

INDIVIDUALITY IN ARISTOTLE

Contexts of τοδε τι

There is a difference between theory and logic; it was drawn, with characteristic precision, by Aristotle. Theory inquires into the principles of real entities, logic describes the formal structures of language [λογος].¹ But in most philosophical writing before and after Aristotle² the ‘real’ and the ‘formal’ aspects of inquiry are assimilated or, if distinguished, then only by degree. One clue to this is the unrestricted use of ‘formal’ terms such as ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ within theoretical inquiries. In Aristotle’s writings, on the other hand, a sharp distinction is drawn between the ‘theoretical’ topics—physics, mathematics, and ‘first philosophy’ (later ‘metaphysics’)—and the formal discourses upon language [λογος], which the tradition has come to call ‘logic’.

A fair representation of the ‘generally accepted opinion’ (what Aristotle’s *Topics* describes as the ενδοξα) on this topic today may be had from the following:

It was a question much debated in antiquity whether logic should be accounted a branch of philosophy, as the Stoics said, or merely a preliminary to philosophical studies, as the Peripatetics maintained. But the dispute was little more than a quarrel about words. Both sides agreed that logic should come first in the education of a philosopher; and if the Stoics, unlike Aristotle, called it a part of philosophy, that was merely because they came later and were self-conscious in the presentation of their doctrines as a system. What most men in later centuries have called logic is the study of questions such as Aristotle discussed in the works of his *Organon*: and the novelty of the Stoic contribution, as we see it in retrospect, is not any new demarcation of subject-matter, but an emphasis on relations of propositions as distinct from relations of universals or concepts. But Aristotle gave no clear account of the province of logic, and for this reason important questions about its relation to other sciences have remained for discussion in modern times.³

This standard account of Aristotle on the difference between theory and logic seriously underestimates his difference from the Stoics, and from the Hellenistic Peripatetics as well. In one word, this view of Aristotle, prevalent among philosophers since Russell’s discovery of Frege, places all the emphasis upon the distinction between a term-logic and a propositional-logic. What it neglects is that the mentioned

¹ That there are just three principles—two contraries (e.g., qualitative, quantitative, of place, etc.) and a substratum which undergoes change from one contrary to its other—to be sought in the study of physical things is developed in *Physics*, Bk. I, ch. 7 (see 191a11, cited below, and Aristotle’s conclusion at 191a20); that there is a parallel triad of principles in ‘first philosophy’ is developed in *Metaphysics*, Bk. IX (where the contraries are shown to be ‘potentiality/actuality’); and that there is no analogous triad of principles in ‘logic’ is a recurring theme in the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere. The reason is that ‘logic’ does not and cannot study individuals; its principles are accordingly diadic, e.g., subject-term and predicate-term. The middle-term in a syllogism does not function as an independent principle.

² The one major exception, Hegel, has been so badly misunderstood on this count that any attempt here to read his *Science of Logic* as continuous with Aristotle’s distinction between theory and logic would require space disproportionate with the purpose of this essay. The interested reader may consult my ‘Phenomenology and Systematic Philosophy’, in *Method and Speculation in Hegel’s Phenomenology*, M. Westphal, ed. (1982) pp. 27ff.

³ William C. & M.H. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (1964), p. 737.

conflict between the Stoics (proto-Fregeans) and the Peripatetics was located within a discursive frame which had already lost sight of Aristotle's distinction between theory and logic.

Aristotle, then as now, has been universally—and justly—celebrated as the inventor of 'logic'. He did this by postulating the linguistic variable, by treating the subject and predicate places in the form of a sentence as open to substitution restricted only by such formal considerations as the extensionality of terms.⁴ His favored way of putting this is: 'B is predicated of all A'. The B and the A are linguistic variables, predicate and subject variables respectively. A predicate variable is, literally, a 'category', the place holder for what is 'being predicated' [κατηγορηθῆναι]; a subject variable is a 'substratum' [υποκειμενον]. The 'logical' notions of a 'universal' and a 'particular'—vaguely anticipated but strictly unknown in pre-Aristotelian philosophy—can be extrapolated by an analogy: predicate variables are to subject variables as universals are to particulars. Use of these terms has been widespread and largely unquestioned in post-Aristotelian philosophy. One result has been centuries of puzzlement over Aristotle's doctrine of being as 'being *qua* being' or 'substance' [ουσια].⁵ He has been seen⁶ to waver between a notion of substance as universal, especially so far as it is said to be knowable, and as particular, so far as it is said to exist. In *Metaphysics* VII and elsewhere he argues that substance, properly regarded, can be neither universal nor particular. In these contexts he frequently argues that substance is a τοδε τι. How are we to understand this term?

The term τοδε τι is rendered variously in the Oxford and Loeb editions of the complete works of Aristotle and in the translations of separate works. The most helpful guide to the problem of translating the term is the one-page article, 'ΤΟΔΕ ΤΙ in Aristotle'⁷ by J.A. Smith, co-editor of the 'Oxford Aristotle'. Smith does not expressly argue for a translation of τοδε τι as 'individual' or 'individuality', but his article is an excellent critique of the received tradition of translation [or, more literally, 'transverbations'] into Latin and modern European languages, including the English ['a 'this'' or 'this somewhat'] of the 'Oxford Aristotle'. In Greek τοδε is literally 'this', and τι is literally 'somewhat'. The received tradition has rendered the compound τοδε τι in ways to suggest either (a.) 'any particular instance of the class of *somewhats*' or (b.) 'any particular instance of the class of *thises*'. The common element in the interpretations is to take both of the compounded terms, τοδε and τι, as having a 'logical' sense, i.e., with the one indicating a 'particular' as contrasted⁸ with the other as a 'universal'. Thus in (a.) τοδε is taken to indicate a 'particular'

⁴ This feature of Aristotle's analytics has been appropriately stressed by Jan Łukasiewicz in *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic* (1957²), pp. 7–10, though it must be stressed here that Łukasiewicz also shares the ενδοξα represented by Kneale & Kneale, above.

⁵ A 'theological' interpretation can be traced to Alexander of Aphrodisias (the being of 'first philosophy' as a particular) and an 'ontological' interpretation (being *qua* being as a universal) to Avicenna.

⁶ This holds for the entire history of Aristotelian commentary, but especially since Avicenna and, for the modern period, since Paul Natorp's 'Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik', *Philosophische Monatshefte*, XXIV (1888), 37ff. & 540ff. The entire 'Jaeger-school' (i.e., most 20th century Aristotle scholarship) builds upon this tradition.

⁷ In *The Classical Review*, XXXV (1921), p. 19.

⁸ This formal contrast must be 'contrasted' with the theoretical contrasts (or 'contraries') developed, e.g., in the *Physics* (see note 1).

instance of the ‘universal’ class τ (as in ‘this somewhat’), and in (b.) τ is taken to indicate a ‘particular’ instance of the ‘universal’ class $\tau\delta\epsilon$ (as in ‘a ‘this’’).

There are, on good authority,⁹ strictly grammatical objections to both interpretations; these are best left to the discussion of classical scholars. But there are also philosophical objections, evident to the most Greekless student, provided that he or she has grasped Aristotle’s sharp demarcation between ‘formal’ analysis (in the ‘logical’ writings) and ‘philosophical’ inquiries (the sciences of ‘theory’, ‘practice’ and ‘production’, see, e.g., *Meta.* VI, 1, 1025b26). The contraries ‘universal’ [καθολου] and ‘particular’ [καθ εκαστον] are, *as such*, appropriate to analyses of structures and relations in language [λογος], paradigmatically the relation between the subject and predicate ‘places’ in a sentence or proposition. *Only these are susceptible of purely formal analysis; these are the only ‘places’ which indicate pure formal variables open to substitution instances without further qualification* (what in modern logic is called ‘extensionality’). When the ‘logical’ terms ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ are used in ‘philosophical’ inquiries, their use must be understood to obtain under some definite restriction appropriate to the specific subject matter of the inquiry in question (hence the ‘*qua*-function’, e.g., the real entities studied theoretically must be considered *qua* biological or *qua* physical or, at the limit of comprehensiveness, *qua* ‘individual’) and never in the unrestricted and formal sense which they can properly have only when the topic is language [λογος] *as such* (i.e., in the ‘Organon’ or ‘logical’ writings).

When—as in Chrysippus or Frege or Russell—the operators in a system of logic are so established as to function with reference to propositional variables (conventionally designated, since *Principia Mathematica*, by ‘p, q, r,...’), rather than to term variables (designated by ‘A, B, C,...’ in Aristotle’s ‘Analytics’), then, *pace* the Kneales and the modern ενδοξα, the formalist character of the inquiry is no less. Whether the substitution instances in a logic be terms or propositions, and whatever the ‘degree of extensionality’ (in R.B. Marcus’ sense of that phrase), it is, on good Aristotelian grounds, a mistake to confound the formal and the real (e.g., following Quine, to purport a discussion of reality in terms of bound and unbound variables). The real is studied by theory; the formal is the proper topic of logic.

The following ‘anthology’ of contexts of $\tau\delta\epsilon \tau$ in Aristotle is designed to illustrate the point at issue; it makes no claim to completeness.¹⁰ The texts and translations cited are based upon Loeb editions, unless indicated. The translations are somewhat amended. In each case $\tau\delta\epsilon \tau$ is rendered ‘individual’ or ‘individuality’.

The main point of the ‘anthology’ is to invite consideration whether $\tau\delta\epsilon \tau$ as ‘individuality’ does not point to a theoretical but non-logical concept of ‘substance’ [ουσια] in Aristotle that is systematically different from the ‘categorical’ concept of ‘substance’ (guided by the ‘logical’ dichotomy—i.e., formal contrast—‘particular/universal’ or ‘propositional-subject/-predicate’) adumbrated by his predecessors

⁹ J.A. Smith, in the article cited, refers to John Burnet’s commentary (at p. 66n.) in his edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

¹⁰ Based upon notes taken during a critical rereading of the Loeb edition in January–August 1985, it has been supplemented by reference to H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin, 1870) s.v. ‘οδε’, and *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* in the ‘Ibycus’ computer data base.

(especially ‘the Italians’), first clearly articulated in his ‘Organon’, and subjected to repeated criticism in his ‘philosophical’ writings—especially the *Metaphysics*.

In each case the page and line reference is to the (first) occurrence of the term τοδε τι within the context here reproduced.

I. τοδε τι in FIRST PHILOSOPHY (‘Metaphysics’)

Meta III 1001b32: “...for modifications and motions and relations and dispositions and ratios do not seem to indicate the substance of anything; they are all predicated of a substrate, and none of them is an individual [τοδε τι]”

Meta III 1003a9: [re ‘impassé’ xi] “Besides the foregoing problems about the first principles we must also raise the question whether they are universal or such as we describe the particulars [καθ εκαστα] to be. For if they are universal, there will be no substances; for no common term denotes an individual [τοδε τι], but a type; and substance is an individual [τοδε τι]. But if the common predicate be hypostatized as an individual [τοδε τι], Socrates will be several beings: Himself, and Man, and Animal—that is, if each predicate denotes one particular individual [εκαστον τοδε τι]. These then are the consequences if the principles are universal. If on the other hand they are not universal but like particulars [τα καθ εκαστα], they will not be knowable; for the knowledge of everything is universal”

Meta V 1017b18: “Substance is said of...[c] all parts immanent in things which define and indicate their individuality [τοδε τι], and whose destruction causes the destruction of the whole; as, e.g., the plane is essential to the body (as some hold) and the line to the plane. And number in general is thought by some to be of this nature, on the ground that if it is abolished nothing exists, and that it determines everything. [d.] Again, the essence, whose formula is the definition, is also called the substance of each particular thing. Thus it follows that substance is said in two ways: [1] the ultimate subject [υποκειμενον] which cannot be further said [λεγεται] of something else; and [2] whatever is a separate individual being [τοδε τι ον]. The shape and form of each particular thing is of this nature” [See the whole of V, ch. 8]

Meta V 1020a8: “‘Quantity’ means that which is divisible into constituent parts, each particular one [εκαστον] of which is by nature some individual [τοδε τι]”

Meta VII 1028a12: “‘Being’ is said in many ways, which we have classified in our discussion [V, ch. 7] of the number of senses in which terms are used. It denotes first the ‘what’ of a thing, i.e., the individuality [τοδε τι]; and then the quality or quantity or any other such category.”

Meta VII 1029a28: “...it is accepted that separability and individuality [τοδε τι] belong especially to substance”

Meta VII 1030a5: “...the essence is ‘the species of some genus’ [οπερ]; but when something is said of some *other* thing, that is not ‘the species of the genus’ [οπερ] individuality [τοδε τι], e.g., white man is not ‘the species of the genus’ individuality [τοδε τι], granting that individuality [τοδε τι] pertains only to substances; hence there is an essence only of such things whose formula [λογος] is a definition.” [Furth tr., amended]

Meta VII 1030a19: “For the ‘what’ in one sense means the substance and the individual [τοδε τι], and in another each one of the categories: quantity, quality, etc.”

Meta VII 1030b11: “And ‘one’ has the same variety in the ways it is said as ‘being’. ‘Being’ is said sometimes of the individual [τοδε τι], sometimes of the quantity, sometimes of the quality. Hence even ‘white man’ will have a formula [λογος] and definition; but in a different sense from the definition of ‘whiteness’ and ‘substance’.

Meta VII 1033a31: “For to make an individual [τοδε τι] is to make an individual [τοδε τι] out of the substratum [υποκειμενον] in the fullest sense. What I am saying is that to make the bronze round is not to make the round or the sphere, but something else; i.e., to produce this form in another medium”

Meta VII 1033b22: “Is there then some sphere besides these [particular spheres], or some house besides the bricks? Surely no individual [τοδε τι] would ever have been generated if form were a separate ‘this’ [τοδε]. No, form means ‘of such a kind’; it is not a determinate ‘this’, but we produce or generate ‘out of this’ something ‘of such a kind’; and when it is generated it is a thing which is both a ‘this’ and ‘of such a kind’ [τοδε τοιονδε, tr. suggested in Smith’s article]. The whole ‘this’ [τοδε], Callias, or Socrates, is like ‘this bronze sphere’, but ‘man’ and ‘animal’ are like ‘*bronze sphere in general*’” [tr. significantly amended].

Meta VII 1037a3: “And with respect to mathematical, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of the formulae of the whole; e.g., why are the formulae of the semicircles not part of the formula of the circle? For *these* are not perceptible. Or does this [difference between perceptibles and mathematical] make no difference? [Probably not.] For there will be matter even in some things that are not perceptible. Indeed there will be matter in some sense in everything which is not an essence, that is, a form by itself, but an individual [τοδε τι]. Thus the semicircles will be parts, not of the universal [circle], but of the particulars [i.e., particular circles], as was said before [VII, 10], for one kind of matter is perceptible [the matter of ‘physicals’] and another kind is intelligible [the matter of ‘mathematicals’]”

Meta VII 1037b28: “But all the elements in the definition [taken ‘logically’, as at *Post An* 92a29] have got to be [in some sense] one; for the definition is a certain single formula [λογος] and [were it to be applicable in this inquiry] of [a] *substance*, so that it must be the formula of some one thing; for ‘substance’ denotes some ‘one’ and ‘an individual’ [τοδε τι], as we say”

Meta VII 1038b6: “Just as the substratum [υποκειμενον, i.e., ‘logical’ subject of predication] and the essence and the combination of these are said to be [but not aptly] substance [ουσια], so too is the universal [καθολου, i.e., ‘logical’ predicate; but, as Aristotle goes on to argue, also inaptly]. Now two of these have been discussed: the essence [at VII 4–6 & 10–12] and the substratum [at VII 3]; of the latter we have said it underlies in two senses, *qua* individual [τοδε τι] (as the animal underlies its attributes), or *qua* matter (what underlies as potentiality for actualization [εντελεχεια]. The universal, too, is taken by some [the Platonists] to be a cause *par excellence* and a principle [αρχη] too. Let us therefore proceed to discuss this as well”

Meta VII 1038b24: “Again, it is impossible and absurd that ‘the this’ [τοδε τι] or substance, if it is composed of anything, should be composed not of substances nor of the individual [τοδε τι], but of a quality; for then non-substance or quality will be prior to substance or ‘to the this’ [του τοδε]. Which is

impossible; for neither in formula [λογω, i.e., ‘logically’] nor in time nor in generation can the affections of substance be prior to the substance, since then they would be separable [χωριστᾶ]”

Meta VII 1039a2: “...it is obvious that no universal attribute is substance; and it is also clear from the fact that none of the common predicates signifies an individual [τοδε τι], but rather ‘what is of such a kind’ [το τοιονδε]. Otherwise many other awkward consequences follow, including the ‘third man’”

Meta VII 1039a17: “But the consequence involves a difficulty. For [1.] *if* no substance can consist of universals, because they signify ‘of such a kind’ [το τοιονδε] and not an individual [τοδε τι]; and [2.] *if* also no substance can be composed of complete [or actualized, εντελεχεια], substances, *then* every substance will be incomposite, and so there will be no formula [λογος] of any substance”

Meta VII 1039a32: “If there are Forms, and if ‘animal’ is present in the man and the horse, it is either numerically one and the same with them, or not. (In formula [λογω] they are clearly one; for in each case the speaker will enunciate the same formula [λογον].) If, then, there is in some sense an Absolute Man, who is an individual [τοδε τι] and exists separately, then the constituents, e.g., ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’, must signify an individual [τοδε τι] and be separate and be substances. Hence there would have to be an ‘Absolute Animal’ too”

Meta VIII 1042a27: “But now let us return to a discussion of those substances which are generally accepted as such. These are the perceptible ones, and all perceptible substances have matter. Now the substratum [υποκειμενον] [is said to be] substance [ουσια], and in one sense [1.] this is the matter (‘matter’ I call [λεγω] that which, though it is not an individual [τοδε τι] actually [ενεργεια], is potentially [δυναμει] an individual [τοδε τι]); and in another sense [2.] [the substratum] is the formula [λογος] and the specific shape (which is an individual being [τοδε τι ον] and is ‘logically’ [in speech, λογω] separable); and thirdly [3.] there is the combination of the two, which alone admits of generation and destruction, and is separable in an unqualified sense—for of substance in the sense of formula [λογον] some are separable and some are not”

Meta VIII 1042b3: “Similarly, if the change is in respect of *being*, there is something which is now in course of generation, and subsequently in course of destruction, and which is the substratum [υποκειμενον], now as this individual [τοδε τι], and subsequently as deprived of this individuality”

Meta IX 1049a23: “It seems that what we are talking about is not a ‘this’ [τοδε] but a definite material [‘thaten’]—e.g., the box is not *wood* but *wooden* [i.e., made of wooden material], and the *wood* is not *earth* but *earthen* [i.e., made of earthen material], and once again if *earth* is likewise not [just any] other thing [*that*] but *thaten* [i.e., a definite material for something else]—[it seems, then, that] always the *that* is, put *simpliciter*, potentially the next thing up in the sequence. For example, *the box* is not *earthen*, nor [of course] *earth*, but is *wooden*; this [=some wood] is what is potentially a box and this is matter of a box, i.e., *wood simpliciter* of *box simpliciter*, and of this box, this wood. If there were some primary stuff which was not yet called the material [*thaten*] for something else [*that*], then this would be primary matter [πρωτη υλη]. For example, if earth is [not air but] ‘made of air’ [i.e., *air-y*], and air is not fire, but ‘made of fire’ [*fire-y*], then fire would be primary matter, since it is not an individual [τοδε τι]. For the ‘that of which’ [το καθ ου, the subject], or the substratum [το υποκειμενον] are distinguished thus: [1.] as being an

individual [τοδε τι] or [2.] as not being one. Take for example [1.] as the ‘subject’ of the attributes ‘man’, a ‘body’ and ‘soul’, and as an attribute ‘cultured’ [in Greek ‘musical’] or ‘white’ (when culture is induced in a thing it is called, not ‘culture’ but ‘cultured’ and the man is called not whiteness but white, and not a walk or a movement but *walking* or *moving*—just as with ‘thaten’ [i.e., things are always ‘made of’ some definite matter]). [In those contexts] where ‘subject’ [functions] in this way, the ultimate [subject] is a substance. But [2.] whenever it [the subject] is not like this, and what is predicated is some [τι] form [ειδος] or an individual [τοδε τι], then the ultimate [subject] is matter or material substance. Thus it is apt when ‘thaten’ [i.e., a derivative predicate] is said of matter as well as of attributes; for both are [in contrast with the substance] in-definite [αοριστα]. Now it has been stated when a thing should be said to be potentially, and when not.” [Furth tr., amended]

Meta X 1052b17: “Hence ‘to be one’ means ‘to be indivisible’ (being essentially an individual thing [τοδε οντι], distinct and separate in place or form or thought), or ‘to be whole and indivisible’; but especially ‘to be the first measure of each kind’, and above all of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extended to the other categories”

Meta XI 1060b1: “...if we posit the principles which seem most unchangeable, Being and Unity, (a) unless each of them denotes an individual [τοδε τι] and a substance, how can they be separate and independent? but the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking are of this nature. (b) If, however, each of them denotes an individual [τοδε τι] and a substance, then all existing things are substances; for Being is predicated [κατηγορειται] of everything, and Unity also of some things. But that all things are substances is false”

Meta XI 1060b22: “It is a perplexing fact also that whereas every science treats of universals and types, substance is not a universal thing, but rather an individual [τοδε τι] and separable thing; so that if there is a science that deals with first principles, how can we suppose that substance is a first principle?”

Meta XII 1069b11: “Now if change is of four kinds, in respect either of ‘the somewhat’ [κατα το τι] or of quality or of quantity or of place, and if change in respect of ‘the this’ [κατα τοδε] is generation or destruction in the simple sense, and change of quantity is increase or decrease, and change of affection is alteration, and change of place is locomotion, then changes must be in each case into the corresponding contrary state. It must be the matter, then, which admits of both contraries, that changes”

Meta XII 1070a11: “There are three kinds of substance: (i.) matter, which exists individually [τοδε τι] in virtue of being apparent (for everything which is characterized by contact and not by coalescence is matter and substratum; e.g., fire, flesh and head; these are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in the strictest sense); (ii.) the ‘nature’ [φυσις] (existing individually [τοδε τι])—i.e., a kind of positive state [εξις] which is the terminus of motion; and (iii.) the particular [τα καθ εκαστα] combination of these, e.g., Socrates or Callias. In some cases the individuality [τοδε τι] does not exist apart from the composite substance (e.g., the form [ειδος] of a house does not exist separately, except as the art of building; nor are these forms liable to generation and destruction; there is a distinct sense in which ‘house’ and ‘health’ and every product of craftsmanship, considered in the abstract, do or do not exist); if it does so at all, it does so in the case of natural things. Hence Plato was not far wrong in saying that there are as many

Forms [εἶδη] as there are kinds of natural things; that is, if there are Forms [εἶδη] distinct from the things of our world”

Meta XIII 1086b27: “For let us suppose that the syllables in speech are substances, and that their letters are the elements of substances. Then there must be only one BA, and only one of each of the other syllables; that is, if they are not universal and identical in form, but each is numerically one and an individual [τοδε τι], and not a member of a class bearing a common name”

Meta XIII 1087a18: “The doctrine that all knowledge is of the universal, and hence that the principles of existing things must also be universal and not separate substances, presents the greatest difficulty of all that we have discussed; there is, however, a sense in which this statement is true, although there is another in which it is not true. Knowledge, like the verb ‘to know’, has two senses, of which one is potential and the other actual. The potentiality being, as matter, universal and indefinite, is of what is universal and indefinite; but the actuality is definite and is of what is definite, because it is individual [τοδε τι] and concerns what is individual [τουδε τινος]. It is only incidentally [κατα συμβεβηκος] that sight sees universal color, because this [τοδε] color which it sees is color; and this [τοδε] A which the grammarian studies is an A. For if the first principles must be universal, that which is derived from them must also be universal, *as in the case of logical demonstrations* [αποδειξεων]; and if this is so, there will be nothing which has a separate existence; i.e., no substance. But it is clear that although in one sense knowledge is universal, in another it is not”

Meta XIV 1089a11: “...if ‘being’ is said in many ways (for sometimes it signifies substance, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, and so on with the other categories), what sort of unity will all the things that are constitute, if not-being is not to be? Will it be the substances that are one, or the affections (and similarly with the other categories), or all the categories together? in which case the ‘this’ [το τοδε] and the ‘such’ [το τοιονδε] and the ‘so great’, and all the other categories which denote some sense of Being, will be one. But it is absurd, or rather impossible, that the introduction of one thing should account for the fact that ‘what is’ sometimes signifies ‘so-and-so’, sometimes ‘such-and-such’, sometimes ‘of such-and-such a size’, sometimes ‘in such-and-such a place”

Meta XIV 1089b29: “But in the case of an individual [τοδε τι], it is possible to explain [λογον] how the individual [τοδε τι] is many things, unless the thing is treated as both an individual [τοδε τι] and a general character [φυσικς τις τοιαυτη; the view of the Platonists]. The difficulty arising from these facts is rather this, how there are actually many substances and not one”

II. τοδε τι in SECOND PHILOSOPHY (kinetic entities)

Phys I 191a11: “As for the underlying nature [υποκειμενον], it must be grasped by analogy. As bronze stands to a statue, or wood to a bed, or [the matter and] the formless before it acquires a form to anything else which has a definite form, so this stands to a substance [προς ουσιαν], to an individual [τοδε τι], to what is [το ον]. This, then, is one principle, though it neither is, nor is one, in the same way as the individual [το τοδε τι]; another principle is that of which we give the account; and there is also the opposite of this, the lack.” [Charlton tr., amended]

Phys IV 214a12: “Another interpretation of the void is ‘that in which there is no individuality [τοδε τι] or corporeal substance’but this is a bad account of it...”

GC I 317b28: “...(1) if it [something which was not a τοδε] actually possessed none of these determinations [size, quality, and position] but possessed them all potentially, the result is (a) that a being which is not a determinate being can possess a separate existence, and (b) that coming-to-be arises out of nothing pre-existent—a view which inspired great and continuous alarm in the minds of the early philosophers. On the other hand, (2) if, although it is not to be an individual [τοδε τι] or a substance, it is to possess some of the other attributes which we have mentioned, then, as we said, the qualities will be separable from the substance”

GC I 318b16: “Another way of distinguishing them is by the special nature of the material of that which changes; for the more the differences of material signify ‘a this’ [τοδε τι], the more is it a real being, whereas the more they signify a privation, the more unreal it is.”

GC I 318b32: “Thus unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away turn out to be different according to common opinion from what they are in truth. For wind and air are in truth more an individuality [τοδε τι] or a ‘form’ [ειδος] than earth.” [Joachim tr., amended]

GC I 319a12: “...for some things signify a ‘this’ [τοδε τι], others a ‘such-and-such’, others a ‘so-much’. Those things, therefore, which do not signify substance are not said to come-to-be without qualification, but to come-to-be *something*.”

De An I 402a24: “Perhaps our first business is to determine to which of the genera the soul belongs, and what it is; that is to say, whether it is an individual [τοδε τι], i.e., a substance, or whether it is a quality, or quantity, or belongs to any other of our pre-established categories, and furthermore, whether it has potential or actual existence”

De An I 410a14: “Further, the word ‘being’ [οντος] is said in many ways: it may signify an individual [τοδε τι], or a quantity, or a quality, or any other of the kinds of predicates we have distinguished.... These (and others like them) are the consequences of the view that the soul is composed of all the elements.” [J.A. Smith tr., amended]

De An II 412a7: “We describe one class of existing things as substance; and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter, which in itself is not an individual [τοδε τι]; (2) shape or form, in virtue of which individuality [τοδε τι] is directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two” [Hett tr., in Loeb, UNAMENDED]

De An II 416b13: “But since nothing is fed which does not share in life, that which is fed must be the body which has a soul, *qua* having a soul, so that food is related to that which has soul and that not incidentally [κατα συμβεβηκος]. But nutritivity and the promotion of growth are not the same; for it is *qua* quantitative that that which has soul has its growth promoted by food, and *qua* individual [τοδε τι] and substance that it is nourished by it; for it preserves its substance and continues to exist, so long as it is nourished, and it causes the generation not of that which is nourished, but of another like it; for its actual substance already exists, and a thing cannot generate but only preserves itself”

III. τοδε τι in the Writings on Language ('LOGIC')

Cat 3b10: “Every substance *seems* to signify an individual [τοδε τι]. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies an individual [τοδε τι]; for the thing revealed is atomic [ατομον] and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name—when one speaks of man or animal—that a secondary substance likewise signifies an individual [τοδε τι], this is not really true; rather it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things” [Ackrill tr., amended]

COMMENT: The distinction between primary and secondary substances is only drawn in the ‘logical’ writings. That is because language *qua* linguistic can only pick out an individual [τοδε τι] as atomic or numerically one. But there are ‘primary’ substances beside these, in the theoretical languages of the special sciences. To take the given examples, ‘man’ would properly function as an individual [τοδε τι] substance in language *qua* anthropological and ‘animal’ would likewise function as denoting an individual in language *qua* zoological. It is only language used without any such restriction or ‘*qua*-formal’—the language of ‘logic’—which knows no individuality beyond atomic or numerical unity.

Post An I 73b7: “I also describe as <existing> *per se* [καθ αυτα] whatever is not stated of something else as [logical] subject [or ‘as substratum’, καθ υποκειμενον]. I mean, e.g., that ‘the walking’ is something else which walks, and similarly ‘the white’; whereas substance, or whatever denotes an individual [τοδε τι], is not anything other than just itself. Thus I call *per se* those terms which are not predicated of a [logical] subject [what functions as substratum, καθ υποκειμενου]; those which are so predicted I call accidents [συμβεβηκοτα]”

COMMENT: In ‘logic’ a predicate term is *eo ipso* an accident because there is no determinate subject matter, things are not discussed *qua* living (as in biology), or *qua* kinetic (as in physics), or *qua* two- or three-dimensional (as in plane or solid geometry: the main source of examples in *Post An*), or *qua* being (as in ‘first philosophy’)

Post An I 87b30: “There is no scientific knowledge by sense-perception. Even granting that perception is of ‘the such’ [τοιουδε] and not merely of an individual [τουδε τινος], still what one perceives must be an individual [τοδε τι] at a place and at a time, and it is impossible to perceive what is universal and holds in every case, since it is not a ‘this’ [τοδε] nor at a time; and if it were it would not be a universal—for it is what is always and everywhere that we call universal [καθολου].

Soph Elen XXII 178b38: “Again there is the argument that there is a third man distinct from man and from particular men [καθ εκαστον]. But ‘man’, and indeed every general predicate, signifies not an individual [τοδε τι], but some quality, or quantity, or relation, or something of that sort. Likewise also in the case of ‘Coriscus’ and ‘Coriscus the musician’—are they the same or different? For the one signifies an individual [τοδε τι] and the other a quality, so that it cannot be isolated; though it is not isolation which creates the third man, but the admission that it is an individual [τοδε τι]. For what man is cannot be an individual [τοδε τι], as Callias is. Nor does it make any difference if one says that the element he has isolated is not an individual [τοδε τι] but a quality; for there will still be the one beside the many, e.g., ‘Man’. It is evident then that one must not grant that what is a common predicate applying to a class universally is an

individual [τοδε τι], but must say that it signifies either a quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or something of that kind.” [Pickard-Cambridge tr., amended]

Taken in their contexts, these arguments about τοδε τι in Aristotle suggest that a limit must be drawn between the theoretical, where it is at home, and the logical, where it is not.

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