is not a gloss on it, not a critique of it, not a commentary on it): the assumptions made by the consciousness with which the PhG begins are akin to the assumptions made by the alleged *a priori*. But then again, we have seen that no discussion of the classical epistemological type could possibly be as *a priori* as one might wish precisely because it does presuppose that knowing is from a perspective which is to be adjudicated in terms of something a-perspectival. The problem of the opposition between the perspectival and the a-perspectival is taken to be dealt with in the problematic of knowing and is itself part of the natural way (the *a priori* way) we represent this problem to ourselves—a way of representing the problem exhibited by many philosophers including Fichte. But I suppose the most well-known and most dramatic example would be Kant. One could not go further astray than by regarding the beginning as a criticism of Kant. What it does is take the problem of knowing at the highest level of articulation, which it might be said to have achieved especially with Kant among others.

I would like to remind you that as far as I am concerned, the objective which I have in mind more than any other in talking about a text like this, in a context such as this seminar, is to determine not so much the argument but what the project is. To catch a glimpse of various ways in which the project is carried through, to see how, not we ourselves may be carrying it through, but how it might be carried through. It is an extraordinary project, but it cannot be easily grasped because of this natural assumption of what is at stake when we do philosophy (an assumption so deep it is not to be eliminated simply by mentioning it). It comes up again and again just as it does in our discussion which is a dramatic demonstration of the persistence of that assumption. It is one thing to say that, it is quite

another thing to say, cogently at least, that this assumption can be overcome. That is why Hegel spent a great deal of time in the "Introduction" and in the *Logic* clarifying what the project is.

Most epistemology is carried out with only a half-hearted gesture in the direction of formulating the sense of the commonsensically presumed knowledge of the in-itself in terms of the epistemic structures which are the only recourse of a reflective epistemology. The distinctive feature is considerably more consistent and less half-hearted. That is why Hegel departs from the Kantian formulation of the problem (which is perhaps the most consistent one) rather than say the Lockean one. Thus, the epistemologist's sense of the in-itself may very well derive from a practical everyday (or everyday theoretical) sort of experience; he then attempts to formulate it in terms of a structure which (as we have seen) is a possible but nevertheless also natural way of representing the problem of knowing. Or, there is an element of commonality in the in-itself which has to be brought into the relationship between the I and the object and shown to be conformable with the epistemic structure. That is the shift which is essential to the epistemological project itself. That is to say, no one has ever (as far as I am aware) been able to formulate an epistemology (a criteriological theory) which does not involve the translation of this public commonsensical confidence we have in the in-itself into anything other than (at least in the first instance) an epistemic subject-object structure. That is the natural way of representing the problem of knowing.

Now, what we have brought into this is not a sense of knowing ourselves as this I, that I, or the other I, but of ourselves as a humanity, a group, a plurality. Our sense of confidence in knowing what is in-itself begins in and through such a plurality. We refer to things as being what they are. We get responses from others and are continuously interacting with others. So we continually, that is, practically, reaffirm our sense of having access to the in-itself. But then that *is* epistemology. Because epistemology is born when we attempt to translate that confidence into a structure the relationship between ourselves and objects (insofar as it is a for-itself relationship) shows that that relationship is all that there is. That is the sceptical dimension where everything is to be reduced to for-itselfness. But we are convinced about the possibility of genuine knowledge. So an aspect of our commonsensical public knowledge has to be brought in that we attempt to formulate in terms of the subject-object relationship. We hunt for aspects of our knowing which are independent (*a priori*) of our knowing. In the PhG that hunting is always searching for the most minimal claim. And in philosophy, as in mathematics, to make a minimal claim is to make the strongest claim. In a certain sense the strongest claim that can be made epistemically is the one with which sense-certainty begins. If we ask ourselves why the PhG begins with sense-certainty, that is one of the considerations we could take up. That is to say, it is the strongest claim because it is the most minimal claim, the most abstract claim.

The penultimate sentence of the "Introduction" is one of the darkest sentences in the PhG:

In other words, at that point where its appearance becomes equal to its essence, consciousness' presentation of itself will therefore converge with this very same point in the authentic science of spirit.

The point made here is extraordinarily difficult. Compare this sentence with Baillie's Introduction to Ch. IV. A great deal of the "Introduction" can be understood—with a considerable amount of

effort—in the context of the “Introduction” itself. But this sentence clearly refers to something beyond the “Introduction” itself, namely, a point in the self-unfolding of the shapes of consciousness.

The plurality or we aspect (the fact that the subject matter is involved in a community) will become clearer and more manifest to us as we move on. One of the things that we have to see, particularly while investigating Chs. VI and VII, is the degree to which even within that dimension it is possible for the plurality to regard the relationship between the in-itself and the for-it epistemically in terms of the opposition of consciousness. One of the most striking things about the PhG is how the involvement of the we (which develops more and more explicitly) nevertheless remains determined by the development of the book itself as a subject matter for what is in principle an opposition of consciousness.

As an interpretation of Ch. I might exhibit, if the appearance of knowing is the appearance for us insofar as it is expressed to us, then we are that which is referred to in knowing. That is to say, the epistemic discourse has an addressee. Who is the addressee? Anybody? We are. The addressee of the epistemic discourse (which is not thematized by the epistemology itself) is precisely that which ‘we’ are and must remain throughout the text. The claim is made to that plurality and is made in terms of an opposition of consciousness.

It will have to be seen in our consideration of Ch. I why (a) the consciousness in question cannot speak for itself and (b) why it is legitimate, in terms of the epistemic claim made by this consciousness, that we can speak for it. But we cannot consider the propositions of ourselves as considering the shapes of consciousness, as considering them as they manifest themselves. We can consider them as they manifest themselves insofar as they are spoken of. They are spoken of in terms of what it is that is seeking legitimation and in the first instance the consciousness in question does not speak. We speak for it. How is it that we do speak for it without determining what it itself is? To put it another way, it is not [left blank in transcript]. We can speak for it with perfect legality just as one’s lawyer or guardian speaks for oneself legally. Consider the question of legitimacy (the *quid juris* question): How is it that ‘we’ can speak for sense-certainty? Why is it that sense-certainty cannot speak for itself? Is it the case that legitimately we cannot speak for it and that legitimately in so speaking for it we *qua* we are not introducing any substantial determination with respect to what it *qua* it is so that the examples we give (“It is a tree.” or “It is noon.” etc.) are incidental? It does not matter what examples are given (any examples could be given). It is precisely for that reason that ‘we’ can speak for sense-certainty. If it should turn out that the examples are determinative of the relationship between essence and example that sense-certainty claims to be (sense-certainty claims to be an example of the structure of sense-certainty), then, if we should use any examples which are determinative of that structure, we would be making an illicit contribution.

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[More To Come]