LOGIC AND THEORY IN ARISTOTLE, STOICISM, HEGEL

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In philosophy there are no deductions.—Wittgenstein

In 1970, I suggested[1] that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (PhG)[2] has the compact literary form of dramatic poetry rather than the loose form of a novel, as it had usually been read. Meanwhile, I have come to see that the PhG is the exact[3] philosophical counterpart of a classic tragedy as conceived by Aristotle in the *Poetics* and by Hegel in his *Aesthetics*.[4] But whereas Aeschylean and Sophoclean tragedies tend to depart from and develop conflicts between the ancient household (οικος, "*oikos*") and city (πολις, "*polis*"), the conflict in the PhG is between "logic" and "theory," as spelled out in this essay.

On what constitutes a tragic drama, no one, including Hegel, is as concise and comprehensive as Aristotle. Let us therefore begin with his definition of tragedy:

> Tragedy […] is a *mimesis* (μιμησις)[5] of worthy and complete action (πραξεως, πραξις, "*praxis*") having magnitude, in speech (λογω, λογος, "*logos*") made pleasing with each form [of pleasing ornamentation] used separately in the parts of tragedy, performed and not produced through narration, achieving through pity and fear a catharsis of such affections.[6]

The point of this essay is to show how the post-Aristotelian and by now habitual "formalist dream"[7] of "logic" as the key to "theory" as launched by "Stoicism," has generated the tragicomic (comic because it had a happy ending, "modernity") drama that Hegel depicts in the PhG. The denouement of this drama is an insight into the millennial conflation of "logic" with "theory" and the rewinning

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1   Kenley R. Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method" (= HPM), *The Review of Metaphysics* XXIII, 4 (1970): 615–41.
2   PhG = G.W.F. Hegel, *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952). Since the Hoffmeister edition, best known to me, is no longer widely used and since the most recent editions, 1980, by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, Band 9, Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, revised 1988), by H.-F. Wessels and H. Clairmont, are not universally used, I have, somewhat reluctantly, included the paragraph numbers based on the original 1807 edition (Bamberg and Würzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt). Because the pagination of the original edition has not, as with Kant's first *Critique*, been preserved in many subsequent editions, the paragraphs in Goebhardt, subsequently numbered (§§), remain the only common reference. They, too, are not universally used, but they have been preserved in the PhG translation by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977) and are projected for inclusion in the Terry Pinkard translation, which may soon appear with the Cambridge UP. I say I have been reluctant to adopt this expedient because it implies a parallel between the PhG and the Enz (= Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 3rd edition, 1830), in which Hegel used numbered paragraphs. There is a profound difference, frequently missed, between the PhG, which is a propaedeutic to Hegel's system, as laid forth in this essay, and the Enz, which is that system. Still, the compromise seemed worthwhile. The translations of Hegel are my own, unless otherwise noted.
3   This is, admittedly, a strong claim. I shall try to make it good. For those who are musically inclined it will be helpful to add that the PhG is also like a "sonata form" as understood by Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven* (New York: Norton, 1972); and Rosen, *Sonata Forms* (New York: Norton, 1980). Rosen's use of the plural, "sonata forms," as opposed to "sonata form," the orthodox conception in contemporary musicology (and the reason why Rosen's contribution to "The New Grove" was rejected), is what interests us here. Rosen's "Sonata Forms" reflects his implicit grasp of Aristotle and Hegel's insight into theory, which includes music theory, namely, that things theorizable are "said in many ways," λεγεται πολλαχως.
4   In 1970, HPM 627n17, following Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch, I mistakenly took Goethe's *Faust*, a "romantic" rather than a "classic" drama, to be the dramatic model.
5   See my "Aristotelian vs. Socratic Mimesis in Hegelian Perspective," *Das Geistige und das Sinnliche in der Kunst*, ed. Dieter Wandschneider (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005) 29–40.
6   Aristotle, *Poetics* 6, 1449b24–28, as translated by Kenneth Telford, with emendations.
7   I take this phrase from conversations with David Lachterman.

of "theory" as θεωρια (*theoria*) under the conditions of "modernity," that is, Hegel's systematic philosophy. This is the "catharsis" of that tragic drama called the PhG. In PhG VIII, Hegel calls this catharsis "Absolute Knowing" ("*Das absolute Wissen*"). In what follows, I try to clarify the, to many, puzzling word "absolute" as an absolving of the "Stoic" habit.

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

This essay aims to make plausible how forty-odd years[8] of thinking about Hegel, the history of philosophy, and modernity have led me to the conclusion that the PhG is a radical reintroduction to Aristotelian thought in the modern world, that is, an introduction[9] to Hegelianism. The means to this end in the PhG is a systematic reconstruction and a thoroughgoing deconstruction of what I shall call "Stoicism," a major factor in the achievement of modernity and the major *aporia* blocking thought once modernity has been achieved.

"Stoicism," which here indicates all philosophy from Chrysippus to the present save Hegel (and probably Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*[10]), blocks thought because it divides language into two, one "inner" and the other "outer," with the presumption that "inner language" is the "place" of logical demonstration or deduction. On this assumption, there is a dimension of knowing that is strictly speaking "unknown" because it is simply presupposed and thus unthematized in the "Stoic" understanding of knowing. We may call this unknown but deeply presupposed dimension "the logical faith."[11] "The logical faith" involves what is taken to be "simply logical," what grounds discourse—

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8   Since 1964, when I formulated the first rigorous and workable interpretation of HPM, based on the "Introduction" ("Einleitung") to the PhG and first published in 1970, HPM. This interpretation has guided my work every year in the meanwhile, one result of which is the present essay. I only discovered that the PhG pointed to Aristotle in the late 1970s. It resulted, in part, from years of mulling an *obiter dictum* tossed off by Wilfrid Sellars during a graduate seminar in 1959: "Hegel is the Aristotle of the modern world." Of course all readers of Sellars know that he referred to his best-known work, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," 1956, republished as Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Richard Rorty and Robert Brandom (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1997) as "incipient *Meditations Hegeliènnes*" (p. 45, § 20). Brandom has attempted in seminars, as reported by John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994) ix, to make Sellars' "incipience" explicit. Brandom hints at this in *Making It Explicit* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994) 663n1, 669n93, 698n78, 716n35.

9   Hans Friedrich Fulda, *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1965), reawakened interest in the problem of the PhG as an introduction to Hegel's system but did not resolve it. Fulda's book was stimulated by Dieter Henrich, "Anfang und Methode der Logik," *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 1, 1962, 19–35. For an earlier formulation of the problem Henrich alludes to Bertrando Spaventa, *Le prime categorie della logica di Hegel*, in *Atti della R. Accademia di scienze morali … di Napoli*, Vol. 1, 1864. In a 1966 conversation Klaus Hartmann pointed out that the earliest formulation of the problem, after Hegel's, was by G.A. Gabler, *Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propädeutik*, Erste Abteilung, *Kritik des Bewußtseins*, Erlangen, 1827. Though mostly a paraphrase of the first part of the PhG, Gabler, a student of Hegel's in Jena and successor to his chair in Berlin, has written the most competent of contemporary comments on Hegel, and the best till Karl Marx at mid-century.

10 Wittgenstein's *Philosophische Untersuchungen* tends to be more post-"Stoic." Robert Fogelin has observed that the closest historical analogue to the "late" Wittgenstein is Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.

    In any case, my "introduction" to Hegel came by means of repeated readings of the *Tractatus* under the guidance of Wilfrid Sellars, and later. I had previously attempted to read the PhG and the Enz but (despite fluency in German) they remained completely dark until I came to the PhG with Sellars' interpretation of the *Tractatus*. Every page of my dissertation (written in 1964) on the PhG was thought with constant reference to the *Tractatus*. The present essay is my first public explication of this fact.

11 On the model of what Michael Dummett, for a much narrower sphere of "Stoic" consciousness, has called "the Fregean faith."

dogmatic, critical, or sceptical—about conscious knowing. Used in this way, the notion "logical" is informal and talk about a "theory" as "logical" seems harmless. When we consider the "thoroughgoing scepticism" that Hegel practices in the PhG, the continuities and differences between "informal" and "formal" logic come to view. The aim will be to see whether we can grasp a significant distinction between "logical theory" in a "Stoic" sense and "theory" as distinct from "logic" in the sense of Aristotle and Hegel. I shall argue that the point of the PhG is to make this distinction between "logic" and "theory" graspable.

In Aristotle, who invented formal logic, there is a clear, if often unnoticed, demarcation between formal logic and theory.[12] "Stoicism" blurs this line of demarcation and introduces "the logical faith" partly because it involves a different formal logic, a propositional as opposed to a term logic, and partly because "Stoic" logic entails a mentalistic "opposition" between what is mental and what is in "the external world."

The main point of this essay is to show how Hegel in the PhG was able to identify "the logical faith" and work out a procedure for its elimination ("Hegel's phenomenological method"). It must be acknowledged that this procedure has not yet yielded the success for which Hegel must have hoped since this procedure or method, if understood at all, has been applied to a conception of philosophy narrowly restricted to the domain of the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century "German" philosophy whereas Hegel's phenomenological method is only operable if it pertains to all the *Gestalten* or "positions" of post-Aristotelian (or "Stoic") thought generated and developed in the PhG,[13] not merely to post-Kantian thought.

"Stoicism" is a deeply sedimented habit of thought, so familiar that it is unknown. The procedure of the PhG is to uncover the "Stoic" habit, universal since the Hellenistic world, and eliminate it step by step. The result of the PhG is a mode of knowing absolved of the "Stoic" habit, the absolved or "absolute" knowing that Hegel pursues in his reconstruction of Aristotle for the modern world: his encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences (Enz[14]).

The key to the "Stoic" habit is the conflation of causality with inference, of theory with logic, the presumption that we can, either positively (e.g., Kant) or negatively (e.g., Hume), make the inference

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More grandly, Nietzsche says "I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have *faith* in grammar." Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "'Reason' in Philosophy," § 5, W. Kaufmann, trans., emphasis added. Cf. Wittgenstein: "Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing." "Notes on Logic, September 1913," *Notebooks 1914–1916* (New York: Harper, 1961) 106.

[12]   We may say that Aristotle was the first to grasp the nature of "theory" because he also grasped the limits of "logic," a comprehension lacking in all later practitioners of "logic" until Hegel, and later Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus*, e.g., 6.35: "Gesetze, wie der Satz vom Grunde, etc., handeln vom Netz, nicht von dem, was das Netz beschreibt." "Laws like the principle of sufficient reason, etc., concern the net, not what the net describes."

[13]   "*Gestalten*," "positions," and "generated" are explained below.

[14]   Hegel's most important book is available as a book in French, Italian, and most other languages, but not in English. Two putative English translations by Gustav E. Mueller (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), and by Steven A. Taubeneck (New York: Continuum, 1990) have been published, but they cannot be taken seriously.

explicit.[15] The Stoics (esp. Chrysippus) explicitly conflated physical causality with logical inference.[16] This is "the logical faith." Subsequent thinkers have clouded the conflation by invoking the notion of a supercausal or creative *logos* (e.g., Philo of Alexandria and St. John),[17] of a unitary cosmic intellect (Averroism),[18] of "the book of nature" as written by God the Philonic creator (e.g., Galileo),[19] or of "nature's laws" brought to light by Newton[20] (e.g., Locke). A study of the PhG can make plain that all the above are variations upon a *Grundmotif*, the "Stoic" conflation of causality with inference, of theory with logic.

That is why we must begin with an attempt to determine just what logical inference is, in order to pave the way to a comprehension of theory as opposed to logic, to seeing that "logical theory" is an oxymoronic expression.[21] This is the way of the PhG, the way toward a rewinning of Aristotelian thought in the modern world, the way toward a grasp of Hegel independent of "German Idealism."

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[15] For a recent celebration of "inference," see Robert B. Brandom, *Making It Explicit*. Brandom's principal contrast is between "inference," his "new paradigm," and "representation," which he takes to be "the received paradigm." He claims Sellars and Hegel's PhG as sources for his new inferentialism but in the PhG inference and representation are both correlative features of the "Form of consciousness," on which see below.

[16] In Chrysippus' account of causality the cause is said to be corporeal (or, roughly, empirical) whereas the effect is said to be a non-corporeal "predicate" ("logical," "in the mind," "a sayable"). As Sextus Empiricus reports: "The Stoics say that every cause (αιτιον, "*aition*") is a body which becomes a cause, to a body, of something incorporeal. For instance the scalpel, a body, becomes a cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate (κατηγορημα, "*kategorema*") "being cut." And again, the fire, a body, becomes a cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate "being burnt." *Adv. Math.* 9.211 = *SVF* 2.341, A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, trans., with emendation. The clearest and most recent treatment of Chrysippus in this regard is Susanne Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998) 18–21; 258–71.

[17] See my "Hegel and Creativity," *The Owl of Minerva* IX, 4 (1978): 5ff. and "The Very Idea of Creation," one in a public lecture series at Purchase College, SUNY, 1979, to appear on my website, https://www.kenleydove.com.

[18] See Philip Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), on Averroism per se, 85–113, and on Herder and Kant's reciprocal accusations of "Averroism," 114–18.

[19] " … I think that in discussions of physical problems we ought to begin not from the authority of scriptural passages but from sense-experiences and necessary demonstrations; for the holy Bible and the phenomena of nature proceed alike from the divine Word, the former as the dictate of the Holy Ghost and the latter as the observant executrix of God's commands." Galileo, Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, 1615 (pub. 1635), Richard Popkin, trans. See Michael B. Foster's articles in *Mind* during the mid-1930s beginning with "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science," 1934, reprinted in Daniel O'Connor and Francis Oakley, eds., *Creation: The Impact of an Idea* (New York: Scribner's, 1969) 29–53.

[20] "Nature and nature's laws lay hid in night. / God said 'Let Newton be!' and all was light." Alexander Pope.

[21] "Logical theory" was the essence of "analytical philosophy," now dead except in name. Equally oxymoronic, but not nearly so important, is the expression "critical theory" as formulated by M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno and sustained by J. Habermas, A. Wellmer, and A. Honneth. I am grateful to Rüdiger Bubner for amusing conversations about "critical theory."
   The project of reducing "theory" to "logic," which in Frege's account of mathematics, esp. arithmetic (a theory separate from logic in Aristotle and Hegel), is aptly called "logicism," and for which Frege reinvented propositional logic, has an even more oxymoronic (Aristotelianly considered) opposite move, the reduction of "logic" to "theory," widely attempted in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany. See, e.g., Heinrich Maier, *Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles*, Vol. II (Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1896–1900): "Inference-theory can never dispense with its epistemological and metaphysical foundations" (p. 85). "The metaphysical background of Aristotle's original logic, to which it owes its real synthetic power, has been forgotten since the Stoic plague" (p. 386). Cited in Günther Patzig, *Die aristotelische Syllogistik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963); *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism*, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1968) 87. The professor most responsible for discrediting Hegel as a philosopher in Germany, A. Trendelenburg, teacher of Franz Brentano, whose students included Ernst Mach and Sigmund Freud and whose dissertation on "το ον λεγεται πολλαχως" Heidegger cites as the beginning of his thinking about "being," also

"The effect of a lecture depends upon the habits (κατα τα εθη, εθος, '*ethos*') of the listener; because we expect the language to which we are accustomed, and anything beyond this seems not to be on the same level, but somewhat strange and unintelligible on account of its unfamiliarity (ασυνηθειαν, '*asynetheia*'); for it is the familiar (συνηθες, '*synethes*') that is intelligible (γνωριμον, '*gnorimon*')" (Aristotle,[22] *Meta.* II, 994b–995a). Thus Aristotle. Compare Hegel: "Das Bekannte überhaupt ist darum, weil es *bekannt* ist, nicht erkannt." "The well known is unknown precisely because it is *well known*" (PhG 28 = § 31).

These two statements may seem to contradict one another, but they do not. Both Aristotle (esp. *EN* II) and Hegel (esp. Enz § 410) take habit (*ethos* or *hexis*, or *Gewohnheit*) or "second nature" to be the key to theory as well as *praxis* in the human world. But we may get into the habit of not taking habit seriously. A bad habit indeed! Although most habits, to Aristotle and Hegel, are good, and indeed indispensable, we may form some habits that are for a time useful but ultimately misleading. That is Hegel's point in the PhG, where he attempts to come to terms with the millennial habit[23] or propensity, which I shall call "Stoic," to supplant "second natures," that is, habits, with putative "first natures" (e.g., minds or wills or "the language instinct").[24]

To exemplify how language in the habit of "Stoicism" is presupposed prior to *philosophical interpretation*, consider the following supposedly neutral characterization of the point of departure for a philosophy of language by the excellent Chomskyan Jerrold Katz, chosen almost arbitrarily from the contemporary literature:

> Roughly, linguistic communication consists in the production of some external, publicly observable, acoustic phenomenon whose phonetic and syntactic structure encodes a speaker's inner, private thoughts or ideas and the decoding of the phonetic and syntactic structure exhibited in such a physical phenomenon by other speakers in the form of an inner, private experience of the same thoughts or ideas.[25]

This presupposed linguistic frame of reference, with its fundamental distinction between an "inner language" and an "outer language," was invented and established by the Stoics in the third century BC

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contributed to the moot reduction of "logic" to "theory" in his *Logische Untersuchungen* (1870, 3rd ed.), see Vol. I, p. 32. A more recent attempt to reduce "logic" to "theory" is Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978); *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984).

22   Aristotle quotations, except for *Meta.* XII, 7, 1072b18–30 = Enz § 577, which is translated afresh below, are mostly, except where otherwise noted, in the "Oxford" translation, with some emendations.

23   Hegel identifies the habit (*Gewohnheit*) to be overcome by the PhG as follows: "In der Rücksicht, daß die allgemeine Vorstellung, wenn sie dem, was ein Versuch ihrer Ausführung ist, vorangeht, das Auffassen der letztern erleichtert, ist es dienlich, das Ungefähre derselben hier anzudeuten, in der Absicht zugleich, bei dieser Gelegenheit einige Formen zu entfernen, deren *Gewohnheit* ein Hindernis für das philosophische Erkennen ist." PhG 19 = § 16, emphasis added.

   "Since the universal representation [the form of consciousness], if it anticipates the attempt to bring about its unfolding, makes it easier to realize its development, it may be useful here to call into question certain ["Stoic"] forms whose *habitual acceptance* blocks the path toward philosophical knowledge." Translation aided by W. Kaufmann.

24   Steven Pinker, *The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language* (New York: William Morrow, 1994).

25   Jerrold J. Katz, *The Philosophy of Language* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) 98.

and has gone virtually unchallenged in the meanwhile, despite the "private language" controversy in the last century. Hegel in the PhG was the first post-Stoic to come to terms with the issue, as I shall try to show. For Aristotle the question did not exist. Hegel's objective in the PhG was to get us back to the position of Aristotle with regard to language and logic.[26]

Aristotle's Greek did not have a word that will directly translate "language" as it has come to be used in the world beginning with Chrysippus.[27] Of course, λογος, "*logos*," is a tolerable analogue, which is often translated "language." But the term has many other connotations, some of which have led moderns to translate "*logos*" as "word," "logic," "discourse," "reason," and, worst of all, "theory." Aristotle was the first philosopher, and arguably the only one until Hegel, to develop an adequate theory of "theory," what he called θεωρια, "*theoria*" and Hegel reconstructed as "*Spekulation*,"[28] which, when seen as such, is clearly different from "logic."

I certainly do not wish to downplay the importance of what Aristotle accomplished in his treatment of *logos*. In one word, he invented the discipline, which, since the Stoics, has been called "logic": the treatment of language as a formal subject matter. The key to this, as Jan Łukasiewicz has made plain, was his insight into the nature of the linguistic "variable."[29] Well before François Viète's (1540–1603) popularization of the numerical variable, which spread the use of algebra in the sixteenth century, Aristotle grasped the significance of a variable that would accommodate linguistic substitution instances.[30]

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[26] The only Hegel scholar known to me who has grasped the place of language and logic in Aristotle is Éric Weil, as discussed below.

Clearly, for Aristotle, "logic" or "analytics" is separate from and propaedeutic to theory, not the "foundation" of theory as urged by Chrysippus and consequently by every *Gestalt* (see below) of consciousness considered in the PhG as taken up in the Stoic tradition. This tradition culminated in twentieth-century analytic philosophy, a post-"Hegelian" movement that arose out of an explicit rejection of "Hegel" by the erstwhile "Hegelians," G.E. Moore and B. Russell. The sociological, academic, and theological circumstances for this rejection and for the rise of analytic philosophy are concisely sketched by Gilbert Ryle in his introduction to *The Revolution in Philosophy*, Ryle *et al.* (London: Macmillan, 1956). In these eloquent BBC lectures, which take the form of a second "manifesto" for analytic philosophy (the first was A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*, 1936), the key to the "revolution" is located in the shift from Aristotelian term logic to Fregean propositional logic. What is accordingly celebrated in this "modest proposal" is the "recent" emergence of a "revolutionary" and vastly superior "logical theory," the oxymoron exposed in this essay.

It is evident that what Hegel calls "*Logik*" in Wissenschaft der Logik (Georg Lasson, ed., Leipzig: Meiner, 1934, 2 vols.) (WdL) and Enz, Part I, is not "logic" in the sense of this essay. It is rather theory, indeed, it is his reworking of what Aristotle regarded as the highest form of *theoria*, "First Philosophy," known since Andronicus' *Corpus Aristotelicum* as "metaphysics."

[27] There was also no such thing as "grammar" in the Hellenic world. It is another Stoic invention in European thought. (Panini's earlier and magnificent grammar of Sanskrit cannot be taken up here.) The Alexandrian and Stoic Dionysius Thrax (late second century BC) gave Europe its first systematic grammatical description of a natural language, Greek.

The Alexandrians also introduced the use of diacritical marks in spelling Greek, one reason my Greek citations appear without diacriticals.

[28] I develop this theme in "Words and Things in Aristotle and Hegel: 'το ον λεγεται πολλαχως,'" *The Philosophical Forum* (= PF) XXXIII, 2 (2002): 125ff., hereafter WTAH.

[29] Jan Łukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1951). See pp. 7ff. on "variables."

[30] To understand inference in Aristotle one must see that the *logical* operation "predication" is performed on the variables, not on the substitution instances. The result is a rather more austere conception of inference than in many interpretations of *An. Pr.* Attaining such austerity makes Aristotle's "logic" less "exciting" but it keeps it from edging over into "theory." It follows that Quine's thesis, "to be is to be the value of a bound variable," and the ensuing notion

It must be said that I have fully accepted Łukasiewicz's reading of the Aristotelian syllogistic as an axiomatic system much like that of Euclid in *The Elements*.[31] Now Aristotle clearly used natural language, as opposed to the formal language he invented (and, we can see, he comprehended), in his theoretical work, physics, etc. Barnes' claim that Aristotle "would have" translated the language of his theories of physics and the like into a formal axiomatic discourse "had he but world enough and time" seems to me fanciful.

Because Jonathan Barnes' claim, widely accepted, is so important for the argument of this essay, we must consider it in his own words. Here is Barnes' question:

> This, then, is the problem: on the one hand we have a highly formalized theory of scientific methodology [*An. Post.*]; on the other a practice innocent of formalization and exhibiting rich and variegated methodological pretensions of its own.[32] How are the two to be reconciled?[33]

Here is Barnes' answer:

> [Aristotle's] achievement, great though it was, inevitably fell short of his ideal; and the Aristotelian system was designed with the ideal in mind.
>
> Aristotle says quite enough to enable us to see how, in a perfect world, he would have presented and organized the scientific knowledge he had industriously amassed. But his systematic plans are plans for a completed science, and he himself did not live long enough to discover everything. Since the treatises are not the final presentations of an achieved science, we should not expect to find in them an orderly succession of axioms and deductions. Since the treatises are intended, in the end, to convey a systematic science, we should expect them to indicate how that system is to be achieved. And that is exactly what we do find. Aristotle was a systematic thinker; his surviving treatises present a partial and unfinished sketch of his system.[34]

Barnes' answer has been overwhelmingly influential.[35] This is a reading of "logic" and "theory" in Aristotle that is subjected to critique in the present essay.

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of "ontological commitment," hinges, from an Aristotelian point of view, upon an overrich conception of the "variables" on which logical operations are performed. In one word, they are too "theoretical."

[31] What I reject in Łukasiewicz, as indicated below, is the notion that syllogistic may be understood as subordinate to propositional logic.

[32] Not a bad characterization of Aristotle's λεγεται πολλαχως procedure in his theoretical sciences. But, of course, Barnes wants more.

[33] Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," *Articles on Aristotle*, Vol. I, *Science*, ed. Barnes *et al.* (London: Duckworth, 1975) 66.

[34] Jonathan Barnes, *Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982) 39.

[35] For the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of biology, for example, see "Definition and Demonstration: Theory and Practice," articles by D.M. Balme, J.G. Lennox, Robert Bolton, and Allan Gotthelf, in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 65–198.

The notion that Aristotle had a "logical" system to which he would have reduced his "theoretical" system has led D.W. Graham to postulate that Aristotle had "two systems." See Graham, *Aristotle's Two Systems* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987).

There are plausible objections to Łukasiewicz's axiomatic interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic, most carefully made by John Corcoran.[36] Here I can only say (some objections are indicated below) that I do not find the arguments against Łukasiewicz's interpretation convincing, though I agree with many critics that his subordination of term logic to "modern" *propositional* logic (as indicated by the subtitle of his book: *From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*), is simply a mistake, a gratuitous gesture to the then triumphalist analytic school, but a red herring with regard to his central *axiomatic* argument.

Among all objections to Łukasiewicz's *axiomatic* interpretation, there seems to be a common thread: to sustain a connection between the notion of inference in language as logical or formal and informal inference as used in a natural language, which is what Aristotle clearly speaks in his theoretical work, for example, physics, biology, or "first philosophy." That logical "inference" can be found in a natural language is the point in common between Corcoran and Barnes. But whereas Barnes argues that such natural-language "inference" could and would have been formally cleared up by Aristotle, had he not died in his early sixties, Corcoran argues that "inference" itself already has its proper place in a natural language.

My point is that both Aristotle and Hegel draw a clear line of demarcation between formal logic and theoretical science, thus averting the claims of both Corcoran and Barnes. Formal logic cannot be made "natural" (*contra* Corcoran) and theoretical science cannot be made formally logical (*contra* Barnes). For the formal language of term variables invented by Aristotle, that is, syllogistic, is what it is by contrast with the natural language used in the theoretical sciences, in which, for example, το ον λεγεται πολλαχως ("*to on legetai pollakhos*"), "being [as well as all other theoretical entities] is spoken of in many ways" (see WTAH). This is also the point that Brandom misses but Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* gets. Full-fledged "logical" inference is only bought at the price of formalism.

Aristotle's, Hegel's, and Wittgenstein's clear line of demarcation between logic and theory can only be grasped in the context of their arguments as a whole. None of them made a "definitive" statement on the issue. Still, it might be helpful to consider three fairly concise formulations in their own words:

(1) Illuminating passages in Aristotle as to the place of "logic" vis-à-vis "theory" are:

"[…] it is absurd (ατοπον, "*atopon*") to be in search of a method when one is already engaged in [theoretical] knowing" (*Meta.* II, 3, 995a13).

And the attempts of some who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted are due to a lack of education in "analytics" [later called "logic"] (απαιδευσιαν των αναλυτικων, "*apaideusian ton analytikon*"); for they should know these things *already* when they come to a special study [i.e., before taking up a *theoretical science*], and not be enquiring into them while they are pursuing it. Evidently the philosopher, who is theorizing (θεωρουντος, "*theorountos*") the nature of all entity,

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[36] John Corcoran, "Aristotle's Natural Deduction System," *Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations*, ed. Corcoran (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974). Corcoran's position has been widely endorsed or followed, e.g., by Fred Sommers, *The Logic of Natural Language* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982); George Englebretsen, *Three Logicians* (The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1981); Robin Smith, trans. and editor of Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).

must *also* [but separately and preliminarily] inquire into the principles (αρχων, αρχη, "*archē*") of the syllogism (συλλογιστικων, "*syllogistikos*").[37]

(2) Here is Hegel on logic and theory in Aristotle:

> Aristoteles ist so der Urheber der verständigen, gewöhnlichen Logik; seine Formen betreffen nur das Verhältniß von Endlichem zu einander, das Wahre kann in solchen Formen nicht gefaßt werden. Aber zu bemerken ist, daß hierauf nicht seine Logik gegründet ist, daß diese nicht sich auf dieß verständige Verhältniß begründet,—daß es nicht diese Formen des Schlusses sind, nach denen Aristoteles verfährt. Wenn Aristoteles so verführe, so würde er nicht dieser spekulative Philosoph seyn, als den wir ihn erkannt haben; keiner seiner Sätze, seiner Ideen könnte aufgestellt, behauptet werden, könnte gelten, wenn er sich an die Formen dieser gewöhnlichen Logik hielte. Man muß ja nicht glauben, daß Aristoteles, indem er spekulativ ist, nach dieser seiner Logik, nach diesen Formen im Organon gedacht, fortgeschritten, bewiesen hätte; sonst hätte er keinen Schritt fortthun können, da wäre er zu keinem spekulativen Satz gekommen.[38]

> Aristotle is thus the originator of the logic of the understanding; its forms only concern the relationship of finite to finite, and in them what is true cannot be grasped. But it must be said that Aristotle's philosophy is not by any means founded on this (superficially) plausible relationship; Aristotle did not think (theorize) in terms of these syllogistic forms. Had he done so, he would not be the speculative [i.e., "theoretical"] philosopher we have come to know. It is not to be believed that Aristotle's speculative theory is conceived, developed, or demonstrated in terms of his logic, the forms of his logical instruments (*Organon*). Had he done so he could not have made a single step towards theory.

(3) Wittgenstein on the limits of language:

> Das Buch will also dem Denken eine Grenze ziehen, oder vielmehr—nicht dem Denken, sondern dem Ausdruck der Gedanken: Denn um dem Denken eine Grenze zu ziehen, müssten wir beide Seiten dieser Grenze denken können (wir müssten also denken können, was sich nicht denken lässt).

> Die Grenze wird also nur in der Sprache gezogen werden können und was jenseits der Grenze liegt, wird einfach Unsinn sein.[39]

> The book will […] draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thought; for, in order to draw a limit to thought we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

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[37] *Meta.* IV, 3, 1005b1–7, emphases added.

[38] *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 2, K.L. Michelet, ed., in *Sämtliche Werke*, Jubiläumsausgabe, Vol. 18 (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1965) 414–15 (lectures on the history of philosophy).

[39] Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, Vorwort.

The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.[40]

But it is one thing to aver that Aristotle's *logic* is axiomatic (and to *deny* that his *theories* are axiomatic, as I do *contra* Barnes), and quite another to spell out by what means Aristotle's logical *inferences* work. Barnes interpolates what is clearly an Aristotelian notion of a "logical" axiomatic (in *An. Post.*) into Aristotle's theories because he does not grasp that the parameters of an axiomatic system in Aristotle are strictly logical (à la Łukasiewicz). In this essay, I try to clarify this by appeal to the implicit notion of "*extensionality*" in Aristotle's treatment of term variables. So far as I know, imperfectly to be sure, there has been no previous account of syllogistic inference in Aristotle that so clearly uses the notion of "extensionality."[41]

Since the principal "logical" operation performed on variables in Aristotelian "logic" is the predication (κατηγοϱεισθαι, "*kategoreisthai*") by one term of another (τι κατα τινος, "*ti kata tinos*"), it was natural for him to limit the range of linguistic substitution instances to terms. In the third century BC, Chrysippus exploited the Aristotelian notion of a variable for sentences, called "*Sätze*" in Frege's nineteenth-century reinvention of Stoic logic and "propositions" in Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13, 2nd ed., 1925–27). But whether employed in reference to terms, as in Aristotle's syllogistic, or propositions, as in Stoic and Fregean propositional calculi, the Aristotelian notion of a linguistic variable, however misunderstood at various hands, has remained intact. And, over the millennia, no functionable linguistic variables have been concocted other than terms and propositions.[42]

I wish to argue that the main impediment to a theoretical reading of Aristotle (and of Hegel as well) has been the conflation of logic and theory[43] first performed by the Stoics; reinforced by Frege,

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[40] Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, Preface, trans. based on Daniel Kolak.
[41] This may seem an immodest boast, and it may be based on an imperfect knowledge of the literature. I can only say that I worked out the argument independently, albeit with much help from Wittgenstein and Sellars.
  Of course extensionality was the implicit notion in J. Venn's *Symbolic Logic* of 1881, in which he attempted to explicate the algebra of G. Boole. I find Venn's diagrams of syllogistic inference to be illuminating. Indeed, they point to my "extensionalist" interpretation of logical inference in Aristotle. But I do not believe Venn drew the conclusions l have drawn. These are most important for drawing a distinction between logic and theory, the topic I have proposed for an interpretation of Hegel's PhG as a reintroduction to Aristotelian science in the world of "modernity," which Hegel first discovered as a theoretical topic (as observed, e.g., by Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* [Cambridge: Polity, 1987]. See WTAH on "civil society," the distinctive institution of modernity, 140–41, and my essays "The Global Dimension of Ethical Life" and "What Is 'Civil Society?'").
[42] A qualification. S. Leśniewski has a logic, called "mereology," in which there are variables for logical constants; Alonzo Church's lambda calculus quantifies over functions; and second-order logic, generally, quantifies over predicates. Douglas P. Lackey has thus proposed that I say: "Until the 20th century, no logic was constructed with other than term or sentential variables." Perhaps.
[43] My reading of Aristotle, as the philosopher who systematically distinguishes between theory and logic, is, as indicated, at variance with the dominant contemporary reading, epitomized by Jonathan Barnes. My interpretation has largely been stimulated by Hegel, *passim*; Éric Weil, in conversations and in "La place de la logique dans la pensée aristotélicienne" (in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 56 (1951): 283–315, English trans. by J. Barnes, in *Articles on Aristotle*, Vol. I, 88–112); Wolfgang Wieland, in *Die aristotelische Physik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962); and David Lachterman, in many conversations (especially when in 1981 we shared an apartment in Poughkeepsie and talked non-stop about these matters) and in various unpublished essays.

Russell, and twentieth-century analytical philosophy; and surreptitiously reimposed on readings of Aristotle (and of Hegel as well). This will require us to consider the difference between the use of two kinds of linguistic variable: term and propositional. My argument is that a logic like that of the Stoics, based on propositional variables, does invite the conflation of logic and theory, whereas a syllogistic logic, like the Aristotelian, based on term variables, *need not*—despite the fact that the predominant reconstructions of Aristotelian logic have made the conflation as well. To see this, we will have to consider for a moment the precise nature of the logical operations made on variables in term and propositional logics, respectively.[44]

First, term logic or syllogistic. Here the principal difference among variables is extensionality. Aristotle exploits the fact that when B is predicated of A, B has an extension wider than or at least equal to that of A. This was seen to follow from the very operation of predication, regardless of the term referents, for term variables have extensions but no referents.[45] Their "logical" determinacy derives exclusively from the performance of a logical function or operation, here predication. It is by virtue of this insight into the nature of a linguistic variable that we can regard Aristotle as the founder or inventor of logic. This is also the reason why Aristotle, in the *Prior Analytics*, where he explains the nature of syllogistic inference, never makes use of natural terms with preestablished degrees of extensionality but rather uses the Greek letters, alpha, beta, etc., whose extensionalities are solely determined by the operation of predication.

As soon as we grasp this basic feature of the syllogistic it is clear that the traditional example for illustrating the syllogism is systematically misleading: "All men are mortal/Socrates is a man/therefore Socrates is mortal." The errors compounded in this famous example are legion,[46] but the most basic

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For the most stunning conflation of theory with logic see Rudolf Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, written 1922–25; *The Logical Structure of the World*, trans. Rolf A. George (Berkeley: U of California P, 1967). I owe my understanding of Carnap to a 1960 seminar on "Abstract Entities" with Wilfrid Sellars.

[44] I do not count myself an "expert" on logic but my work in the field has been fairly sustained. I was introduced to term logic by Professor W.H.K. Narum in 1955 and continued working as his assistant in the teaching of logic over the next three years. Professor Frederic Fitch introduced me to propositional logic in 1958. From 1959 I took a series of seminars on "entailment" with Professor Alan Ross Anderson, courses which resulted in Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel Belnap, *Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975). In 1961–62, I shared an office, and continuous conversations on logical topics, with Nuel Belnap, the most fruitful period in my study of logic. I have in the meanwhile formed serious reservations about the coherency of "entailment" logic.

Also, in Spring term 1961 Karl W. Deutsch, Professor of Political Science at Yale, appointed me his consultant in mathematical logic for a graduate seminar whose sessions he had taped, the edited version of which became *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: Free Press, 1963), translated into German as *Politische Kybernetik: Modelle und Perspektiven* (Freiburg im Br: Rombach Verlag KG, 1969). During the late 1960s and early 1970s that book became the basis for a reorganization of the German Democratic Republic, much as the People's Republic of Hungary had used the "input/output" economics of Wassily Leontief as a "cybernetic" model to facilitate central planning.

[45] With regard to reference, term variables differ importantly from propositional variables, which, as Frege has argued ("Über Sinn und Bedeutung," sometimes translated as "On Sense and Reference"), "refer" to "the true" and "the false," both of which are understood to be "assertibles" (Frege's "concept notation" for assertion is what Sellars called "the gate"), each of which has its correlative "propositional attitude," i.e., "in the mind." On Frege, see below. But, N.B., the variables in Aristotelian logic have no referents. It is by means of the Fregean notion of "propositional attitudes" that Brandom has been able to insert his critical notion of "discursive commitment" and thus make plausible his conflation of "theory" with "logic."

[46] These errors are spelled out by Łukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, 1–19.

error consists in making us believe that the force of inference derives from the extralogical degrees of extensionality in the natural-language terms "mortality," "humanity," and, what is not even a category because a proper name, "Socrates." (It is truly astonishing that Bertrand Russell, in his explication of the Aristotelian syllogistic,[47] also misuses this notorious example.)

By contrast, Aristotle's paradigm for the most basic form of syllogistic inference (which the medieval tradition called "Barbara") could not be more transparent: "If B is predicated of A and C is predicated of B, then C is predicated of A." Here we can see that the conclusion, "C is predicated of A," follows by simple transitivity from the conjoint hypotheses "B is predicated of A" and "C is predicated of B." The degrees of extensionality[48] by which the inference is drawn are all intralogically, not extralogically, determined. It is the mark of logic, as the formal treatment of language, that all determinacies are intralogically established. As Günther Patzig[49] has shown, much of the *Prior Analytics* consists in techniques for transforming, converting (*qua* αντιστρεφουσιν, "*antistrephousin*") or "perfecting," more obscure albeit valid syllogisms into the "Barbara" form, where the inference is transparent, φανερος, "*phaneros*" or "evident." By these means the logical powers of such operators as "some" and "not" are removed and inference strictly and solely based on the *extensionality* of the term variables is brought to view.[50]

Let us now consider the basic inferences of propositional, originally Stoic but more famously Fregean, logic.[51] Here the linguistic variables are not terms but sentences, statements, or propositions. A proposition consists minimally of two terms, one predicated of the other. Since predication is presupposed of the minimal units in propositional logic, the basic logical operation cannot be, as in syllogistic, predication. The basic contrast in Stoic logic is, as they said, between "simple" and "non-simple," or, in the now more familiar terms, between "atomic" and "molecular" propositions. As the names suggest, an atomic proposition is singular and uncompounded whereas a molecular proposition is a combination of atomic or other molecular propositions. The principle of Stoic logic is that there are just three logical operations by which molecular propositions are formed. These are: "conjunction," "disjunction," and "if/then conditionality." The Stoic convention for indicating an atomic proposition used the phrases "the first," "the second," "the third," and the like. In twentieth-century propositional logic, articulated by Whitehead and Russell in ignorance of its Stoic predecessor

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[47] Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945) 196.

[48] On the highly interesting topic, degrees of extensionality, see, e.g., Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Extensionality," *Mind* LXIX, 273 (1960): 55–62; Karel Lambert and Bas van Fraassen, *Derivation and Counterexample* (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1972); Karel Lambert, "Predication and Extensionality," *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 3 (1974): 255–64; and Lambert, "General Terms, Predicates and Extensionality," *Dialectica* 49, nos. 2–4 (1995): 195–202. Marcus' and Lambert's interpretations of extensionality do not coincide with mine but they, together with conversations 1966–70 with Bas van Fraassen, have been very helpful. I came to my view of extensionality thanks to seminars on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* with Wilfrid Sellars.

[49] Patzig, *Die aristotelische Syllogistik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959), 2nd ed., 1963; *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism*, trans., J. Barnes (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1968).

[50] On "perfection" see Patzig, ch. III. Patzig does not state what I call "the thesis of extensionality," but his account of how a syllogism is perfected according to *An. Pr.* makes the transitivity of extensionality among term variable contrasts and hence the thesis clear. Aristotle (as later Hegel) uniquely grasped the nature of theory because he saw the limits of logic. My extensionality thesis is only an attempt to make these limits more transparent.

[51] On the Stoic original of propositional logic see Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley: U California P, 1953). Mates credits a 1927 article in Polish by Jan Łukasiewicz for the first modern reconstruction of Stoic logic.

but with constant reference to Frege, the convention has been to use letters of the alphabet beginning with "p" to indicate the atomic propositions which the Stoics called "the first," "the second," etc. Since "p, q, r, … " are shorter than the Stoic conventions, and since the language of *Principia Mathematica*, called PM-ese, on the model of "Chinese," has become well known, I will here speak PM-ese.[52]

If the key logical determinacy of a term variable in syllogistic is extensionality, that for propositional variables is "truth" and "falsity." It will be evident, as it was to Aristotle (*de Int*, 17a5–6), that a term per se can be neither true nor false. But when one term is predicated of another to form a proposition, the result can be true or false. As Frege has said most clearly, in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892), the *Bedeutung*, or "reference," or "logical meaning" of a proposition, atomic or molecular, is its truth-value, either "the True" or "the False." Thus any proposition may be designated true or false and the decisive determinacy of a propositional variable is truth and falsity. In the economical language PM-ese, these are shortened to T and F. Now, the whole point of propositional logic is to spell out techniques whereby the "truth value," T or F, of a molecular proposition can be determined solely on the basis of the respective truth values of its constituent atomic propositions. This *is* inference in propositional logic. These techniques are, since Wittgenstein and Post, called "truth tables."

Each logical operation—conjunction, disjunction, and conditionality—is said to have a distinctive array of truth-values for its resultant molecular propositions based upon the truth-values of the atomic propositions operated upon. So, if the logical operation is conjunction, "p & q,"[53] there will be four possible truth values of the resultant molecular proposition:

p, q	p&q
T, T	T
T, F	F
F, T	F
F, F	F

The other two-place truth functions are the logical counterparts of "or," v, and "if/then," ⊃. But it must be stressed that the symbols for logical operations, &, v, and ⊃, are not "translations" of the natural language terms "and," "or" and "if/then." For they function only upon propositional *variables* to determine the truth-values of resultant molecular propositions according to the truth tables, given the truth-values of the component atomic propositions, whereas their natural language counterparts

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[52] I owe the expression "PM-ese," and much of my understanding of its subject matter, to my teacher Wilfrid Sellars.

[53] Technically the ampersand symbol is neo-PM-ese since PM used a period "." to indicate the operation of conjunction. But "&" has become conventional.

are multifunctional and systematically ambiguous.[54] Here is the truth table for the non-exclusive "or," corresponding with the Latin word "vel," v:

p, q	pvq
T, T	T
T, F	T
F, T	T
F, F	F

Finally, the truth-functional counterpart of "if/then" is symbolized ⊃. It is particularly important that this symbol be interpreted strictly in accordance with the following truth table, or truth-functionally, for the Stoics vacillated on the question, and the Stoic tradition, with the exception of Hobbes, had to await David Hume for a critical discrimination between "causal connection" and "logical inference."

p, q	p⊃q
T, T	T
T, F	F
F, T	T
F, F	T

The third molecular truth-value for conditionality (sometimes called "material implication" but more accurately "Philonic implication") has been controversial. But such controversy has only arisen when, beginning with Diodorus Cronus (d. 284 BC), whom the Stoics largely followed, p⊃q is not interpreted truth-functionally but on the basis of "if/then" statements in a natural language. Whatever the Stoic confusion, the main point is that logical items, whether terms or propositions, are variables whose determinacies are intralogically determined extensions or truth-values rather than words or sentences in a natural language.

The main difference between term and propositional variables is that the latter can be and often are understood mentalistically. Indeed, the Stoics explicitly asserted that propositions are αξιωματα, "*axiomata*" and that "*axiomata*" are incorporeals and as such in the "mind." At first blush this may seem surprising since the physics of the Stoics, like that of the Epicureans, was unabashedly corporealist or, as this is sometimes unaristotelianly put, "materialistic." But, for reasons we will touch upon later, the Stoics drew a firm line of demarcation between two spheres of language or λογος, "*logos*." The one they called "outer language," λογος προφορικος, "*logos proforikos*"; the other they called

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[54] Aristotle recognized this aspect of a natural language, the only proper language of "theory," in his repeated observation that "being" (the topic of the supreme theoretical science, "first philosophy" or what has become known since Andronicus as "metaphysics") is λεγεται πολλαχως, "spoken of in many ways."

"inner language," λογος ενδιαθετος, "*logos endiathetos.*"[55] The *logos proforikos* may also be called "uttered speech," which takes the form of articulate sounds audible to the ear and written sentences visible to the eye. These are obviously corporeals. The "*logos endiathetos*" is sometimes called "utterable speech" or "meanings" that may or may not be expressed. For the Stoic tradition it is "inner language" or the "*logos endiathetos*" which is the paradigmatic realm of incorporeals and therefore of logical inference. We must pay special heed to the Stoic contention that it is only within the realm of inner speech that logical inference can be performed. In the Stoic tradition Hobbes is the pre-Kantian philosopher most attentive to the fact that "demonstrative arguments" are only to be had in the realm of "mental discourse," beyond which all arguments are "conjectural."

A brief digression. I just used the expression "the Stoic tradition." As we usually do the history of philosophy, a "tradition" is a sequence within which one thinker is "influenced" or somehow affected by a predecessor. In the case of the Stoic tradition this can be systematically misleading. For some of the foremost expositors of the "position"[56] first articulated by the Stoics reconstructed their "position" with no knowledge of its source and hence with no "influence" in the ordinary sense of the term. As to the critical Stoic bifurcation of language into the "*logos endiathetos*" and the "*logos proforikos*," we find a profound reworking of this "position" in Hobbes' contrast between "mental discourse" and "verbal discourse," in Kant's distinction between talk about what is "transcendentally ideal" and what is "empirically real," and in the fundamental distinction of twentieth-century analytic philosophy between "meaning-talk" and "saying-talk,"[57] elegantly captured in Stanley Cavell's celebrated question: "Must we mean what we say?" Now there is small evidence of any influence of the Stoics upon Hobbes or of Hobbes upon Kant (I shall leave aside the vexed question of Kant's "influence" on analytic philosophy). The point here is that there are some basic "positions" that are, in the words of Hans Blumenberg,[58] "occupied" and "reoccupied" over the course of time, without any need of "influence." Perhaps the greatest exponent of this way of considering philosophical "positions" was Hegel in the PhG, where the "Form" of consciousness is shown to undergo a sequence of immanent transformations from *Gestalt* ("shape") to *Gestalt*, or from "position" to "position," with a beginning, middle, and end—like an Aristotelianly conceived "plot"—and, again like an Aristotelian tragedy, without any reference to or confusion with history.[59]

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[55] Cf. Max Mühl, "Der λογος ενδιαθετος und προφορικος von der älteren Stoa bis zur Synode von Sirmium 351," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 7 (1962): 7–56.

[56] "Position" appears here and elsewhere in inverted commas because the word is used in the sense of Blumenberg, see below, whose "*Stellungen*" or "positions" echo the *Gestalten* of Hegel's PhG and parallel Hegel's use of "*Stellung*" in Enz §§ 19–83.

[57] "Talk" as used in this sentence is unmistakably "Sellars-speak."

[58] Hans Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966). Translation of the 1976 German edition by Robert M. Wallace: *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983). On "positions" see *Legitimacy*, e.g., 300 & 339.

[59] "It is also apparent from what has been mentioned that the function of the poet is not to speak of incidents which have come to be (γενομενα, "*genomena*"), but rather of what might come to be (γενοιτο, "*genoito*"), i.e. what is possible by virtue of either the likely or the necessary … . On this account poetry (ποιησις, "*poiesis*") is both more philosophic and more worthy than history, for poetry speaks more of universals while history speaks more of particulars. The universal is what characters of a certain kind say or do in accordance with what is likely or necessary in a certain kind of succession of incidents [and] is that at which poetry aims in setting down names for characters, while the particular is what Alcibiades, for example, did or suffered." Aristotle, *Poetics* 9, 1451a36–40, b6–11, Kenneth Telford trans., with

I shall return to Hegel's PhG in the second half of this essay.

Here it might be apt to add that, unlike Hobbes, Kant, and analytic philosophy, each of which presupposed and worked within the Stoic bifurcation of language, Hegel, in the Introduction to the PhG, gave us our first diagnosis of it in 2,000 years and spelled out a way, "Hegel's phenomenological method," to overcome its *aporia*. He called this method "*sich vollbringende Skeptizismus*" ("thoroughgoing scepticism") (PhG 67 = § 78) and later called the *aporia* "*der Gegensatz des Bewußtseins*" ("the opposition of consciousness").[60] I take this opposition to be between "inner" and "outer" language, between "mental discourse" and "verbal discourse." Incidentally, the aim of Hegel's PhG was, by eliminating the Stoic bifurcation of language, to rewin access to Aristotelian modes of thought in the modern world, which he then displayed in *Die Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (Enz). Alas, this magnificent accomplishment has been kept from view by the persistent propensity, only recently challenged,[61] to read Hegel himself as a philosopher within the Stoic "tradition," especially as articulated by Kant, Fichte, and Schelling.

To resume, the Aristotelian syllogistic and Stoic-Fregean propositional logic are both logics properly so called because they both observe, in their better formulations, the defining characteristic of a logic: That it consists in perspicuous and algorithmic operations performed on variables, term and propositional, respectively. One of the chief differences between them is that the objects of Stoic logic, propositions, are bearers of truth or falsity and may as such be affirmed or denied. The agency of such affirmation and denial the Stoics called the ηγεμονικον, "*hegemonikon*" (the "ruling part" of the soul), what has come to be called "mind." Indeed, it may be said that the very idea of mind or consciousness—absent in classical Greek philosophy (as Charles Kahn has shown[62])—was *invented* by

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emendations. In the PhG the "episodes" of a tragic drama are like the individual "movements" of *Gestalten* of consciousness and the "plot" is like the development of the "Form of consciousness" from "Sense-certainty" to "Absolute Knowing."

[60] "Aber die Befreiung von dem Gegensatze des Bewußtseins, welche die Wissenschaft muß voraussetzen können … ." (WdL, Vol. I, 32); "But the liberation from the opposition of consciousness, which theory must be able to assume … ." "Der Begriff der reinen Wissenschaft und seine Deduktion wird in gegenwärtiger Abhandlung also insofern vorausgesetzt, als die Phänomenologie des Geistes nichts anderes als die Deduktion desselben ist" (WdL I, 30); "The concept of pure theory and its proof [the PhG] will be assumed here [in the WdL] since the PhG is just that proof." Cf. Dove, "Hegel's 'Deduction of the Concept of Science,'" *Hegel and the Sciences*, ed. Robert S. Cohen and Marx Wartofsky, *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 64 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984) 271ff.

[61] See, for example, Alfredo Ferrarin: *Hegel interprete di Aristotele* (Pisa: ETS, 1990); Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), and WTAH. An earlier example is Franco Chiereghin, *Dialettica dell'assoluto e ontologia della soggettività in Hegel: Dall'ideale giovanile alla Fenomenologia dello spirito* (Trento: Verifiche, 1980). Chiereghin usefully exploits the Aristotelian notion of a "topos" in his exposition of the PhG, *Dialettica*, 454ff. The well-known 1923 essay, "Aristoteles und Hegel" by N. Hartmann, does not illuminate because it gives a "Stoic" misreading of both philosophers. The most theoretically (or "speculatively") suggestive remarks on Aristotle and Hegel are to be found in Herbert Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt: 1932); republished without changes as *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1968); *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, trans. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); see my review in *The Philosophical Review* (July 1989): 419ff. Unfortunately, the phrase "theory of historicity," shaped in the shadow of Heidegger, is oxymoronic. G.R.G. Mure, less attuned to "theory" than Marcuse, has written knowledgeably, if somewhat obscurely, about Aristotle and Hegel in *Introduction to Hegel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), esp. 1–51, and in *A Study of Hegel's Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950).

[62] See, e.g., Charles H. Kahn, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 48 (1966): 43–81, reprinted in Vol. IV, *Articles on Aristotle*, ed., Barnes, Schofield, Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1979),

the Stoics,[63] in part for this purpose (consider another in the next footnote). Aristotle had no need for anything like mind or consciousness to explicate his syllogistic (though many subsequent interpreters, beginning with Andronicus of Rhodes, have retrojectively imposed Stoically mental notions upon his thought).

Since mind or consciousness are among the most deeply problematic and ambiguous, albeit deeply embedded, notions in philosophy and psychology since Chrysippus, it can come as no surprise that Frege (like F.H. Bradley and Husserl) was concerned to affirm "pure" ("Stoic") mentalism or "mental discourse" in the sense of Hobbes and to ward off what he called "psychologism," exemplified in J.S. Mill's *Logic*, and what others have called "anthropologism," since this is said to confuse the purely mental, which Frege associated with what he called "*der Gedanke*," with a merely empirical notion of *psyche* or *anthropos*. But more important than the assertability of propositions, something like mind or consciousness is vital to Stoic logic because, having distinguished between inner and outer language to establish the inner or mental locus of logical inference, the agency for performing logical operations had to be placed there as well. The temptation to hypostatize (or "psychologize") this agency has been great and usually unresisted.[64] Frege's resistance, especially in *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*,[65] has been rightly regarded, especially by Michael Dummett, as "heroic." This work also contains Frege's most forthright argument that the minimal "unit of meaning" is the *Satz*, or proposition, Russell's "logical atom."

The elimination of the habit of taking consciousness to be the locus of thinking (theory), as well as of inference (logic), is the purport of the PhG.

Let me conclude this part of the paper by stating some of the basic contraries that have emerged in the Stoic tradition before I take up the method Hegel worked out in the PhG to overcome this tradition. The first opposition is between (A) a formal language of precise truth-functional operations performed on propositional variables and defining inferential validity with respect to these variables

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and "Aristotle versus Descartes on the Concept of the Mental," R. Salles, ed., in the Festschrift for Richard Sorabji (Oxford: OUP, 2004).

[63] Over the decades I have ventured the thesis that mind was a Stoic invention in various lectures at various universities, and at a special session of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings, December 1987, New York: "Minding our Language," PF XLIX, 4 (2018): 449ff.
  We may helpfully invert the subtitle of Steven Pinker's *The Language Instinct*, from "*How the Mind Creates Language*" to "how language creates the mind."

[64] Hence, or so I maintain, the Stoic invention of another aspect of mentality, "well known" to us but non-existent, as Hegel and Bruno Snell have shown, in the world of pre-Hellenistic Greece: the will. (Bernard Williams simply misses this point in his discussion of Snell on the will in *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1993) 21–26. Williams is particularly astute when he observes on p. 166: "In important ways, we are, in our ethical situation, more like human beings in antiquity than any Western people have been in the meantime." This "Hegelian" insight does not seem to derive from a reading of Hegel but simply from a keen consideration of the "positions" (like "*Gestalten*") taken in recent ethical "theory," elegantly set forth in his *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1985). Since Kant it has been possible to refer to this agency as an "uncaused causality," which, within the Stoic tradition, is apt. In a 1970 conversation Snell said that he had learned from Hegel "alles was ich weiß," "everything I know," about the absence of the will in classical Greek antiquity, a fact unnoted in the considerable literature on Snell's famous thesis. This literature might be improved by considering Snell in the context of Hegel and Aristotle.

[65] Gottlob Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*: *Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl* (Breslau: W. Koebner, 1884). *The Foundations of Arithmetic*: *A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number*, trans. J.L. Austin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, 2nd ed.).

and (B) natural languages that are inherently imprecise, and properly so, because they imbed a wide array of "speech acts" that make natural languages, from a *logical* point of view, "overdetermined."

The pervasive tendency in the Stoic tradition has been to portray *natural* languages as if they by themselves captured inferential validity in the *logical* sense of the word. This is why "logical theory," though commonly used, is an oxymoronic expression. A recent example of this tendency has been Robert Brandom, who exploits the notion of "material inference" as formulated in an early essay by our common mentor, Wilfrid Sellars, to make the case that the performatory aspects of a natural language can add up to something like inferential validity in a formal logic. Brandom acknowledges that "material inferences" "are not logically valid inferences. But logical vocabulary, subjunctive conditionals, can be used to express these material inferential relations. Without such vocabulary, the inferences can still be endorsed. With it, those content-generating inferential endorsements can be made explicit as the content of a claim or propositional endorsement."[66] Brandom's inferentialism is subtle in comparison with Russell's: "Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features."[67] But it is still the "Stoic" inferentialism under attack in the PhG.

The second opposition in the Stoic tradition is that between "inner" and "outer" language, *logos endiathetos* and *logos proforikos*, "mental discourse" and "verbal discourse" (Hobbes), "transcendental" language and "empirical" language (Kant). This will be the focus of the second part of the paper. Here let me mention that the issue has been simply avoided by most members of the Stoic tradition. Prominent exceptions have been Kant and Frege. Let us briefly consider Frege, whose *Begriffsschrift*, or "concept notation," of 1879 is perhaps the most sustained effort to deal with the problem. Frege recognizes that the vocabulary of propositional logic can only be expressed in the realm of "outer" language or verbal discourse. The task he sets himself, the task of a *Begriffsschrift*, is so to use verbal discourse that it restricts reference to mental or (acknowledging Kant) transcendental discourse.

The third opposition is an intensified version of the second. It stresses, with Chrysippus, Chomsky, and Katz, that "inner" language involves, in Chomsky's phrase, "a distinctively human semiotic." This contrasts with Aristotle's view that language (*qua* διαλεκτον, "*dialekton*") is simply one of the biological characteristics of *anthropos* (*Hist. An.* IV, 9, 536b1–2) or that man has vocal organs capable of producing speech (*qua logos, de Part. An.* II, 16, 659b35ff.), or that language (*qua logos*) makes man *capable* of participation in an association (κοινωνια, "*koinonia*") like a household (οικος) or a city (πολις) in which, by luck, he just might be habituated to full humanity (*Politics* I, 2, 1253a7ff.).

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[66] Brandom, *Making It Explicit*, 103–04. Brandom is made the consummatory "Hegelian" moment in American analytic philosophy (following Sellars' "Kantian" moment) in Luigi Ruggiu and ltalo Testa, eds., *Hegel contemporaneo: La ricezione americana di Hegel a confronto con la tradizione europea* (Milan: Guerini e Associati, 2003).

[67] Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919), as cited in G. Patzig, *Sprache und Logik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970) 9. I would venture to say, *pace* Brandom, that "inferentialism," mild or strong, is the mark of the "Stoic tradition" in philosophy, a foundation of the "opposition of consciousness" which Hegel attempted to overcome in the PhG. Note Hegel's important observation in his lectures on the history of philosophy, cited above, that Aristotle never attempted to impose his inferentialist syllogistic on any of his "theoretical" studies of the real world, including, *pace* Russell, zoology.

Since the Stoics, language has come to be regarded as the mark of the human, and not merely biologically. For generative linguists in the Chomsky school, the mark of this is that humans are said to be "competent" to generate an infinite number of intelligible sentences. Such a notion was unknown to Aristotle, for whom human excellence (αρετη, "*arete*") was characteristic of a small number of human animals lucky enough to be habituated in παιδεια, "*paideia*." This will also prove to be an important theme in what follows.

It is well known that the PhG includes a brief segment in chapter IV entitled "Stoicism" and that Hegel there acknowledges that the term he has chosen corresponds with a phase in the history of spirit (PhG 152 = § 198). But the topic of the PhG is not history. As stated above, it is a sequence of shapes (*Gestalten*), or Blumenbergian "positions," of consciousness that have, quasi-systematically, like an Aristotelianly conceived tragic plot, a beginning, a middle, and an end.[68] These consist in variations upon the root motif of the PhG, what Hegel calls "the Form of consciousness." The distinguishing characteristic of my interpretation is that I take the "Form of consciousness"[69] to be even more Stoic than that *Gestalt* explicitly so called.

WHAT IS STOICISM?

Let us consider Stoicism under four aspects: (1) Stoicism as a historical phenomenon, (2) the "Form" of consciousness as Stoic, (3) Stoicism as a "*Gestalt*" of consciousness (in PhG IV, B), and (4) the overcoming of Stoicism (the "absolution" of Stoicism, "absolute" knowing, PhG VIII[70]).

The first aspect can only function as a heuristic, as a means of making plausible the problem in general. For historical considerations can never rise above the level of imaginative reenactments, reconstructions of ways of being in the world that necessarily function within the "Form of consciousness" and can never rise above that Form. As a "*Gestalt* of consciousness" Stoicism can be no more than one in a series of *Gestalten*, a *Gestalt* whose inner dynamic can only generate a successor

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[68] "We have assumed that tragedy is imitation of action that is complete and whole and has a certain magnitude … ."

"A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and a completion. A beginning is that which is not itself of necessity after something else, but after which something else naturally exists or comes to be [like PhG I]. A completion is the contrary of this, being that which itself naturally exists or comes to be, either of necessity or for the most part, after something else, but after which there is nothing [like PhG VIII]. A middle is that which is itself after some other thing and after which there is also something else [like PhG II–VII]. A well-constructed plot, therefore, ought not to begin or complete itself wherever it may happen to, but ought to use the forms just mentioned." Aristotle, *Poetics*, 7, 1450b24–34, Telford trans. This is the structure which Charles Rosen grasps as shaping a "sonata form" in Haydn and Mozart. If we can grasp Rosen's musical analogy, the parallel with the "movements" of *Gestalten* and their formation into the plot (μυθος) of the "Form of consciousness" in the PhG will be transparent.

[69] "*Die Form des Bewußtseins.*" See, e.g., PhG 490 = § 699, 507 = § 729. In PhG VIII it is also assimilated with "*die Form der Gegenständlichkeit*," "the form of objectness," PF XXXII, 4 (2001): 407; PhG 549 = § 788: " … es ist allein noch um das Aufheben dieser bloßen Form zu tun, oder vielmehr weil sie dem *Bewußtsein als solchem* angehört, muß ihre Wahrheit schon in den Gestaltungen desselben sich ergeben haben." "All that remains [to be done] is to eliminate this mere form. Or, more precisely, because this form pertains to *consciousness as such*, its truth must have already become evident in the development of the *Gestalten* of consciousness." PF 407. Cf. WdL I, 35 and PhG 553 = § 795: " … die Form, eine *besondere Gestalt des Bewußtseins* zu sein … "; "the form of being a *particular Gestalt of consciousness*," PF 411; 556 = § 797: " … in der Form einer *Gestalt des Bewußtseins* … "; "in the form of a *Gestalt of consciousness*," PF 412; 556 = § 798: " … *Form der Gegenständlichkeit* für das Bewußtsein … "; "*form of objectness* for consciousness," PF 413.

[70] I presented a fairly detailed analysis of PhG VIII at the 2002 APA meeting mentioned below, but its contents are so detailed as to be incommensurable with this essay.

Gestalt, indeed, the *Gestalt* called "Scepticism." But if we can thematize our topic as the "Form of consciousness," the Form which is seen to generate a necessary sequence of *Gestalten* that has an iterative, cumulative, and consummatory character, then a "Science of the experience of consciousness" (Hegel's first title for the PhG) is constituted by the very nature of our subject matter. Those attempts, and they are the majority, to read the PhG and Hegel's philosophy in general as a completion of the Kantian project, as Fichte and Schelling understood their projects, are systematically misleading because such attempts are restricted to the "Form of consciousness" or to "Stoic" modes of thought. What they fail to grasp is that Kant, especially in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, represents the most complete rearticulation of the Stoic "position," the "Form of consciousness," since Chrysippus, the third century BC Stoic who best formulated this "position."[71]

(1) STOICISM AS A HISTORICAL PHENOMENON

As a historical phenomenon Stoicism took shape with the invention of the "Form of consciousness." As Hegel observes in his lectures on the history of philosophy, we must turn to Sextus Empiricus, a very "objective" opponent, for a historical grasp of Stoicism. The immediate historical context is the Hellenistic world in the aftermath of the *polis*. That world, for which the beautiful ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) of the *polis* was "no longer" ("*nicht mehr*" in the parlance of the PhG V, b), was, in the words of W.H. Auden, "an age of anxiety," an age that possessed the written legacy of the Hellenic world together with the awareness that that world was hopelessly lost. But rather than romantically pining—recall Schiller's words, exquisitely set to music by Schubert: "Schöne Welt, wo bist du?" ("Beautiful world, where are you?")—or engaging in the millennial games of "*polis* envy," all of which presuppose the Stoic "Form of consciousness," the Stoics addressed the problem head on and constructed a new post-*politan* frame of reference for the human spirit, namely, "mind," that has endured for more than 2,000 years and includes Andronicus of Rhodes, who, in first century BC Rome, edited the canonical albeit Stoic edition of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, and the Stoicizing Aristotle interpretations of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus, and Proclus.

The Stoic problem was that the Hellenic or *politan* Greeks had, in Bruno Snell's fine phrase, achieved a "discovery of the human spirit" ("*die Entdeckung des Geistes*"[72]), and that this discovery was, as Werner Jaeger has persuasively argued (*Paideia*, Vol. I), preserved in writing during the fifth and fourth centuries BC whereas it first took shape under the conditions of illiterate *orality*.[73] These writings make clear that human beings first discovered the spiritual beauty of human life *qua* human as the result of a program of "upbringing"[74] whose result, for the first time in history, was a class of human beings (admittedly only adult male citizens of a *polis*) whose happiness (*eudaimonia*) was the object of

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[71] See the quotation from Sextus, *Adv. Math.* IX, 352–353, with discussion, below. This point is elaborated in my "Minding our Language," mentioned above.

[72] *Die Entdeckung des Geistes* was misleadingly translated into English as *The Discovery of the Mind*, trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer (New York: Harper, 1960).

[73] I address the significance of Greek "orality," thanks to 1966–72 conversations with and books (esp., *Preface to Plato* [Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1963]) by Eric Havelock, in "Individuality in the Modern World," presented at a special session of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings, Atlanta, December 1989 (unpublished, see my website). On the topic of Greek "orality" the writings of Milman Parry, Albert B. Lord, and Gregory Nagy are also indispensable.

[74] The word "education" has become too intellectual, too Stoic, too literate, to translate "*paideia*."

the exercise. These citizens were habituated for happiness, not by study,[75] but by participation in the domestic rituals of the household (*oikos*) and the public rites of the *polis*. By these means men could be habituated to a life of virtue and made capable of a relatively complete life, a life of happiness. As the ultimate phase of this development, Aristotle was able to articulate the consummatory mode of the happy life, available only to a very few lucky citizens, as the satisfaction of the desire to comprehend, the sheer pleasure of seeing (in Wilfrid Sellars' phrase) "how the world hangs together in the broadest possible sense," how every individual thing is a part of the whole by an activity that points, προς εν ("*pros hen*"), to its own perfection (*Meta.* IV, 1). This seeing is what Aristotle called the most complete activity, "theorizing" (θεωρειν, "*theorein*") and what Hegel would later call "speculation." The activity of individuals *qua* individuals (τοδε τι, "*tode ti*") Aristotle[76] called ενεργεια, "*energeia*."

As Alfredo Ferrarin has rightly said,[77] *energeia* is the rubric under which Hegel's Aristotelianism is best understood. But he, like Aryeh Kosman,[78] does not seem to have fully appreciated the difficulty of grasping *energeia* independently of the "opposition of consciousness" (*Gegensatz des Bewußtseins*), independently of the Stoic "Form of consciousness."

Historically, and therefore also inadequately, we may catch sight of the emergence of that opposition and "Form" by considering the brief dialogue depicted by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* VII, 275–77) between a Stoic and a Sceptic. The topic of discussion is how to identify the human spirit. It was not a topic that had arisen for the *politan* Greeks, who first discovered the human spirit and for whom that discovery was a matter of tacit knowledge and oral tradition. For them "spirituality" did not attach to any given species of animal, not even to the species *anthropos*.[79] In the world of the

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[75] Study is the distinctively Trans-Alpine or Germanic path to "virtue" or, better, to morality, to "*Kultur*," as opposed to the "quasi-*paideia*" that the French call "*civilisation*," still cultivated on the shores of the Mediterranean and evident whenever one sits down to table. As Gadamer said in a 1968 conversation, the line of demarcation could be drawn between those who drink wine and those who drink beer. No one has drawn the contrast with more conceptual precision than Kant (who, incidentally, as a cosmopolitan Hanseatic Königsberger, drank wine, but this doesn't diminish Gadamer's point) in his "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht," Siebenter Satz: "Wir sind im hohen Grade durch Kunst und Wissenschaft kultiviert. Wir sind zivilisiert, bis zum Überlästigen, zu allerlei gesellschaftlicher Artigkeit und Anständigkeit. Aber, uns für schon moralisiert zu halten, daran fehlt noch sehr viel. Denn die Idee der Moralität gehört noch zur Kultur; der Gebrauch dieser Idee aber, welcher nur auf das Sittenähnliche in der Ehrliebe und der äußeren Anständigkeit hinausläuft, macht bloß die Zivilisierung aus."
    "To a high degree we are, through art and science, *cultured*. We are *civilized*—perhaps too much for our own good— in all sorts of social grace and decorum. But to consider ourselves as having reached *morality*—for that, much is lacking. The ideal of morality belongs to culture; its use for some simulacrum of morality and the love of honor and outward decorum constitutes mere civilization."
    Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (1784), in *Kant on History*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1963) 21. For further development of the contrast "*civilisation*"/"*Kultur*," affirmed by Nietzsche and Spengler but rejected by Freud, see the various writings of Norbert Elias.

[76] In 1985 I made a detailed analysis, "Individuality in Aristotle: Contexts of τοδε τι," that appears on my website.

[77] Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle*, 7 *et passim*.

[78] L. Aryeh Kosman's many articles on Aristotle are to me among the best of twentieth-century scholarship and I am, despite my deep disagreement, very indebted to him. In conversations he has made explicit what some of his articles imply: that the structure of *energeia* is analogous to that of Kant's *Selbstbewußtsein*. That, alas, is a view widely shared.

[79] In the world of the *polis* the concept of "human" rights would have been quite unintelligible, and that of "animal" rights as well. The *politans* were no "speciesists" in the sense of Peter Singer. Speciesism was a Stoic invention (see the following paragraph) and, as human rights accorded to individuals *qua* recognized, but not *qua* biological (e.g., touched

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polis the potentiality for human spirituality was only fully[80] realized by a very few males:[81] those who had had the good fortune of being brought up and habituated by *paideia* in a good *polis*. With the demise of the *polis* (ca. 322 BC[82]), that intraspecies identity was no longer possible. It appears from Sextus' dialogue that the Stoics (he calls them "the dogmatists") had at first tried to extend the *politan* notion of human spirituality to all members of that animal species which speaks. But they were apparently met by the sceptical objection that that definition could not exclude certain birds like parrots. Sextus then has his Stoic rejoin the argument thus:

> (1) They [the Stoic dogmatists] say that it is not uttered speech (*logos proforikos*) but internal speech (*logos endiathetos*) by which man differs from non-rational animals, for crows and parrots and jays utter articulate sounds. (2) Nor is it by the merely simple impression that he differs (for they too receive impressions), but by impressions produced by inference and combination. (3) This amounts to his possessing the conception of "following" [inference] and directly grasping, on account of "following," the idea of sign. For sign is itself of the kind "If this, then that" [see "truth table" 3 above]. (4) Therefore the existence of signs follows from man's nature [the origin of "speciesism"] and constitution.[83]

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by the Divine at biological conception), has become for modernity a precious and indispensable legacy. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (= Rph) shows how this Stoic legacy can be, and has been, integrated into an Aristotelianism for the modern world, i.e., Hegelianism, by showing how all who are legal "persons" (Rph I) and moral "subjects" (Rph II) are also ethical "individuals" (Rph III) by habituation in the three *modern* spheres of life—"the family" (a sphere of "love," unlike the ancient *oikos*), "civil society" (unprecedented in the ancient world and hence unknown to Aristotle), and "the state" (a sphere that does not exclude "barbarians," unlike the ancient *polis*)—that are, by contrast with the "elitist" world of ancient Greece, shared by all recognized members of the species "man," not *qua* biological but *qua* recognized. This argument is developed in my "Moral Subjects and Ethical Individuals," *Hegel-Jahrbuch 1987*, 62ff.; "The Global Dimension of Ethical Life," a lecture at the National University of Singapore, January 1994; and "What Is 'Civil Society?,'" a lecture at Fudan University, Shanghai, and Peking University, Beijing, and elsewhere in China, 1996–97.

  It is remarkable how this process of global practical integration has accelerated since World War II (WW II) and is now, in the twenty-first century, empirically pointing toward the completion theoretically anticipated by Hegel. These developments have little to do with what Kojève and Fukuyama call "the end of history."

[80] It is instructive to note that the wives, children, and slaves of citizens were regarded as *more fully* "spiritual" than resident aliens (metics), some of whom, like the Cephalus who appears in Plato's *Republic*, Bk. I, were very rich, and in the case of Cephalus' son, Lysias, very literate. See Aristotle, *Politics* I, 1260a30ff.

[81] By modern (Stoic) standards the *politans* were "sexists," a notion that would have been as unintelligible to them as "humanism" or "speciesism." For the Greek practice of "human spirituality" (*Geist* in the sense of Hegel and Snell), "ethos" was all and biological categories were irrelevant. The notion of abortion as homicide would have been unthinkable because a fetus has acquired no (or very few—given recent studies of fetal acquaintance with the vocal patterns of those, usually parents, it hears prenatally) ethically significant habits, which are what simply constitute spirituality in the Hellenic or *politan* world.

[82] In that year, Antipater, Alexander's old and trusted general in Macedonia, who, incidentally, had funded the establishment of Aristotle's Lyceum in Athens, put down a hopeless revolt, fomented on word of Alexander's death by the aging Demosthenes, and thus ended all practical illusion of an independent *polis*. Of course the "myth" of the *polis* persisted and was again and again exploited for political purposes until well after the Roman annexation of Greece in 146 BC, under Lucius Sulla, who, incidentally, confiscated the unpublished manuscripts of Aristotle and brought them to Rome, where, after several botched attempts, they became the *Corpus Aristotelicum* at the hand of the Stoic Andronicus of Rhodes.

[83] Sextus, *Adv. Math.* 8.275–76 (*SVF* 2.223, in part), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol. 1, trans. A. Long and D. Sedley (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 317–18.

This monumental and ground-breaking distinction, between "uttered speech" and "internal speech,"[84] so essential for propositional logic, the "logical faith," and human rights, marks the advent of a way of speaking and thinking that will become "second nature" for philosophy and much else in the West, sedimented and echoed for example in Hobbes' distinction between "verbal discourse" and "mental discourse," in Thomas Jefferson's unforgettable "we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal … ," and in the contrast of "saying" and "meaning" that became *de rigueur* in twentieth-century analytical philosophy. I say "philosophy and much else" because the Stoic identification of human spirituality with a distinctively human semiotic is what facilitated a Habermasianly "emancipatory" movement in human affairs. Perhaps its most decisive incarnation has been by means of the Christian notion that all persons are equal in the eyes of God (Rph § 62 A[85]) and that all human subjects are equally free to act.[86] Nietzsche famously proclaimed that Christianity was "Platonism for the people"; with greater justice we might say that Christianity became—especially in the hands of the great Tarsus-trained Stoic philosopher/tent-maker Saul, later the Apostle Paul—"Stoicism for the masses."

Hegel and others have fully appreciated what I have called the "emancipatory" moment of Stoicism. The story he tells in his lectures on the philosophy of history[87] would be quite unintelligible without it. It is the vital element for the second step in the celebrated progression of worlds from (A) One is Free, to (B) Some are Free, to (C) All are Free. What sets Hegel apart is his insight into the fact that this story, for all its world-historical importance in the liberation of slaves and, more recently,

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84 Max Mühl, Richard Sorabji, and others have said that the Stoic bifurcation of the *logos* is adumbrated in Plato and Aristotle. As to Aristotle, "εν τη ψυχη ("*en te psyche*")," "in the soul," is indeed said at *An. Post.* I, 76b25, as cited by Sorabji *et al.*, but Mühl and Sorabji, like many others, have given a "Stoic" misreading of Aristotle. Consideration of the same phrase in context at *An. Post.* II, 19, 100a1 and 100a7 will make this clear, especially in light of Aristotle's treatment there of νους ("*nous*") as a εξις ("*hexis*"), or *Gewohnheit* or "habit." The difference between εν τη ψυχη ("*en te psyche*") and λογος ενδιαθετος ("*logos endiathetos*"), which doesn't occur in Aristotle, is manifest. In short, there is no notion in Aristotle of any sphere of "human spirituality" or *Geist* that attaches to a biological species and is in any way analogous to the postulation of that substitute for *paideia* spirituality that the Stoics made with their notion of an "inner *logos*." For the anticipation of "Stoicism" in Plato's Socrates, see the note below.

85 "It is about a millennium and a half since the freedom of personality [divinely mediated and hence a *transcendently* mediated reciprocity] began through the spread of Christianity to blossom and gain recognition as a universal principle from a part, though still a small part, of the human race. But it was only yesterday [with the 1789 declaration of 'human rights'], we might say, that the principle of the freedom of property [the *immanent* reciprocity of legal persons and members of civil society] became recognized in some places." T.M. Knox, trans.

86 Subjects as moral agents (Rph II), each with a "will" of its own, is a notion unknown in the Hellenic world. See Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1982) 20ff.

87 Edited by his son, Professor of History Karl Hegel, and published *as if* a "book," these lectures came, alas, to epitomize Hegel in Germany and elsewhere from the 1840s, and, in collaboration with the Prussian-sponsored anti-Hegelian lectures of Schelling in Berlin, heard by S. Kierkegaard and F. Engels, led to the neglect of his published writings (except in Italy, then France, then America, and then the UK, until there was finally, in the late-nineteenth century, a "Hegel renaissance" in Germany, which discovered Hegel's "development," as Schleiermacher had discovered Plato's "development" and Werner Jaeger was to discover, 1910, Aristotle's "development"). German scholars of Hegel, as of Aristotle, remain so preoccupied, to this day, with a philosopher's "development," laid out with overwhelming philological precision, that the thought of the philosopher so subjected to philological scrutiny is nearly wholly lost. Hence the "Hegel renaissance" in Germany has born little fruit. This is also true of such seemingly independent thinkers as Jürgen Habermas, who, in "Arbeit und Interaktion," his contribution to the Löwith Festschrift, republished in *Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968) 9–47, did a developmental account of the concept of "interaction" in Hegel, which, on "developmental" grounds, completely misreads WdL II, "Vom Begriff im allgemeinen," 220ff., and makes out Hegel to be a latter-day Averroist.

women, is only a story—that history *qua* history is insusceptible of philosophical comprehension.[88] He did not need a Karl Löwith to tell him that any attempt at a "*theory* of history" would require a "secularization of the Judeo-Christian eschatology,"[89] or the adaptation of what Hilary Putnam has called a "God's-eye view."

Many Hegel scholars have attempted to read the PhG as a strangely palimpsestic "philosophy of history" and much effort has been spent trying to figure out "its" strange "historical" transitions and to determine how many times the PhG recapitulates human history. Such attempts are even more systematically misleading than those which try to read Hegel's "idealism" as the fulfillment of the Kantian (and thus an intra-"Stoic") project.[90] For the project of the PhG, as unequivocally stated in the WdL,[91] is overcoming the "Form of consciousness," the "opposition of consciousness," and thereby rewinning speculative thought that will enable an encyclopedic fulfillment of the Aristotelian project in the modern world.

What we may call "Hegel's original insight"[92] was that Kant, who regarded the traditional appeal to divine intermediation as a "scandal,"[93] represented a rewinning of the original (pre-Philonic) Stoic "position," the "Form of consciousness," whereby the Stoic project might be subject to a *reductio ad absurdum*. The PhG is that *reductio*.

I will conclude these historical notes with an attempt to indicate the *aporia* of the Stoic position and the two principal strategies to evade the Stoic impasse. There is no more concise articulation of the Stoic *aporia* than the Introduction to the PhG, but I will postpone an explicit consideration of it. Here let me state categorically, with considerable help from Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy, that the key Stoic move, the bifurcation of language (*logos*) into mental and verbal discourse, postulates a dividing line that, once accepted, cannot be crossed without falling into theoretical perdition. Explicitly or implicitly, the Stoic "position" assumes that the "inner" language, mental discourse, or "meaning," is the realm of truth, the only realm in which logical inferences can be performed and consequently, as Hobbes saw most clearly, the only realm in which demonstrative science can be had.[94]

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[88] Recall Aristotle's *Poetics* 9, on poetry vs. history, cited above, with which Hegel emphatically agrees.

[89] Cf. K. Dove, "Hegel and the Secularization Hypothesis," *The Legacy of Hegel*, ed. Joseph J. O'Malley *et al.* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) 144ff.

[90] For the best of this ill-starred lot (no small praise) see Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989).

[91] See ref. above to my "Hegel's 'Deduction of the Concept of Science.'"

[92] Compare Dieter Henrich, *Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967); "Fichte's Original Insight," *Contemporary German Philosophy*, Vol. 1, trans. David R. Lachterman (1982) 15–53. In my words: Fichte's project was to treat self-consciousness as a theorem rather than as an axiom.

[93] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (= KdrV), B XXXIX ftn. Scandal or no—and Kant was right, it was a scandal to rely on faith to bridge the gap formed by the Stoic bifurcation of language/mind—this was the leading device by which the Stoic "Form of consciousness" was kept alive for more than two millennia. Though more acute than Locke, Kant was nevertheless seduced into thinking that the "Stoic" mode of consciousness could be upheld as the "condition necessary for the possibility of" (the formula of "transcendental argument") Newtonian physics. This aspect of the "scandal" Kant did not recognize.

[94] For Hobbes, all else, beyond "mental discourse," including physics, is *conjecture* (on this point Hobbes is as emphatic as, indeed more so than, Karl Popper or Paul Feyerabend). As he wrote in his Epistle Dedicatory to *Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics*, "Geometry, therefore, is demonstrable, for the lines and figures from which we reason are

With this assumption, anything external to the mind could only be known if it were covered by what Sellars called an "inference ticket." Some early Stoics claimed to have such an inference ticket in the form of a "cataleptic impression" which truly represents in the mind or "inner *logos*" what exists outside the mind. This, they claimed, was the "criterion" of truth. It did not take much wit to discover that knowledge-claims based upon such a putative criterion involve reasoning in a vicious circle, an infinite regress. In Sextus' words:

> … in order to decide the dispute that has arisen about the criterion, we have need of an agreed-upon criterion by means of which we shall decide it; and in order to have an agreed-upon criterion it is necessary first to have decided the dispute about the criterion. Thus, with the reasoning falling into the circularity mode, finding a criterion becomes aporetic; for we do not allow them to adopt a criterion hypothetically, and if they wish to decide about the criterion by means of a criterion we force them into an infinite regress. Further, since proof requires a criterion that has been proved, while the criterion has need of what has been determined to be a proof, they land in circularity.[95]

Most philosophers in the world of language ("Stoicism") have held that claims to know mentally (inwardly) what lies beyond the mind are either (a) dogmatic and properly to be regarded as mere conjectures—for example, Sextus, Hobbes, Hume, the later Wittgenstein—or (b) guaranteed by the benevolent intermediation of God the Creator—for example, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz. Kant was the first in the Stoic tradition to return to the original (pre-creationalist, i.e., pre-Philonic) Stoic teaching that sensible objects in the mind or consciousness derive their whole and part character from two "logical" operations or *Verbindungen*: (1) intrapropositional "predication," *Zusammensetzung*, and (2) interpropositional "connection," *Verknüpfung*, performed in the realm of the inner *logos* or mind.[96]

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drawn and described [within, i.e., in the mind] by ourselves; and civil philosophy is demonstrable because we [likewise] make the commonwealth ourselves. But because of natural bodies we know not the construction, but seek it from effects, there lies no demonstration of what the causes be we seek for, but only of what they may be." Giambattista Vico, in *Principi di scienza nuova*, 1725 (in *Opere*, ed. A. Battistini [Milan: Mondadori, 1990] 983–1222), entertained a similar notion of a knower *qua homo faber*, but his principles were more poetic than so explicitly Stoic as in Hobbes, albeit still Stoic.

95 Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Book 2, ch. IV, 18–21, Benson Mates, trans., in Benson Mates, *The Skeptic Way* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996) 128–29. Cf. Hegel, *Lect. Hist. Phil.*, trans. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge, 1894) II, 358.

96 Kant is famous (or, among analytic advocates of PM-ese, notorious) for his remark (KdrV, B VIII) that logic sprang full-formed from the head of Aristotle. But as I learned from my mentor (1958–63) Wilfrid Sellars, Kant effectively reconstructed propositional logic in his account of the "principles" of relation (categories/principles 7–9 on Kant's tables, A 70 = B 95 and A 161–62 = B 200–02, esp. B 201–02 n.). Among logical operations ("combinations" or "*Verbindungen*"), he clearly distinguished (KdrV, B 201–02) between syllogistic predication ("composition" or "*Zusammensetzung*," categories 1–6) and propositional "connection" ("*Verknüpfung*," categories 7–9). The latter explicitly display the PM-ese operations of conjunction, & (category 7), if/then conditionality, ⊃ (category 8), and disjunction, v (category 9). By reconstructing Stoic logic, and anticipating Frege, Kant was more of an innovator in logic than his famous remark about Aristotle and logic would lead us to believe.

That was one of Sellars' better insights into the history of philosophy, in which he stood out as master in contrast with Quine, who famously demoted the "history of philosophy" to something "sub-philosophical." Quine had the "logical faith."

The proto-Kantian form of Stoicism is not as well known as it deserves to be. Hence I will quote the best formulation of it known to me (it is from Sextus, *Adv. Math.* IX, 352–53 = *SVF* II, 80):

> … the dogmatists [sc., the Stoics] are accustomed to say that what is external, underlying (υποκειμενον, "*hypokeimenon*"), and sensible (αισθητον, "*aistheton*") is neither a whole nor a part, but it is we who add the predicate "whole" or "part" to it. For "whole" is a term of relation, since a whole is considered such with reference to the parts. And "parts" are also relative, for they are considered parts with reference to the whole. But relations obtain in our "consciousness" (συμμνημονευσει, "*symmnemoneusei*" = literally, "concurrent recollection"), and our consciousness is in us. Accordingly, the whole and the part are in us, and what is external, underlying, and sensible is neither a whole nor a part, but it is a thing of which we predicate our consciousness [or recollection]. [97]

I do not wish to suggest that Kant had any knowledge of the above passage from Sextus. I do want to say that Kant's basic argument can be seen to be a "reoccupation" (in the sense of Blumenberg) of the Stoic "position" if we understand Stoicism in light of this sophisticated (proto-Kantian) constructivism rather than in terms of the crude doctrine of the cataleptic impression as the criterion of truth usually associated with the Stoics.

(2) THE "FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS" AS STOIC

Many have observed that the PhG develops its arguments without reference to the historical figures to which its arguments might seem to be directed. Some, like G. Lasson and the English translator J.B. Baillie, have attempted to make good this "deficit" by providing explicit references to historical figures. But Hegel's lack of references does not constitute an oversight. His argument in the PhG is proto-systematic ("phenomenological" in the propaedeutic Hegelian sense) and he knew that a historical argument could not have this character. Hence his treatment of the "Form of consciousness" in the PhG is performed without names, without reference to Chrysippus or Kant.[98] I have mentioned the Stoics only to provide a heuristic for transforming his problematic from the narrow confines of "German Idealism" to the more adequate domain of post-Aristotelian thought and thus to the "Form of consciousness" per se, which German idealists blindly presupposed or, in the case of Fichte, "constructed."

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[97] Translation by Jason L. Saunders, ed., *Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle* (New York: Free Press, 1966) 67, with emendations and emphases.

[98] The word "*Kantische*" (Kantian) is mentioned at PhG 41 = § 50 and at PhG 434 = § 617. Anaxagoras is mentioned once, Aristotle twice, at PhG 22 = § 22 and, as "*aristotelische*," at PhG 57 = § 71, and Bacon, Lichtenberg, and Plato four times each. It should be illuminating that these are the only names of other thinkers hinted at in the PhG. None of these "mentionings" amounts to a "use." The PhG is not a history of philosophy. Cf. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, "Preface": "Wieweit meine Bestrebungen mit denen anderer Philosophen zusammenfallen, will ich nicht beurteilen. Ja, was ich hier geschrieben habe macht im Einzelnen überhaupt nicht den Anspruch auf Neuheit; und darum gebe ich auch keine Quellen an, weil es mir gleichgültig ist, ob das was ich gedacht habe, vor mir schon ein anderer gedacht hat."

"How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I cannot judge. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in points of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it makes no difference to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by someone else." D. Kolak trans. Wittgenstein only makes an exception for Frege and "his friend" Russell, whom he cites.

Since I have given accounts of Hegel's procedure in the PhG in numerous places,[99] my treatment of it here can be condensed.

The topic of the PhG is the problematic "Form of consciousness" which emerged from the Stoics' treatment of language. It is, to my knowledge, the first and only book to address this problem[100] coherently. At one level, the problem can be easily stated, for we are all familiar with formal scepticism. Consciousness distinguishes from itself a factor to which it also attempts to relate itself. What consciousness distinguishes from itself is said to be "for it." What is "for it" cannot, *ex hypothesi*, be presumed "in itself" or objectively known without a "scandalous" belief in divine revelation, which typifies medieval thought, or a naïve belief in the extraphilosophical efficacy of "the sciences," a neo-medievalism (sometimes called "the philosophy of science") that has marked much philosophy since the seventeenth century. Of course, we all tend to believe that we have objective knowledge. And, to Hegel, we are right so to believe. Our problem is that we try to formulate the rightness of our belief logically, within a frame of reference, the "Form of consciousness," that distinguishes between what we know (what is "*for* consciousness," accusative), and why we "know" it (what is "*to* consciousness," dative, the unthematized "logical" criterion on the basis of which we claim to know or have the "logical faith").[101]

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[99] E.g., Dove: *Toward an Interpretation of Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1965); "Die Epoché der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," *Stuttgarter Hegel-Tage*, ed. Hans-Georg Gadamer (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1974) 605ff.; "Logik und Recht bei Hegel," *Neue Hefte für Philosophie*, XVII (1979): 89ff.; "Hegel's 'Deduction of the Concept of Science,'" 271ff.; "Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy," *Method and Speculation* [sic. This title by Westphal is a mistake in that there is no "speculation," Hegel's word for "theory," in the PhG] *in Hegel's Phenomenology*, ed. Merold Westphal (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1982) 27ff., republished in *Selected Essays on G.W.F. Hegel*, ed. Lawrence S. Stepelevich (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993); HPM, (1) *The Review of Metaphysics* XXIII (1970): 615ff., republished in (2) *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy*, ed. Warren E. Steinkraus (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971) 34ff.; (3) *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments* (a survey of two centuries of Hegel scholarship in four volumes), Vol. III, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic*, ed. Robert Stern (London: Routledge, 1993); and (4) *The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays*, ed. Jon Stewart (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997) 52ff.; WTAH 125ff.

[100] The problem is anticipated by Socrates in Plato's *Euthydemus* and at *Meno* 80E as "the paradox of learning" ("once posed, never solved," as Michael Polanyi stated in his Terry Lectures at Yale, and discussed with me for hours thereafter, a conversation that has contributed to the argument of this essay), and alluded to by Aristotle in his *An. Post.* I, 71a28 (which Polanyi was eager to learn). As Hegel, in effect, observes, Socrates was a Stoic *avant la lettre*. That is why, as Hegel strongly argued in his lectures on the history of philosophy, the Athenians put him to death, justly in Hegel's unsentimental view.

  Again, I must add that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, with the help of Sellars, is what first enabled me to understand the "Form of consciousness" as problematic.

[101] When made partially explicit, such justifications of objectivity within the "Form of consciousness" are conventionally called "transcendental arguments." The classical form of such argumentation was formulated by Kant, for whom the conditions necessary for having an object (*Gegenstand*) of knowledge at all (*überhaupt*) are *eo ipso* conditions for having "objective" (*objektive*) (i.e., legitimate) knowledge. Kant's reasoning is that knowledge of objects requires the deployment of logical operations (syllogistic in categories 1–6 and propositional in categories 7–9) and that this logical dimension, which is a condition for our having any knowledge of objects, confers objective validity upon this same knowledge. Kant calls logic, so deployed, "transcendental logic." In the PhG this "logical" dimension is said to be tacit, dative, or "*to* consciousness." Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell (*Mind and World* [Cambridge; Harvard UP, 1994]) call this dimension "the space of reasons"; Barry Stroud, in his acute comments on scepticism (e.g., "Kant and Skepticism," *The Skeptical Tradition*, ed. Myles Burnyeat [Berkeley: U of California P, 1983] 413ff.), reverts to the term "transcendental."

Prima facie such formulations are easily shown to involve a dogmatism, namely, that we can distinguish an "in-itself" within our field of conscious knowledge. The unmasking of this dogmatism is called scepticism, or, better, "formal scepticism," classically formulated by Sextus Empiricus, and much more crudely reformulated by more recent sceptics. It is brought about by showing, using various time-tested means (tropes), that every putative "in-itself" or criterion for bridging the gap between what is "for consciousness" and what is "in itself" is actually a matter of "for-itself-ness" or irredeemably "perspectival," as Nietzsche put it.

What Hegel notices about such scepticism is that its negative arguments all function within and, indeed, presuppose for their efficacy, the "opposition of consciousness." Let us call such scepticism "formal." It can always achieve its objective, the delegitimation of a truth-claim, but because it functions within the "Form of consciousness," its results are purely negative and indeterminate, theoretically "accidental" or "contingent" in the sense to be elucidated below. It might, à la late Wittgenstein, claim that its results are therapeutic by ridding us of our "pathological" belief in objective "Truth" (Rorty is just around the corner). But, even with a romantic, ironic, or existential commitment to "the courage to be" (Tillich) in the face of absurdity (Sartre), such a cure is less sustaining than the disease it addresses. Nevertheless, it remains true that any dogmatism is susceptible of such an unmasking by a formal scepticism operating *within* the Stoic tradition.

Now Hegel, I have suggested, has for the first time located the dialectic of dogmatism *and* scepticism *within* the "Form of consciousness." That leads naturally to the question whether he has found a way to subject the "Form of consciousness" itself to sceptical refutation. The answer is yes but the way, the PhG, is not easy. Instead of a formal scepticism that functions within the opposition of consciousness, there is need for what he calls a "*sich vollbringende Skeptizismus*,"[102] a "thoroughgoing scepticism."[103] There is no operation, no trope, indeed, there is no Sextian list of tropes by which not merely a *Gestalt* of consciousness but also the "Form of consciousness" may be brought to heel. *Ex hypothesi*, all would be performed *within* the opposition of consciousness and thus leave that Form intact.

The key to a "thoroughgoing scepticism" is the discovery that consciousness is not merely the domain of constructive activity, as in Chrysippus and Kant, but is itself a construct.[104] To achieve insight into the difference that is constitutive of consciousness, a distinction must be drawn between what is taken to be "in itself," even if it is taken to be an unknowable *Ding an sich*, and what is taken to be "for consciousness." Thinkers in the Stoic tradition tacitly assume that this distinction is a "given." In the words of Sellars, Hegel shows that such "givenness" is "a myth." It is a condition for

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Kant's partial explication of the "logical" or "dative" dimension of the knowing situation is probably what enabled Hegel to reconstruct the pre-Philonic and originally Stoic notion of the "Form of consciousness."

[102] PhG 67 = § 78.

[103] HCE 14.

[104] Fichte saw that self-consciousness was a construct and thus could not function as a mere presupposition. That is what Henrich calls his "original insight." But whereas Hegel regarded the exposure of self-consciousness as a construct to be a refutation of its putatively foundationalist function, Fichte reveled in it.

all "consciousness-talk" (Sellars' phrase) that a subject distinguish between its "inner" and its "outer," between "time" and "space," between "spontaneity" and "receptivity."

But the very notions of an "outer," of "space," of "receptivity"—of "the given" as such—are all "mythical"; they are all constructs of consciousness whereby consciousness itself is constructed. It will not do, however, simply to assert their "mythical" status. That would amount to no more than one damn assertion next to another. If the very framework for "the myth of the given" is to be subjected to a thoroughgoing scepticism, that framework cannot be posited by the sceptic, else scepticism could be no more than formal.[105]

But if we could see how consciousness originally posits the opposition of "in itself" and "for itself" by which it *is* consciousness and then consider how it undergoes, not as consciousness per se but as a determinate consciousness, a *Gestalt*, the determinate negation to which it is susceptible *qua* this *Gestalt* of consciousness, then it would be at least in principle possible to consider a sequence of such determinate *Gestalten* or "shapes" of consciousness. And if we did not intervene in the process, by dragging in references to history or "well known" philosophical positions, then it might be possible for such a sequence to shape itself autonomously and perhaps even arrive at a *Gestalt* of consciousness for which *any* putative "in itself" could be seen as merely "for it."[106]

Such a state of affairs could not properly be called a *Gestalt* of consciousness for, as we have seen, consciousness requires for its very nature a distinction between an "in itself" and a "for itself" dimension. If such knowing could be arrived at we might call the knower "absolved" of the "Form of consciousness" or engaged in "absolute knowing." It might be argued that such a knower would be, for the first time since the advent of the opposition of consciousness in post-Aristotelian thought, prepared to think speculatively, to theorize à la Aristotle, for whom the opposition of consciousness did not exist.[107]

It is clear that a thoroughgoing scepticism cannot, like formal scepticism, be performed upon a single *Gestalt*. The question is how an autonomously constituted sequence of *Gestalten*, with a beginning, middle, and end, might take shape. To this end there is a distinction in the PhG between the *dative* and *accusative* dimensions, between what is *for* consciousness and what is *to* consciousness, between what is "*für* das Bewußtsein" and what is "*dem* Bewußtsein,"[108] a distinction systematically maintained by Hegel throughout the PhG but one that has been noticed by few if any German scholars

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[105] I am afraid that Robert Brandom has remained imprisoned by the "Form of consciousness" in his, admittedly brilliant, *Making It Explicit*.

[106] The absolution from the "opposition of consciousness," from what I shall shortly call the dialectic of the dative and accusative, is what Hegel calls "absolute knowing" and sets forth in PhG VIII: a "thoroughgoing" phenomenological "reduction" or "epoché," exceeding Husserl (a radical "Stoic") by far (on Hegel vs. Husserl see my "Die Epoché der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," cited above).

[107] Alas, St. Thomas Aquinas and that other great Aristotle interpreter, Leibniz, have surreptitiously inserted the "Form of consciousness" into their readings of "*'l maestro di color che sanno*" (Dante, *Inferno* IV, 131).

[108] The distinction was first published in my "Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy" (1982), cited above.

and preserved by no translation into any language known to me[109] (except mine[110]). Yet this distinction is the principal clue as to how the "Form of consciousness" may be said to undergo a sequence of *Gestalten* that bids fair to begin, develop, and, most importantly, end, like a classical tragedy.

The distinction is first explicitly stated in the Introduction:

Es ist in ihm eines *für ein* anderes, oder es hat überhaupt die Bestimmtheit des Moments des Wissens an ihm; zugleich ist *ihm* dies andere nicht nur *für es*, sondern auch außer dieser Beziehung oder *an sich*: das Moment der Wahrheit.[111]

In consciousness, one moment is *for* another; in other words, consciousness in general has the determinacy of the moment of knowledge in it. At the same time, this other is *to* consciousness not only something *for it*; it is also something outside this relationship or *in itself*; the moment of truth.[112]

What formal scepticism unmasks is that every moment of truth, every putative "in-itself," can be reduced to a "for-itself." All versions of scepticism are variations upon this theme. Hegel's original insight is that any such unmasking is at the same time a hiding of the fact that an "in-itself" reduced to a "for-itself" is itself a hidden "in-itself," namely a *for*-itself (accusative) *to* consciousness (dative).[113] Within the "Form of consciousness," this transition is invisible,[114] both *to* sceptical as well as *to* dogmatic consciousness. But the transition, however hidden, must be made, and the distinction between the "in-itself" and "for-itself" must be maintained, else consciousness would no longer be the foundational structure of knowledge, the ultimate elimination of which (PhG VIII) is the whole purpose of the PhG.

The condition *sine qua non* for the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is this structure of consciousness, this distinction which constitutes consciousness, and the hiddenness of the emergence of a new "in-itself" unthematized by the consciousness in question. Hegel's way of indicating the result of such a hidden transition is to say that the new "in-itself" is *to* rather than *for* consciousness. Of course this would be a mere playing with words if the distinction were not rooted in the very "Form of consciousness." Granting that it is, the task is to show how it is possible for us to consider one such sceptical refutation

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[109] The most recent Italian translation (Hegel, *Fenomenologia dello Spirito*, trans. Vincenzo Cicero [Milan: Bompiani, 2000]) sometimes adopts the unfortunate expedient of rendering the dative dimension, "*dem Bewußtsein*," as "*agli occhi della coscienza*."

[110] Hegel, "The Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*" (translator), in Martin Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience* [HCE] (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) 7ff. *et passim*, reissued, Paperback, 1990; Hegel, "Sense Certainty," chapter I of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (translator) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.), PF 399ff.; Hegel, "Absolute Knowing," chapter VIII of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (translator) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.), PF 407ff. For a new translation of PhG IV, B, see PF XXXVII, 3 (2006): 318ff.
 References to my translation of the PhG "Introduction" are designated as HCE, to my translations of PhG I, IV, B & VIII as PF.

[111] PhG 71 = § 84, italics added.

[112] HCE 20, with an emendation: the translation of "Bestimmtheit" has been changed from "determination" to "determinacy," a difference made apparent in my post-1970 study of WdL.

[113] This development, covering the whole PhG, is spelled out briefly for the first five *Gestalten* in the next section.

[114] The transition (*Umkehrung*) takes place "behind the back" of the consciousness in question ("*hinter seinem Rücken*"), PhG 74 = § 87, HCE 25.

and hidden transition after another with each a *determinate negation* of its predecessor, not just an abstract or indeterminate negation as in ordinary or formal scepticism.

That is the task of the now celebrated "phenomenological we."[115] To play the role of this "we," we must be able to doubt the viability of the "Form of consciousness" per se. Such doubt cannot eliminate this Form. But, if exercised sustainedly, it can keep "us" from surreptitiously interrupting the immanent development from *Gestalt* to *Gestalt* and thus comprehend the drama. I have stressed that the "Form of consciousness" is most adequately grasped as "Stoic," not to introject another historical dimension into a reading of the PhG but to provide a heuristic for becoming a member of the "phenomenological we," for whom the "opposition of consciousness" is a linguistic construct, the name of the barrier that has constricted all thinkers, and especially interpreters of Aristotle, for the more than 2,000 years since Chrysippus, and has, for nearly two hundred years, blinded interpreters of Hegel's PhG by placing his problematic within the narrow confines of "German Idealism."

(3) STOICISM AS A "*GESTALT* OF CONSCIOUSNESS"

Of all the *Gestalten* of consciousness in the PhG, that called "Stoicism" is among the briefest (PhG 151–54 = §§ 197–201[116]). It follows the celebrated and much misunderstood *Gestalt* called "Lordship and Bondage," PhG IV, A, which Kojève[117] notoriously but persuasively[118] took to be the very beginning of the PhG (thus ignoring Hegel's own "Introduction" to the PhG, the premise of my work on Hegel, as well as PhG I, PhG II, and PhG III).[119] Most readers of the PhG *tacitly* neglect or misread the "phenomenological method" which is the topic of the "Introduction" to the book (esp. PhG 70–

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[115] The function of the "*wir*," "we," in the PhG was first made intelligible in HPM 627ff.

[116] PF 318ff.

[117] Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit, professées de 1933 à 1939 à l'École des Hautes Études, réunies et publiées par Raymond Queneau* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947). Abridged versions of this "famous" text include: *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr., 3–259; trans. Kenley & Christa Dove, 261–87 (New York: Basic Books, 1969); and *Hegel: Versuch einer Vergegenwärtigung seines Denkens*, ed. Iring Fetscher, trans. I. Fetscher and G. Lembruch (Stuttgart: Kolhammer, 1958). It is noteworthy that the new title in German was given by Fetscher in consultation with Kojève. Hence Kojève believed that his lectures represented an "update" of Hegel's "thinking" or "theory." But the PhG does not contain Hegel's "theory." It is only an "introduction" to "theory," e.g., in the Enz.

[118] See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3–18, with endless expansions and repetitions.

[119] It must be acknowledged that Kojève does "mention" sections of the PhG prior to PhG IV in his "Structure de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit," *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, 576ff. (K. & C. Dove translation in *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 261ff.). But he does not "use" these sections in any of his interpretations of the PhG. For Kojève the PhG is Hegel's "philosophy of history" and for him history begins with "Lordship and Servitude" (PhG IV, A). But the very idea of a "philosophy of history" is incoherent on Hegelian grounds. Consider the following passage from the Rph § 3 A (Remark): "To consider particular laws as they appear and develop in time is a purely historical task. Similarly, explaining why one follows another by comparing them with existing circumstances is a job for the understanding, which has its rightful place in its own discipline. None of this has any bearing on philosophical reasoning, for derivation from history should not be confused with the development of the Concept." Stephen Bungay, trans., in Bungay, "The Hegelian Project," *Hegel Reconsidered*, ed. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Terry Pinkard (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1994) 37. Compare PhG 564 = § 808, PF 419, on history as 'a mere happening,' "in der Form der Zufälligkeit," "in the form of contingency"; cp. PhG 563 = § 807, PF 418, "in der Form des *freien zufälligen Geschehens*," "in the form of a *free contingent happening*." It is simply amazing that the author of these lines could still, after nearly two hundred years, be regarded as a "philosopher of history." Such misreadings must spring from a deep-felt "need," about which I will not here speculate.

75 = §§ 81–89). But Kojève *expressly* rejects Hegel's own "Introduction" in favor of what he explicitly takes to be a "replacement introduction,"[120] which is simply Kojève's translation and commentary upon PhG IV, A. A "replacement" of Hegel's own "Introduction" indeed! But so it has functioned for much PhG scholarship since WW II. Given that Kojève's PhG interpretation virtually defined French intellectual life during the decades after WW II (Merleau-Ponty,[121] Sartre, etc.) as well as for others on the French periphery (Leo Strauss, Stanley Rosen, Allan Bloom, Iring Fetscher, Francis Fukuyama, and Paul Wolfowitz, the reputed architect of the Bush plan to impose a democratic constitution on Iraq), one simply must take seriously the habits of interpretation that this absurd, if brilliant, reading of Hegel's PhG has induced. What I will attempt in what follows is a corrective, based upon what is clearly Hegel's own "Introduction" to the PhG (suppressed by Kojève) and HPM.

For the purpose of this essay it is essential to convey, however inadequately, some sense of what Stoicism as a *Gestalt* of consciousness in the PhG is. In brief, it is the fifth in the sequence of *Gestalten* that begins with "Sense-Certainty," PhG I,[122] and ends with "Absolute Knowing," PhG VIII.[123] What follows is a highly condensed account of these five *Gestalten*.[124]

"Sense-Certainty" marks the beginning of this sequence because its presupposed and thus unthematized criterion of truth is the first possible criterion,[125] indeterminate immediacy.[126] This criterion is *to* consciousness in a manner analogous to the way the inward path of logical inference is *to* Chrysippus. Both exemplify the "logical faith." What is *for* consciousness are particulars, the particulars of immediate sensation. These particulars are taken to be true insofar as they are an immediate "this." As "Sense-Certainty" makes repeated attempts to explain how a particular sensation might be true by virtue of its immediacy, the hitherto unthematized criterion of immediacy *to* consciousness, the "this," comes to be *for* consciousness. As *for* consciousness, however, the "this" as an immediate particular shows itself to be a universal, a "this" vis-à-vis all particulars, and thus mediated. As so mediating, the "this" comes to be an in-itself that is now *for* consciousness. *Qua for* consciousness, the erstwhile in-itself *to* consciousness becomes the *new* in-itself *to* consciousness, no longer a particular like what it purports to adjudicate but a universal mediating the sense particulars.

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[120] Kojève, "En guise d'introduction," *Mesures* (January 1939), reprinted in *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, 9–34, translated as "In Place of an Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology" by K. & C. Dove, 1963, published for numerous courses at Yale University, 1963–72, and revised by J.H. Nichols in *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 3–30.

[121] Maurice Merleau-Ponty has formulated, based on his acceptance of Kojève's PhG interpretation, the only advertent "Western" defense of Stalin's terror known to me, *Humanisme et terreur, essai sur le problème communiste* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), *Humanism and Terror*, trans. John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon, 1969). Tony Judt's devastating account of French intellectual life in this period (Judt, *Postwar* [New York: Penguin, 2005]) could be strengthened by considering the role of Kojève.

[122] PF 399ff.

[123] PF 407ff.

[124] For a much more adequate account of the first four *Gestalten* in the PhG (but without explicit insight into the dative/accusative contrast), see my *Toward an Interpretation of Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1965) 66–162 (to appear on my website).

[125] That "indeterminate immediacy" is the *first* "possible" criterion or dative dimension of consciousness in the PhG is a topic to which I have devoted sustained argument which will not fit into this place.

[126] Not to be confused with the "indeterminate immediacy" with which the WdL begins. Here it is the first criterion within the "opposition of consciousness." In the WdL the "opposition of consciousness" has been eliminated, as Hegel says, by a comprehended PhG (just now happening).

Hence the particular "this" of "Sense-Certainty" becomes the universal "thing" of "Perception," the previously unthematized criterion of "immediacy" becomes, *qua for* consciousness, the universal condition (*Be-ding-ung*) in which sense particulars are now to be grasped (taken to be true, *wahrgenommen*, "perceived," the *Gestalt* called "Perception," "*Die Wahrnehmung*"), PhG II.

What is now *for* consciousness is the relation between a universal (as "the thing") and particulars (the properties of a thing). What is *to* consciousness, or criteriological, is the presumption that the thing can be the correlation of *its* sensible properties, what had been the "wild" particulars of "Sense-Certainty." What the *Gestalt* called "Perception" brings to light is that the perceptible thing (the universal) and the perceptible properties (the particulars) should have but do not have any demonstrable correlation *qua* perceptibles. What is the standard *to* this second *Gestalt*, the correlation of sensible particulars with a sensible universal, as now thematized *for* consciousness, becomes the correlation of sensible particulars with a universal per se, i.e., independent of sensible thinghood, or unconditional, which is to say, "un-thinged" (*un-be-dingt*).[127]

The universal unconditioned by sensibility, the implicit criterion of "Perception," now made explicit or *for* consciousness, becomes, *qua for* consciousness, what is now, in "Understanding" (PhG III), *to* consciousness, the new criterion, a universal that not only correlates sensible particulars, like the thing of Perception, but also, behind the veil of appearance, *produces* them: "force." As productive of the sensible particulars, however, force must be kept in the "logical" realm of "mental discourse" (as a "noumenon"), behind a "veil" separating the supersensible logical realm (which is only *to* consciousness) from the empirical realm of particulars *for* consciousness. With consciousness' explanation ("*Erklären*") of how this works in consciousness, the veil is thematized (made *for* consciousness) and thus broken.

The result is a *Gestalt* of consciousness, "Self-Consciousness" (PhG IV), *to* which the standard of truth is the susceptibility of sensibilia to be drawn across the now-thematized veil and reduced to a unity with consciousness itself. Hegel calls this process of reduction to unity with self "desire" ("*Begierde*").

All objects of self-consciousness as desire are only "true" insofar as they are reduced to unity with it. The common word for this is "consumption." But among the candidates for "truth" so encountered there are two kinds: simple objects for consumption (e.g., nuts) and objects that are capable of animated submission (some other animals). Nuts, like other animals, may simply be consumed. In the case of other animals (i.e., living beings), this will involve their death. As capable of submission, however, death may be averted. That is, an animate being may, by submission, introject itself between another desiring animate being and what that being aims to consume. This introjection may take the form of "servitude," in which, out of fear of death, a desired animal which is potentially consciousness may negate its own desire for the reduction of objects to unity with itself (the truth of

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[127] "*Das unbedingt Allgemeine*," "the unconditioned (or un-thinged) universal," PhG 102–03 = § 132, 103–04 = § 134, 104 = § 135, & 105–06 = § 136. By contrast consider "*bedingte Allgemeinheit*" or "thinged universality" at PhG 100 = § 130. Jean Hyppolite, *Genèse et Structure*, *passim*, comments helpfully on Hegel's use of puns in the PhG, esp. "Beispiel" and "beiherspielen" ("playing along with") in PhG I and "Unbedingt" in PhG III. German, Italian, and English-language Hegel scholars tend to be less alert to his humor.

"Understanding") to another. By this act one consciousness avoids death and places itself as an intermediator between a dominant consciousness and the realm of things it seeks to dominate and reduce to unity with itself, nature in general. In this intermediating position the self-subordinating consciousness suppresses its own desire to reduce things to unity with itself (the "truth" of "Understanding," PhG III) and is, as such, able to mediate the relationship with nature on the part of the dominant animate entity that threatens its life.

In this situation, the threatening entity is "recognized" as something other than mere nature and the threatened entity suspends its own desire vis-à-vis nature thereby to "serve" the entity (now recognized *as* a consciousness) it fears.[128] Such a state is called "servitude" and the *Gestalt* feared and served is called "lordship." The principal result of this relationship, "lordship and servitude," is that the *Gestalt* of the servant, having suspended its desire to merely *labor* upon and consume objects of nature, may "*work*" upon them,[129] that is, impose its own "form" upon things which endure, that is, are not just evanescent objects of consumption. In this condition the "servile" *Gestalt* of consciousness has the liberty to discover the forms it has imposed upon natural objects with its own desire to consume them suspended.

This is the circumstance in which "servile" self-consciousness can discover that it is a source of form for natural things and thereby discover that it is a determinate source of form (or determinacy). It should be noted that the lordly mode of self-consciousness has no such potential for self-development because to it the servile mode is simply an augmentation of the structure of reducing to unity with itself that was the product of "Understanding."

It is therefore the servile mode of self-consciousness that has the potentiality to develop. This development is realized in "Stoicism," the situation in which a *Gestalt* of consciousness discovers, by way of the forms it imposes upon things in work, that it has "a mind of its own." Once having achieved this state, however, the Stoic *Gestalt* of consciousness cannot distinguish among the forms that it imposes via work upon natural objects. It is indeed "free," but in an indeterminate manner. It is the first *Gestalt* that can be said to relate itself to determinate objects (the objective that eluded "Sense-

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[128] In the Hebrew tradition "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" rendered in the PhG as that "die Furcht des Herrn der Anfang der Weisheit ist" (PhG 148 = § 195). But whereas Dihle (1982) makes this an attitude of "mind" simply "receptive" to a "transcendent" commander, the PhG "develops" it immanently within the *Gestalten* under review. Dihle's thesis is that the concept of "will" is completely absent from the Hellenic tradition but is implicit in the Hebrew notion of obedience to the commands of God as epitomized in the "Akedah," God's command to Abraham to kill his son Isaac, the only bond between Jahweh's promise and Abraham. That this is the transcendent "source" of the concept of will in antiquity (Dihle's thesis) is demolished by the non-revealed and immanent generation of this same "fear of the lord" in PhG IV.

Étienne Gilson, in his 1931–32 Gifford lectures, argued that "the idea of creation … in itself rational, escapes the grasp of reason because it lacks the aid of revelation." (Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediæval Philosophy* [New York: Scribner's, 1936] 446n.6.) This notion of a "rational idea" only graspable by means of a *transcendent* act, "revelation," is shared by many twentieth-century writers, including K. Löwith, H. Jonas, Gilson, and Dihle. It is refuted by the *immanent* development of the very same idea in the PhG.

[129] The PhG implicitly acknowledges the important distinction drawn in Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*, between "the *labor* of our bodies and the *work* of our hands." As Hannah Arendt notes, in *The Human Condition* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1958), the distinction labor/work is implicitly captured in most European languages.

Certainty," "Perception," and "Understanding") but its resultant condition is empty and abstract. That is the situation of "Stoicism" as a *Gestalt* of consciousness.[130]

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(4) THE OVERCOMING OF "STOICISM":
ABSOLUTION FROM THE "OPPOSITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS":
"ABSOLUTE KNOWING" (PhG VIII)

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The title of the last chapter of the PhG has proved to be problematic for many readers. Brandom calls it "alarming." It has seemed to suggest a knowing *of* the absolute ("God," "the infinite," … etc.) from the standpoint of consciousness. But such knowing would be out of keeping with a book that has announced its path as a "thoroughgoing scepticism." Indeed, it would be, in Kant's sense, as it has been for many readers, a "scandal." To avoid this difficulty we must remind ourselves that the word "absolute," like many others in Hegel, takes its sense by way of contrast with *its* other, here "relative." The various *Gestalten* of the "opposition of consciousness" all involve a contrast between what is relative, *for* consciousness, and what is absolute albeit unthematized, *to* consciousness. In PhG VIII this contrast, which constitutes the source of the movement (*Bewegung*, like a *kinesis*) of consciousness throughout the PhG, is eliminated and never used again in the system of philosophy, the encyclopedia (Enz) that follows. The dative/accusative contrast is "mentioned" in the Anmerkung to Enz 418, in Hegel's "theory" of consciousness, but never "used" in that work, in the WdL, or in the Rph, Hegel's only other published works.

The "absolute" that was pictured and thus "relative" in "Religion" (PhG VII) and grounded in what was *to* consciousness is reenacted in "Absolute Knowing" as completely *for* consciousness. Through the recollection of *Gestalten* and the development of the Concept, first as a *Gestalt* of consciousness, then as a *Gestalt* that comprehends consciousness, we arrive at "Absolute Knowing."

When all that was *to* consciousness is now *for* consciousness, the "myth of the given" is eliminated, what was "in itself" *to* consciousness is no more, knowing is absolved of its putative *Ding an sich*, everything is simply *for* consciousness and science may begin. The opposition (*to/for*) of consciousness has been eliminated. The task of the PhG is complete.

> This last *Gestalt* of Spirit is *absolute knowing*. It is the Spirit which simultaneously gives its complete and true content the form of Self, and thereby realizes its Concept and also remains within its Concept in this realization; it is Spirit knowing itself in the *Gestalt* of Spirit, *knowing which comprehends*. It is not merely [the] *truth* which is, *in itself*, fully equivalent to *certainty*; [here] truth also has the *Gestalt* of Spirit's certainty of itself, it is in its existence, i.e., it is for knowing Spirit in the form of Spirit's self-knowing. Truth is the *content* which in Religion is still unequal to its certainty. Thus this equivalence is constituted when the content obtains and preserves the *Gestalt* of Self. What has thereby become the element of existence or the *form of objectness (Gegenständlichkeit)*[131] for

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[130] See PF 318ff. for more details.

[131] "Objectness" is a generic feature of any *Gestalt* of consciousness. Hegel associates it with the "*Form* of consciousness" *within* which *Gestalten* in the PhG are sequentially generated examples. Any *Gestalt* is the standing of an object for consciousness as implicitly contrasted with a criterion of truth (as *to* consciousness, dative) that has not yet been thematized, or made "*for* consciousness" (accusative).

It is perhaps worth noting that the word "object," without a counterpart in classical Greek or Latin (which is why the translation of, say, το νουμενον ["*to noumenon*"] or το νοητον ["*to noeton*"] as "*object* of thought" is misleading), made its way into the European tradition by way of a translation from the Arabic participle *mawdu*, "that which is posited." It is also to be noted that Islam, without a mediating doctrine of a "chosen people" or of a "trinity," is the most "positivistic," in Hegel's sense, of all the monotheistic creationalist religions.

The derivation of the linguistic novelty, "object," from Arabic is spelled out by the French Arabist, Amélie-Marie Goichon, in *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), and in *Vocabulaires comparés d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sina* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, 1999) reprint of eds. published in Paris in 1938 and 1939, both reprinted together 1999. Around the ninth-century *mawdu* was translated into Latin as "objectum," and thence into other European languages, including the English "object" and the German "*Objekt.*" Although Kant and Hegel use the Latin-derivative "*Objekt,*" they also use "*Gegenstand*" (equally rooted in the Arabic original) formulated in terms of Germanic "roots" for "standing against." Perhaps it was the already-established contrast, *Objekt/Gegenstand* in German, that helped Kant and Hegel to recover a pre-Philonic (and hence also pre-Arabic) sense of the word's Hellenistic (i.e., Stoic) *conceptual* roots, which were relied upon by Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BC–50 AD) in his "creation" of what became the late-Jewish/Christian/Islamic doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, the ultimate source of what Kant referred to as the "scandal" of philosophy. I say "late-Jewish" because scriptural texts in Hebrew do not contain this doctrine, though Philo invites us to read the doctrine back into *Genesis*, an invitation generally accepted, whereas the first Jewish scriptural text that refers to a "beginning of existence" is 2 *Maccabees* 7:28, which, like the texts of Philo, was not written in Hebrew but in Greek for the Jews of Alexandria. (The reader may wish to consult my two essays on the subject of creation: "Hegel and Creativity," and "The Very Idea of Creation," cited above.)

This is also the origin of the notion of law as "objective" because divinely posited, the "*shariah,*" as the command of a transcendent agency, Allah, whose transcendently "positivist" character most separates the Islamist world from modern "civil society" Hegelianly conceived not as "Western," for there are by now plenty of non-"western" examples but simply as "theorizable," a stage of the Enz, in which laws are posited, not by a transcendent deity but by men legislating in a "constitutional" manner. The lack of any comprehension of the Islamist habits associated with the "shariah" is what has led to the disaster perpetrated upon Iraq by the second Bush administration. It all comes down to blindness in the face of habit (*hexis, ethe, Gewohnheit*), which takes *time* to change. The notion that an "abstract negation" of an "evil" regime (Saddam Hussein's) by "a coalition of the willing," as opposed to a "determinate negation," could succeed, represents, in light of Hegel, the most monumental political stupidity yet displayed in the twenty-first century. An example of the "logical faith" in practice. But this too will pass. As it did in nineteenth- to twentieth-century Spain, despite Franco. Consider Hegel's near-contemporary account of a disaster like that of Bush in Iraq. "Napoleon … tried [in 1808] to give the Spanish a constitution *a priori*, but the project had bad results. For a constitution is not simply made; it is the work of centuries." Rph § 274 Z (Addition). Napoleon's failure is dramatized in the paintings of Goya. Similarly, Ataturk in 1926 had the Swiss Civil Code simply translated into Turkish and imposed, with complex consequences that we read about in the daily press. (On law in Turkey see Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, *An Introduction to Comparative Law*, trans. Tony Weir [Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987] Vol. I, 380.)

Karl Marx treated *Gegenständlichkeit* (which I have translated "objectness," to contrast it with *Objektivität*, "objectivity," because most English translators of Hegel as well as of Marx render *Gegenständlichkeit* as well as *Objektivität* as "objectivity") as the key to his analysis of "commodities" (*Waren*) in the *Grundrisse* and in *Das Kapital.* An explication of Marx's insight would exceed the limits of this essay. Such an allusion is not irrelevant here because of what I have referred to as the empirical fulfillment, continuing in the twenty-first century, of Hegel's theoretical insight into the human condition in the modern world, of whose means ("the accumulation of capital") Hegel was unaware and which were first articulated by Karl Marx, the only nineteenth-century thinker who understood and improved upon Hegel in regard to "modernity." I must acknowledge that I owe the beginning of my understanding of *Gegenständlichkeit* to a 1961 conversation with Herbert Marcuse, and much of my understanding of Marx as the *only* economist with a comprehension of economics in the first stage of "civil society," namely capitalism, as systematically *dynamic* (all others employ static equilibrium models, or a "principle of irrationality," as in Joseph Schumpeter's "*Unternehmergeist,*" "entrepreneurial spirit," inspired by Max Weber's notion of irrational or "charismatic" leaps, to "explain" growth—the more recent variation on this theme relies on "Moore's Law" of technological development in the sphere of digital manipulation) to Claudio Napoleoni, *Il pensiero economico del 900* (Turin: Einaudi, 1963).

consciousness is the same as what essence itself is, namely, the Concept. Spirit *appearing* to consciousness in this element, or what is here the same, Spirit produced in this element by consciousness, *is* science.[132]

The recollection of previous *Gestalten*, contrasted with the "in-itself" of "Religion," which was *to* consciousness, has brought us to the situation of absolute knowing, where the dative dimension is eliminated and the "opposition of consciousness" is consequently overcome. Absolute knowing does not dispense with consciousness and its objects; it embraces them and suffuses them as moments, parts of *the whole* self-constituted sequence of *Gestalten* that the PhG is. If anything, absolute knowing renders the *Gestalten* of consciousness and their respective in-itselfs more comprehensible in that they can be seen *as parts* of a totality that are all *for* consciousness. This journey makes sense once its destination is reached, as in the denouement of a classical tragedy. *Contra* Kojève and many other readers, the "*wir*" (we) of the PhG does not view the sequence of *Gestalten* from the standpoint of "absolute knowledge," as if the "we" were shot from a pistol. The whole point of the PhG is to *enable* the "we," sceptical from the outset in light of the "Introduction" but by no means "absolute," to *achieve* an absolution from the opposition of consciousness at the end, "Absolute Knowing."

It is only in the final section of PhG VIII, dealing with time, that the Aristotelian τελος, "*telos*," of the work as a whole, namely, ενεργεια, "*energeia*," *Tätigkeit*, activity, as opposed to the κινησις, "*kinesis*," *Bewegung*, motion, of consciousness, becomes manifest.

Throughout the PhG there is a relentless impetus, the dialectic of the accusative and dative dimensions, driving the process from *Gestalt* to *Gestalt*. And the process is sequential; it is a series in which one *Gestalt* necessarily follows upon another by determinate "inversions," *Umkehrungen* (PhG 74 = § 87, HCE 24) of consciousness and with a *motion* (*kinesis*) that proceeds like time in the Aristotelian sense (*Phy.* VIII, 1, 251b28). But even the most cursory acquaintance with the transitions leaves no doubt that what drives the experience of consciousness is not time. That it feels like time, that it behaves like time, is a clue to the *telos*, the potentiality for timeless "theory" (but misgrasped as timeless "logic") that moves the "Form of consciousness" from one "theoretical" illusion (*Gestalt*) of timelessness (merely *to* it) to the next until the end.[133]

The progression of *Gestalten* of consciousness in the PhG is for the "Form of consciousness" a linear journey, a movement or *kinesis*, "a process that realizes a potentiality in so far as it is a potentiality."[134] Consciousness is in motion (*kinesis*), in time despite its "logical" illusion of timelessness; speculation (*theoria*) is activity (*energeia*), truly timeless. At each stage or *Gestalt* consciousness retains an in-itself that is *to* it timeless; it believes it has completed its motion and reached its destination, gotten hold of its truth, reached its final standpoint—come to rest. It still shares the "logical faith." But motion in the PhG, as in Aristotle's *Physics*, is only the realization or actualization of a potential *qua* potential. The end of one motion (*Gestalt*) is only the beginning of the

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[132] PhG 556 = § 798, PF 413.
[133] That there is an end is what, e.g., "critical theory" does not grasp, rejecting it as an impossible knowledge *of* the absolute (see, e.g., Adorno, 1973, 405–06).
[134] Aristotle, *Phy.* III, 1, 201a10.

next. One foundation, one in-itself *to* consciousness, is reduced to an in-itself *for* consciousness only to reemerge as an in-itself *for* consciousness that is now *to* consciousness a new foundation for a sequel *Gestalt*. Until consciousness reaches the stage where it becomes *activity* (*energeia*, *Wirklichkeit*)[135] in absolute knowing it remains in restless perpetual motion, divided between its accusative and dative dimensions. Thus from within the standpoint of the consciousness afflicted with its opposition, its journey is a "way of despair,"[136] a motion toward a termination that progressively reextends itself over time until it is absolved of the "opposition of consciousness," the dative and accusative contrast, in "absolute knowing."

When we reach the standpoint of absolute knowing, the standpoint of science or "theory" Aristotelianly conceived, of theoretical activity, it becomes clear that experience *in* any *Gestalt* of consciousness is temporal. Each *Gestalt* that instantiates the "Form of consciousness" undergoes a process that is akin to *kinesis*, involves time, and is incomplete and reiterative. The process that develops *all* the *Gestalten*, the "Form of consciousness," which is the PhG as a whole, is like the plot (μυθος, "*mythos*") of a classical tragedy. The "plot" of the PhG dramatizes the motion ("*kinesis*") of sequential *Gestalten*, so "we" can see that each *Gestalt* as well as the PhG *in toto*, is "a whole that has … a beginning, a middle, and an end."[137] Hence the PhG is like the *mimesis* of action (πραξις, "*praxis*"), the plot that Aristotle takes to be the "soul" (ψυχη, "*psyche*") of tragedy (*Poetics* 6, 1450a37). As involving time, the sequence of *Gestalten* of consciousness is akin to history. But, unlike historical "stages," which are hopelessly "overdetermined" ("*überbestimmt*" in the sense of Wittgenstein), the *Gestalten* of consciousness are, like *kinesis* in Aristotle's physics, susceptible of comprehension. That is the development of the PhG.

The temporality of a *Gestalt* is expressly addressed thus:

Time is the Concept itself *existing* as something definite and representing itself to consciousness as empty intuition. That is the reason why Spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time so long as it does not *grasp* its pure Concept, i.e., so long as it does not annihilate time. Time is the pure Self *externally* intuited and *not grasped* by the Self; it is the Concept merely intuited. When this Concept does grasp itself, it eliminates its temporal form, comprehends intuiting, and is intuiting comprehended and comprehending.

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[135] Aristotle never provided a "definition" of *energeia*, as he had of *kinesis* in *Physics* III, 1, "the actualization of a potential *qua* potential." In previous publications I have attempted to fill this gap by defining *energeia* as "the actualization of a potential *qua* actual," with special reference to *Meta.* IX, e.g., 1050a15–17. See WTAH 136. This distinction also pertains to activity in Hegel.

[136] PhG 67 = § 78, HCE 14. It has been observed that "pessimism," if not nihilism, became the mark of intellectual sophistication among the French (but not only the French) at mid-century. This is completely understandable but entirely "*insupportable*." Among the "brilliant," pessimism is easily generated if one feels oneself attuned to what may be called the "Stoic" predicament while judging others to be beneath this depth of insight into what is sometimes called "the modern condition." This still trendy arrogance represents a deep misunderstanding of "modernity," which, I'm afraid, is only averted by a comprehension of Hegel as "the Aristotle of the modern world."

[137] "ολον δε εστιν το εχον αρχην και μεσον και τελευτην" (Aristotle, *Poetics* 7, 1450b27). For the analogous function of the three "principles" in "theory" according to Aristotle, see *Phy.* I, 7, esp. 191a12–14, and for an explanation of the three principles as the "soul" of "theory" in Hegel as well as Aristotle, see WTAH 133–38.

Time accordingly appears as the fate and necessity of that Spirit which is not completed within itself. It appears as the necessity of enriching the participation which self-consciousness has in consciousness, the necessity of setting into motion the *immediacy of the in-itself* (the form in which substance is in consciousness) or, inversely, when the in-itself is taken as *something internal*, time appears as the necessity of realizing and revealing what is at first merely *internal*, i.e., of claiming the in-itself for Spirit's self-certainty.[138]

The PhG, like each of its constituent *Gestalten*, is a *process*. In Aristotle as in Hegel there are three kinds of process: (1) ενεργεια ("*energeia*"), *Tätigkeit/Wirklichkeit*, activity; (2) κινησις ("*kinesis*"), *Bewegung*, motion; and (3) κατα συμβεβηκος ("*kata symbebekos*"), *Zufälligkeit/Akzidentalität*, contingency. The structure of each articulates three αρχαι ("*archai*"), *Prinzipien*, principles: (1) an initial ειδος ("*eidos*"), *Bestimmtheit*, determinacy or form-from-which; (2) a factor *capable* of undergoing a transition from one determinacy or form to its contrary (εναντια ["*enantia*"], *Gegensatz*), υλη ("*hyle*") or υποκειμενον ("*hupokeimenon*"), *Materie* or *Substrat*, matter or substratum; (3) a telic ειδος ("*eidos*") or τελος ("*telos*"), a *Begriff* or *Idee* or *vollkommene Bestimmtheit*, a realizable determinacy or form-to-which. When matter or the hyletic factor is considered in the process as lacking the form-to-which, its determinacy or form-from-which is called its στερησις ("*steresis*"), *Negativität*, lack or (in Sellars-speak) "gappiness." Hence the three αρχαι ("*archai*") or principles of a process considered in θεωρια ("*theoria*") may be summarized as (1) στερησις ("*steresis*"), (2) υλη ("*hyle*"), and (3) ειδος ("*eidos*") or τελος ("*telos*") (*Phy.* I, 7).

This three-principle, "theoretical," account of a process is perhaps most familiar from Aristotle's treatment of κινησις ("*kinesis*"), motion. Here, as with "activity" and "contingency," the main point is to comprehend just what the process consists in. Motion is what it is because the material factor, υλη ("*hyle*"), has the capacity or potentiality of proceeding from its initial determinacy, its form-from-which, its στερησις ("*steresis*") or lack, to the *telos* of the process. The process *is* the process that it is in so far as it is the process of realizing the matter's capacity of being *in* the form-to-which or the telic form. Motion is a process *only* as the realization of this capacity or potentiality. Once the matter or hyletic factor is *in* the form-to-which, the process, as motion, is over.

Now the contrary forms involved in motion may be of three kinds: of place, of quality, and of quantity. Consider for a moment contraries of place or location, in which the process consists in the transition of the matter from one place or locus to another, locomotion, say, from Thebes to Athens. The process is actual only in so far as the material factor has not yet realized its capacity to get from Thebes to Athens. Once in Athens, the telic determinacy, the process is over.

And so it goes, through *all* of the motile *Gestalten* in the PhG. What is different about the last *Gestalt*, "Absolute Knowing" (PhG VIII), is that the capacity for a *Gestalt* to "move" toward the thematization of its criteriological dimension, "moving" from a dative to an accusative apprehension of its in-itself, has been exhausted. Why are these "positions" or *Gestalten* exhausted by PhG VIII? A

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[138] PhG 558 = § 801, PF 414, italics added.

good question, and one that deserves an answer. Here I can only say that PhG VIII *is* Hegel's "completeness proof." Its specific explication will have to await another occasion.

What I can say here is that the kind of process with which the PhG consummates is no longer a *kinesis* or motion, as (1) within all the preceding *Gestalten* and as (2) the complete motion from *Gestalt* to *Gestalt*, the "motion" of the "Form of consciousness," motion in the PhG as a whole. The consummatory process depicted in "Absolute Knowing" is no longer motion but rather ενεργεια ("*energeia*"), *Tätigkeit*, or activity: θεωρια ("*theoria*"), "*Spekulation*," or "theory" in the sense already developed in this essay.

Let us first consider the difference between *energeia* and *kinesis* as processes. We have elucidated *kinesis* as a process that is per se incomplete, the realization of a potential, a telic determinacy, but only as underway *to* that *telos*. This is why *kinesis* is said to take time. Indeed, for Aristotle and Hegel, this *is* time.[139]

The distinguishing character of ενεργεια ("*energeia*"), *Tätigkeit*, activity, is that the process is complete throughout. In short, the hyletic factor, matter, "is in the form" (εν τω ειδει εστιν, "*en to eidei (eidos) estin*," *Meta.* IX, 8, 1050a17), that is, the telic form, in so far as the process *is* an activity. Aristotle's favorite example is the process of seeing, an activity rather than a motion. Seeing as a process is *what* it is because it in-forms the process throughout, not as the telic form in motion which is only realized *as* a capacity or potentiality. Seeing is not "catching sight of" (a motion). Seeing is an activity whose determinacy is *what* it is in so far as it is a process at all. In this it is like the activities of living, sensing, knowing, and theorizing (θεωρειν, "*theorein*"), the divine activity toward which all other activities (as well as motions) are said to point (προς εν, "*pros hen*"). This is the topic of the last text we shall consider in this essay (*Meta.* XII, 7, 1072b18–30 = Enz § 577).

It remains here only to consider the third kind of process, which Aristotle (esp. *Phy.* II, 4–6, 195b30ff.) designated κατα συμβεβηκος ("*kata symbebekos*") or contingent or accidental, a process in which the telic form is "incidentally" or "accidentally" imposed from without, either by nature or by design. Generally, there can be no theory of what is accidental. But in Aristotle there is an important exception in the case of poetry. Here the poet imposes a telic form to constitute a plot (μυθος), which makes a sequence of practical episodes like those considered in theory, and unlike those that occur in mere history. That is why poetry, especially a tragic drama, though treating events analogous to those taken up by history, can be "more philosophic" than history. This is the model Hegel exploited to compose his PhG, whose *Gestalten* would otherwise unfold in an infinite sequence of contingent episodes (as in Adorno). This is why the PhG finds its "exact" counterpart in an Aristotelianly conceived drama, as claimed at the beginning of this essay.

Of course contingent events, insusceptible of theorization, are common enough. (Some, like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, revel in "the dangerous idea" of universalizing them in order

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[139] Heidegger was correct to assert, in *Sein und Zeit*, that Hegel shares with Aristotle the same conception of time. He was wrong to assert that this conception is "merely" "ontic." Indeed, Heidegger's famed "ontological difference" only makes sense on the basis of the "Stoic" conception of "receptivity" that he derived from his, admittedly searching, reading of Kant, as he makes clear in his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

to "refute" the "skyhooks" deployed by thinkers trapped in a Philonically conceived universe, as if that were the only alternative). Indeed, both Aristotle and Hegel maintain that "accidentals" are a "necessary" feature in any "theoretical" consideration of reality.[140] That is because theorizable entities are "spoken of in many ways" (πολλαχως λεγομενον), some of which will get it wrong.

Perhaps the most familiar of accidental processes are matters of luck, if good, "serendipity." Luck, τυχη ("*tyche*") crops up in the field of πραξις ("*praxis*") or human affairs.[141] For example, the process in question might have us going to the market to buy a chicken (the telic form). *En route* we encounter a man who owes us a debt. He pays. That's luck.

More broadly, Aristotle speaks of physical contingency (αυτοματον, "*automaton*"). For example, an oak is undergoing the process of growth (quantitative motion) from its sapling state to that of a full-grown tree. If struck by lightning during its process to maturity, the tree has been subjected to αυτοματον, "*automaton*," physical contingency.

For the purpose of this essay, the most interesting example of a process κατα συμβεβηκος ("*kata symbebekos*") concerns "logic." For according to Aristotle (*Meta.* IV, 4), the operation of predication *per se* can have, as that logical operation, a relationship to the subject matter stated in a natural language (not the "language" of operations on logical "variables") that is no more than "accidental." Unless I misread them, and I read them in tandem, this is also a principal insight of Hegel in the PhG and of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. For all three—Aristotle, Hegel, Wittgenstein—there is a difference between "logic" and "theory" that has been blurred by most other members of the post-Hellenic tradition ("Stoicism").[142]

Back to PhG 588 = § 801. Time is annihilated in the last *Gestalt* of consciousness because the process of the PhG has brought knowing around from being a matter of motion, which involves time, to being an activity, which is *timeless*. This is why the PhG functions as the "introduction" to Hegel's Aristotelian encyclopedia of "theory." The only means to get there is the elimination of the "Stoic" presumption that we have, within consciousness, a timeless grasp of an in-itself. This the PhG shows to be an illusion, a "formalist dream," a conflation of theory with logic.

Apart from the adumbration of timeless theorizing in PhG VIII, there is not a page of the PhG on which one might find anything like "theory."[143] Theory is to be found aplenty in WdL, Enz, and

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[140] With regard to Hegel, Dieter Henrich got this right in "Hegels Theorie über den Zufall," *Hegel im Kontext* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971) 157–86. Neither Henrich nor, to my knowledge, anyone else has noted that Aristotle has a parallel teaching about the necessity of contingency or the accidental, κατα συμβεβηκος: "Hence, since not everything is or comes to be of necessity and always, but most things happen usually, *the accidental must exist*." *Meta.* VI, 2, 1027a9–11. Hugh Tredennick, trans., emphasis added.

[141] The world of *praxis* was, rightly, not regarded as theorizable by Aristotle but it was theorized by Hegel, thanks to the condition of "modernity." On this difference between theory in Hegel and Aristotle, see WTAH and esp. "What Is 'Civil Society?'" cited above.

[142] Unlike most others, Aristotle, Hegel, and Wittgenstein each have an austere concept of logic according to which logical operations only pertain to formal variables and have, at most, a relation to natural language "meanings" that is accidental or κατα συμβεβηκος ("*kata symbebekos*").

[143] Hence those many books that find Hegel's "theory" of this or that in the PhG will have to be cast into the fire set ablaze by David Hume.

Rph, where there is no trace of "Hegel's phenomenological method," not even in the "PhG" section of the Enz, §§ 413–39.

These systematic works form a cycle, a circle of "theory" only made evident in the Enz, which, alas, remains, as Hegel left it, a torso. Still, the considerations made here should have clarified somewhat why Hegel's encyclopedia ends and, let us not forget, begins (for it is a cycle) with the following words from Aristotle:

> Thinking (νοησις, "*noesis*") in itself is what is best in itself, and what thinking is in the fullest sense is what is best in the fullest sense. Thinking comprehends itself by participating in thought. By engaging in thought and by thinking, it becomes thought, so that thinking and thought are the same. For thinking (νους, "*nous*") is the capacity to comprise (δεκτικον, "*dektikon*") thought and entity (ουσια, "*ousia*"). In comprising both thought and entity it engages in activity and is actualized. It is because of this actuality rather than potentiality that thought seems to partake of the divine. Indeed, the act of theorizing (θεωρια, "*theoria*") is most pleasant and best. If then that happiness which we sometimes enjoy is what God always enjoys, this compels our wonder; if it is greater, this compels our wonder even more. And it is so. Indeed, life is divine; for living is the activity (ενεργεια, "*energeia*") of thinking, and activity (ενεργεια, "*energeia*") is God. And the activity (ενεργεια, "*energeia*") of God is in itself living at its best and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that living and life continuous and eternal are divine; this is God.[144]

We must never forget that Aristotle and Hegel's God, unlike that of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, is not transcendent.[145] He (it) did not create the world. The reference to "the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence prior to the creation of nature and finite spirit" (WdL I, 31) at the beginning of the *Science of Logic*, is a Spinozist joke.[146] It is as little a clue to the "secret of Hegel" as the infamous triad: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Such clues are useful only to those who do not or cannot read Hegel, but know that he was a "famous" philosopher about whom "something" must be said.

AFTERTHOUGHTS

Aristotle and Hegel distinguish between "theory" and "logic." For either, "logical theory" would be oxymoronic,[147] as both have effectively shown (see above). The Stoic tradition (for this reason the

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[144] *Meta.* XII, 7, 1072b18–30 = Hegel Enz § 577, K. Dove and J. Middleton, trans.

[145] This point is made, albeit too tersely, in WTAH. The God Hegel here invokes is the God of Aristotle, a pure immanent *energeia* (ενεργεια), not God the transcendent creator in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic sense, a God totally alien to Aristotle and to Hegel, though his views on this matter could not be, for obvious reasons, unequivocally expressed. Hence his ambiguous legacy.

[146] Hegel's humor, here as elsewhere, is as subtle as Goethe's or Heine's. The many humorless commentators who have taken this passage as a "key" to Hegel's thought indicate the need to read the PhG in light of Aristotle. Hegel's reference to God prior to the creation of things is fairly obviously an ironic reference to Spinoza, *On the Improvement of the Understanding* (in *Spinoza Selections*, ed. John Wild [New York: Scribner's, 1930] 27): " … the understanding of God before He created things," ironic because Spinoza was well known to Hegel, in company with most other contemporary German intellectuals, as a radical anti-creationist.

[147] I am reluctant to put Peter F. Strawson's fine book, *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London: Methuen, 1952), under this ban. For the book provides an excellent critique of the "logical empiricist" propensity to reduce "induction" to "deduction." But I must. Strawson's corrective is a half-way house. It is necessary to go the whole distance in

topic of the PhG) does not draw this distinction. Hegel was the first, and remains one of the few, who recognize this distinction in Aristotle and in philosophy itself. It is the conflation of theory and logic in the Stoic tradition that provides a clue to how "Stoics" (in the broadest sense, embracing all post-Hellenic thought, save Hegel and Wittgenstein, to the present) could make an "implicit" (but not, *pace* Brandom, an "explicit") claim to knowledge of the in-itself (the criteriological dimension indicated throughout the PhG by the use of a dative/accusative contrast). For each *Gestalt* of consciousness in the PhG, the in-itself or the criteriological dimension is always hidden, that is, *to* consciousness, until the *end* of *that Gestalt*: The in-itself *to* consciousness can no longer function *as* an in-itself once it is *for* consciousness, for then the putative absolute is made relative, namely, to consciousness. The PhG proceeds to its conclusion, "Absolute Knowing," by following a "phenomenological method" to progressively reveal, by making *for* consciousness (accusative), in each case (within a *finite*[148] sequence of *Gestalten*) a hitherto dative dimension (what is *to* consciousness). In every case till the last, a *Gestalt* of consciousness tacitly takes its dative dimension to be "foundational." This is what has been the "logical faith" defining "Stoicism."

Allow me to add that this anti-foundationalist aspect of my PhG interpretation has been persistently investigated in my teaching and writing since 1964.[149] It is apt to think of the PhG as an anti-foundationalist exercise, that is, as a critique of the "Form of consciousness" as essentially foundationalist (involving a dative as well as an accusative dimension). But once absolved of its foundationalism via "Absolute Knowing" (PhG VIII), Hegel's knowing in the Enz does not concern itself with the question of foundations. It simply proceeds Aristotelianly, thinking through the circle of knowledge (Enz) in terms of the hierarchies of activity (*energeia* or *Wirklichkeit*) and motion (*kinesis* and *Bewegung*).[150]

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disentangling logic from theory. Only Hegel, following Aristotle, does so, with some latter-day help from Wittgenstein and Sellars.

[148] The "theoretical" disaster of "critical theory" becomes evident when we see T.W. Adorno, in *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966; *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton [New York: Seabury, 1973]), apply 'Hegel's phenomenological method' to an *infinite* number of cases. Other members of the "Frankfurt School" are not as forthright as Adorno.

[149] Some of my students at Yale and the New School in the 1960s and 1970s (including, for a period during the Fall term of 1968, Robert Brandom) have taken my Sellars-inspired anti-foundationalist interpretation of the PhG to be the essence of Hegel per se. Salient examples are Richard Winfield, *inter alia*, in *Overcoming Foundations* (New York: Columbia UP, 1989), and William Maker, in *Philosophy without Foundations* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). None of these fine students, including Brandom, has yet grasped the relationship between Hegel and Aristotle. (Well, neither had I, in 1970. Witness my remark on "the Aristotelian and Nietzschean interpretation of the Concept" in HPM 619.) My most comprehending "student" has been Stephen Bungay, who happened to attend a lecture, "Logic and Law in Hegel" (so far only published in German, on the basis of a lecture given shortly thereafter at the Frankfurt Law School, "Logik und Recht bei Hegel," *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* XVII [1979]: 89ff.) I gave at Oxford in June 1978, and has remained a friend ever since. The most excellent brief introduction to Hegel I know is Bungay, "The Hegelian Project," *Hegel Reconsidered*, ed. T. Engelhardt and T. Pinkard (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1994). Unfortunately Bungay's 1981 Oxford D.Phil dissertation was severely truncated, with the most philosophical parts omitted, for publication in Bungay, *Beauty and Truth: A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984). It nevertheless remains the best published account of Hegel's theory of art. See also the work of my former Purchase College student, Jay Gupta, "Hegel on Logic, Determinacy and Cognition," PF XXXV (Spring 2004): 81ff.

[150] These hierarchies of activity and motion involve an ever-recurring and circular process in the circle of knowledge called the εγκυκλιος παιδεια (Enz). Most critically for my interpretation, this circle has no terminus. lt is ever-recurring, an "eternal return of the same." Each and every stage of Hegel's system in the Enz is, in a phrase from Frege that Sellars

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There is no hint of anything remotely Aristotelian among the foundationalist *Gestalten* considered in the PhG. Aristotle was no foundationalist.[151]

It is gratifying to think what admirable things my many former students have accomplished. It is sobering to consider how demanding "*die Anstrengung des Begriffs*" ("the engagement with conceptual thought") (PhG 48 = § 58) can be.[152]

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loved, "unsaturated." Each stage in the cycle Logic (Enz I), Nature (Enz II), Spirit (Enz III), as well as subordinate stages, up to and including the last words in the printed book, from Aristotle, *Meta*. XII, 7, 1072b18–30, retranslated above, has a theoretical "gap" ("gappy" was another one of Sellars' favorite terms) that is only "satisfied" (Sellars again) by its successor stage. But no stage is "final." No single stage, only the whole, is complete. That is why it is a "circle" of knowledge, an encyclopedia (organized without alphabetical contamination). This circle is sketched in WTAH.

[151] That is why one must be astonished that such a well-educated Hegel scholar as Richard Winfield has included Aristotle among *his* targets of anti-foundationalist critique, even imputing the Stoic bifurcation of the *logos* to him (Winfield, *Overcoming Foundations*, 58).

[152] Earlier versions of this essay were presented at a special session, "Aristotle and Hegel" (with Professor Alfredo Ferrarin, Pisa), at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings, Philadelphia, December 28, 2002, and at a symposium, "Aristotele, Hegel e il linguaggio" (with Professor F. Lo Piparo, Palermo), at the University of Venice, May 27, 2004.

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