

## **HEGEL'S 'DEDUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SCIENCE'**

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In one of his most memorable epigrams, Aristotle declares it to be the mark of an educated man to seek in each type of inquiry only as much precision or exactness as the nature of the subject matter allows. This remark, which appears at the beginning of his inquiry into 'the practical sciences' (i.e., Ethics and Politics), is designed to forestall the kind of mistakes made by his great predecessor, whom Aristotle criticizes for trying to determine the unity of the *polis* too precisely. He does not mean to suggest that an educated man should avoid the study of works such as Plato's *Republic*; the suggestion is rather that his time would be better spent if he did not attempt to discover scientifically demonstrative arguments in them.

The subject matter of the present inquiry is Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Many have been persuaded that the book should be read in the spirit of Aristotle's practical philosophy, that one should not seek scientific precision where it cannot be found, and that Hegel, like Plato, can be read with great profit without succumbing to 'the Platonic Fallacy.' This manner of approaching the *Phenomenology* is extremely attractive, and for at least two reasons. (1) After a century and a half of scholarly writing about the *Phenomenology*, no consensus has been reached either concerning the precise subject matter or the argument of the book. To the extent that agreement has been reached, it has tended to be negative, namely, that Hegel himself altered his intentions about the subject matter or the argument during the course of his actual composition of the book. (2) The subject matter Hegel takes up in the second half of the book, whether or not it is continuous with and develops out of the foregoing subject matter, bears a very strong family resemblance to the subject matter of Aristotle's practical philosophy. Indeed chapter VI, 'Geist,' begins with a treatment of a form of ethical life whose basic structure directly parallels Aristotle's juxtaposition of the *oikos* and *polis* in the first book of the *Politics*. All the more reason, then, for reading Hegel's *Phenomenology* in the spirit of Aristotle's practical philosophy. Readers agree that many of the trees are magnificent; but the wood is dark. So why get lost?

Probably the darkest saying Hegel ever made about the *Phenomenology* is to be found in the opening pages of the *Science of Logic*. It is especially vexing since it is one of his very few utterances about the function of the work as a whole. He there refers to the book as "the deduction of the concept of science" and assigns the concept, thus deduced, the formidable role of being the necessary presupposition for his otherwise presuppositionless *Logic*.<sup>1</sup> The *Logic*, on the other hand, takes up in its first chapter a subject matter which seems to bear no resemblance to that of the second half of the *Phenomenology*. It begins with 'pure being.' And if we ask what this might be, the immediate context does not seem to be very illuminating, for we are only told what 'pure being' is not: it is *not* definite and it is *not* mediate. It is "*das unbestimmte Unmittelbare* (WL [1812] 1, p. 22)." In fact, it is said to be nothing more nor less than Nothing.

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<sup>1</sup> The question whether Hegel later, i.e., after 1812, retracted this interpretation of the *Phenomenology* has been the subject of a considerable literature. In addition to the reminder that Hegel explicitly reaffirmed this view in the last year of his life (see the second edition of the first book of the *Science of Logic*), the reader may be recommended Hans Friedrich Fulda's masterful survey of the critical literature in his book, *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik* (Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1965).

This famous and irritating beginning of the *Logic* has been the object of a considerable literature.<sup>2</sup> But, as in the case of the *Phenomenology*, nothing like a critical consensus has been arrived at. The *Logic* continues to be read, but its beginning remains an enigma.

## I

Given this situation, it would be foolhardy simply to assert that the mysteries of the *Logic* might be unlocked by referring all difficulties of its beginning to the *Phenomenology*, as its presumptive ‘deduction.’ For, as we have seen, the *Phenomenology* itself is no less problematical than the *Logic*. But perhaps some light might be cast on the question of the *Phenomenology*’s subject matter if the question of its argument were focussed by the problem of the beginning of the *Logic*. The aim of this paper is to explore the conjecture that the *Phenomenology*, when read as a “deduction of the concept of science,” will reveal more clearly the nature of its subject matter.

As we have seen, the subject matter at the beginning of the second half of the *Phenomenology*, ‘Geist,’ is remarkably akin to that of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. It is also strikingly different from the traditional subject matter of German Idealism, i.e., the ‘*Ich*.’ Now when we look at the pages of the *Logic* immediately preceding the treatment of ‘pure being,’ we find that Hegel explicitly contrasts ‘*Ich*’ and ‘*Geist*’ with respect to the problem of an absolute beginning in science. An examination of this discussion, “Womit muß der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?” (with special reference to the recently republished 1812 edition), will suggest an interpretative conjecture concerning the *Phenomenology*.

The section begins with the statement of what appears to be a dilemma. On the one hand, the result of the *Phenomenology*, ‘pure knowing,’ is said to be presupposed by the *Logic*, the *pure science* (*WL* [1812], p. 6). On the other hand, an absolute science must itself *be an absolute* beginning, and as such it may presuppose nothing (*WL* [1812], p. 7). If the *Logic* is taken to begin as a science of the absolute, it will therefore be incompatible with the *Phenomenology*. Since Hegel has explicitly affirmed that the *Logic* does require and must presuppose the “deduction of the concept of science,” and that the *Phenomenology* is this deduction, the implication seems to be that the *Logic* does not and cannot have an absolute beginning.

An explication of this, at first sight, impossible dilemma is to be found on the next page of the 1812 edition. The paragraph in question has been discussed only rarely in the Hegel literature; and since it is critical to our problem, it will be well to cite it entire:

In der ersten so eben gegebenen Darstellung des Seyns als des Anfangs ist der Begriff des Wissens vorausgesetzt. Somit ist dieser Anfang nicht absolut, sondern kommt aus der vorhergehenden Bewegung des Bewußtseyns her. Die Wissenschaft dieser Bewegung [i.e., the *Phenomenology of Spirit*], aus der das Wissen resultirt, müßte nun den absoluten Anfang haben. Sie macht ihn mit dem *unmittelbaren Bewußtseyn*, dem Wissen, daß etwas ist. — Das Seyn macht so hier gleichfalls den Anfang, aber als Bestimmung einer concreten Gestalt, des Bewußtseyns; **erst das reine Wissen**,

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<sup>2</sup> A critical review of nineteenth century attacks on and defenses of the beginning of the *Logic* may be found in Dieter Henrich’s short essay, ‘Anfang und Methode der Logik,’ *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 1.

**der Geist, der sich von seiner Erscheinung als Bewußtseyn befreyt hat, hat auch das freye, reine Seyn zu seinem Anfang.** — Aber jener Anfang, das unmittelbare Bewußtseyn, enthält das Ich als bezogen auf ein schlechthin Anderes, und umgekehrt, den Gegenstand bezogen auf Ich; somit eine Vermittlung. — Zwar enthält das Bewußtseyn die beyden Vermittelnden, — die auch wiederum die Vermittelten sind, — selbst, weißt somit nicht über sich hinaus, und ist in sich beschlossen. Aber indem die Vermittlung gegenseitig ist, so ist jedes Vermittelnde auch vermittelt, somit keine wahrhafte Unmittelbarkeit vorhanden. — Aber umgekehrt **wäre** eine solche vorhanden, so ist sie, **da sie nicht begründet ist**, etwas **willkührliches** und **zufälliges** (*WL* [1812], p. 8 — bold emphasis added).

As in the case of Plato’s recollection myth, which is said simply to transport the paradox of learning (*Meno*, 80e) to another level, Hegel’s remarks concerning the beginning of logical science and its derivation from the *Phenomenology* have been seen as a dodge. In the light of this paragraph, however, we see that Hegel clearly distinguishes between two ways of beginning and two types of subject matter in which these beginnings may be made. The one kind of beginning is absolute, but not immediate. The other is immediate, but not absolute. In the former, immediate consciousness begins absolutely, with the knowledge that something is. It is absolute because consciousness refers to nothing beyond itself. It simply affirms the absolute identity of what is ‘for it,’ pure being, and what it takes itself to be, the pure *Ich*. As the affirmation of a relation, however, consciousness is not immediate but rather the reflective mediation of the *Ich*, identified with what is for it (the object), and the object, identified with the *Ich*. Both terms of this identity are therefore mediating and mediated. And to affirm the immediacy of either by itself would be to remove it from the absoluteness of the identity, to declare it fortuitous, arbitrary, and groundless. Consciousness is therefore the subject of the absolute way of beginning. It begins with an absolute grounding, the identity of its terms: the *Ich* and pure being. And this is the beginning of the *Phenomenology*, the shape of consciousness called ‘Sense Certainty.’

The other way of beginning, which is immediate but not absolute, first becomes possible as the *result* of the movement (*Bewegung*) which begins absolutely with consciousness and through which ‘*Geist*’ is “liberated from its appearance as consciousness.” As such, it is said to be ‘pure knowing’ and to have ‘pure being’ as *its* beginning. ‘Pure being’ was also the beginning, indeed, the absolute beginning of the ‘*Ich*’ in the *Phenomenology*. But, as we have seen, it was there a term in a relation of absolute identity, the unity of consciousness. At the end of the *Phenomenology* ‘pure being’ becomes a beginning, the beginning of ‘pure knowing,’ now conceived as Spirit purified of all relation to an object, pure spiritual unity (*geistige Einbeit*). Here there is no absolute beginning because there is no absolute ground; spiritual unity is pure immediacy, immediacy as the result of a process of purification. And through this process, consciousness, which began the movement described in the *Phenomenology* with an absolute grounding, seems to have become groundless.

These observations suggest that the key problem for a coherent interpretation of the *Phenomenology* will be an understanding of how spiritual unity emerges through the movement of mediation which *begins* with the absolute identity of the ‘*Ich*’ and its object. Put in its most concise form, the question is how Spirit emerges — and is not simply introjected — in the ‘*Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins*.’ Is this Science continuous with the ‘*Wissenschaft der Phänomenologie des Geistes*?’

To this end it will be important to notice that the absolute identity of consciousness *is* absolute only from a standpoint independent of consciousness. Hegel makes this point most clearly in his Jena lectures of 1803–04. “Aber dies *Bewußtseiende* und das, dessen *es sich bewußt ist*, ist nur für einen Dritten diese Einheit des Bewußtseins, nicht für sie selbst ... .”<sup>3</sup> In the *Phenomenology* it is clear that this ‘third’ is the ‘Wir,’ who observe the entire development of consciousness from its absolute beginning to its ‘*Aufhebung*’ in pure knowing.<sup>4</sup> The absoluteness of the beginning of the *Phenomenology* must be seen to consist not merely in the identity of the two terms of consciousness, *Ich* and object, for this inner reflective unity is an absolute unity only by means of an ‘external reflection,’ or ‘*für uns*’ (see *WL* [L], 2, p. 18). The ‘*Wir*’ is therefore a constitutive element of consciousness from the point of its absolute beginning and because it *is* an absolute beginning.

It must be noted, however, that the absolute unity of consciousness with which the *Phenomenology* begins is not posited by the ‘Wir.’ The ‘Wir’ is rather pre-thematically posited by consciousness as the necessary condition of its claim to absoluteness. The development of the argument in the book may therefore be read as a progressive thematization by consciousness of that ultimate, but at first abstractly posited ground of its absoluteness: the ‘*Wir*.’ The *Ich* of consciousness therefore has two objects, the one with which it identifies itself as a knowing subject, and the other the essential ground on which its claims of ultimate or absolute identity with its first object are based. In its relationship to the first object, the *Ich* takes itself to be absolutely certain of itself. It is absolutely at one with its object. But as the knowing subject in an absolutely scientific mode of knowing, it must also express the truth conditions, the grounds, for its certainty. And thus it begins the process of thematizing its second object. This second object is at first taken to be simply the *Ansich* or the essence of the certainty constituting the relation to the first object. But when consciousness actually expresses what it takes the absolute ground or essence (*Ansich* or *Wesen*) of its certainty to be, the ground expressed reveals itself to be merely an *Ansich* or essence *for consciousness* and not something in itself or absolute. We therefore see that consciousness, as consciousness, cannot *immediately* thematize its ground; it cannot, as Hegel so strikingly puts it, “shoot the absolute out of a pistol.” But it does take the now thematized essence or *Ansich* to be new ground for its subsequent truth claims. And this process of mediation in which consciousness progressively thematizes its absolute continues throughout the *Phenomenology*.

The movement (*Bewegung*) of consciousness presented in the *Phenomenology* may therefore be understood as a sequence of stages (the ‘*Gestalten des Bewußtseins*’), each of which is defined by the fundamental truth claim that consciousness has come to the point of thematizing. But although the *Gestalten* are discontinuous, each being defined by a definite *Ansich*, all share the form of consciousness as such, all are forms of knowing in which a subject takes itself to be related to an object. Viewed in this way, we can also see that this movement will have a terminus, namely, at that stage when knowing no longer has the form of consciousness, when, as Hegel expresses it in the *Logic*,<sup>5</sup> the “opposition of consciousness” (i.e., *Ich* and Object) will have been overcome. At the completion of its voyage of

<sup>3</sup> *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 2 vols. (Leipzig, Meiner, 1932), Vol. 1, p. 201. Cf. *Phän* [H, 1937], p. 74.

<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the question of the ‘Wir’ in the *Phenomenology*, see my essay, ‘Hegel’s [Phenomenological Method](#),’ *Review of Metaphysics* 23 (1970), 615–641.

<sup>5</sup> See *WL* [1812], p. xiii; *WL* [L] 1, p. 30; *Phän* [H, 1937], p. 549.

discovery, the last *Gestalt* of consciousness thus comes to discover what it is in truth, namely ‘*Wir*.’ But, as such, the knowing subject is no longer in the form of consciousness, no longer a subject making truth-claims. For at this stage there is no longer any ground for asserting the absoluteness of any relation between subject and object. The ‘*Wir*,’ purified of its relation to consciousness, is pure knowing (*reines Wissen*), no longer a knowing grounded in the absolute, but knowing knowing itself. And, as such, it is pure immediacy, the pure and unmediated knowing from which the ‘pure science,’ i.e., *Logic*, begins.

The problematic beginning of the *Logic*, ‘pure being’ characterized as “*die unbestimmte Unmittelbarkeit*,” does, as we have seen, have the form of a reflective expression. And Hegel, in the section of the *Logic* referred to above, clearly acknowledges this.<sup>6</sup> But whether or not such expressions, at the beginning of the *Logic* of ‘*Sein*,’ illicitly presuppose categories yet to be developed in the *Logic* of ‘*Wesen*,’ is a question that might be viewed in another light if an introductory “deduction of the concept of science” includes an example of the *Logic* of *Wesen* in the development of consciousness’ truth-claims. Then “*die unbestimmte Unmittelbarkeit*” might be read as a result rather than an anticipation.

## II

If we grant the foregoing conjecture with respect to the *argument* of the *Phenomenology*, conceived as a “deduction of the concept of science,” what light is thrown upon the question of the *subject matter* of the book? How may this *subject matter* be understood to undergo a development conforming to the proof-structure demanded by this argument? More specifically, what does the conjectured development of consciousness, as a progressive thematization and ultimate manifestation of its absolute ground, suggest about the significance of the ground posited by consciousness, the ‘*Wir*,’ for us as *readers* of the *Phenomenology*, on the one hand, and for the concept of ‘*Geist*’ on the other?

In the first place, it is clear from the Introduction to the *Phenomenology* that Hegel shows his readers why it would be impossible for them to make any justifiable truth-claims at the beginning of an exposition of science (*Phän* [H, 1937], pp. 63–66). Hegel does not at this or any other point in the *Phenomenology* invite us to begin or observe the beginning of pure science, i.e., *Logic*, but rather to witness the development of phenomenal science, that is, a science begun by consciousness and in which consciousness expresses, gives phenomenal form to, its own absolute truth claims. For it is the very nature of consciousness to be a consciousness-of, of an *object*, and, as a scientifically knowing subject, to set down standards in terms of which it is prepared to utter warrant statements about its objective knowledge (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 71).

Thus we, as readers of the *Phenomenology*, are explicitly invited to suspend all judgment, to engage in what might be called an *epoché* with respect to our subject matter, knowing consciousness, which by its nature does make truth-claims. In this respect, we, as readers of the *Phenomenology* are from the outset akin to that ‘*Wir*’ in which consciousness was above seen pre-thematically to ground its claim to knowledge of the absolute. But at this stage, our disengagement, our *epoché*, is no more than a

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<sup>6</sup> “Die einfache Unmittelbarkeit ist selbst ein Reflexions-ausdruck, und bezieht sich auf den Unterschied von dem Vermittelten” (*WL* [1812], p. 7).

disengagement from the standpoint of consciousness. If we, as readers of the *Phenomenology*, are to come to the actual insight that we are not merely akin to but at one with the ‘*Wir*,’ the ‘pure knowing’ with which the *Phenomenology* ends, then this will only come as a result of our detailed comprehension of how consciousness, our subject matter, itself progresses from its absolute beginning to its final sublimation in the ‘*Wir*.’ For us readers, the suspension of judgment that we undertake at the beginning of the *Phenomenology* is a mere thought-experiment.

Secondly, let us turn to the question of ‘*Geist*.’ At the conclusion of the *Phenomenology* (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 564) as well as in Hegel’s Jena lectures,<sup>7</sup> absolute knowing is described as “*der sich als Geist wissende Geist*.” May this be regarded as an alternate expression for what we have called the ‘*Wir*’? If so, then ‘*Geist*’ in its final form must be a pure structure of interaction in which all members participate, not in virtue of any determinate characteristics they have as individuals and not in virtue of any claims that they have to the truth, but purely and simply as members. But how is such a pure spiritual unity conceivable? As a unity directly presented to consciousness it is, quite clearly, incomprehensible. As we have seen, consciousness as such cannot thematize the ‘*Wir*’; it can only come to a oneness with it. But then isn’t this state of ‘oneness’ with the ‘*Wir*’ simply a Hegelian reformulation of the neo-Platonic doctrine that there is only one *noûs*, or a rational mysticism through which individual consciousnesses ecstatically come to unity in a transcendental or meta-consciousness?<sup>8</sup>

Hegel’s indication of how the ultimate spiritual unity in the *Phenomenology* is reached suggests that his concept of ‘*Geist*’ is not to be understood in terms of a supra-individual meta-consciousness. Knowing in such a unity would still have the form of consciousness. The final unification spelled out in the last chapter of the *Phenomenology* suggests rather that ‘*Geist*’ is a unity in plurality and a plurality in unity. The unification in which ‘*Geist*’ comes to know itself as ‘*Geist*’ is here presented as a synthesis between the result of chapter VI, Spirit in the form of consciousness, and chapter VII, Spirit in the form of self-consciousness (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 553ff). Chapter VI, in turn, is treated here, and also in the introductions to chapters VI and VII, as the culmination of chapters I–V in the sense that they show themselves, in retrospect, to be ‘abstractions’ from Spirit in the form of consciousness (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 314). The entire book, viewed from its result, thus assumes the following three-fold structure:

- A. Spirit in the form of consciousness, including the abstracted shapes of consciousness, Self-consciousness and Reason
- B. Spirit in the form of Self-consciousness
- C. Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, i.e., as the synthesis of A. and B.

Our question is now whether or not this structure may be seen to correspond to the general argument-structure required for a “deduction of the concept of science.”

In part A, consciousness finally comes to show itself as the indeterminate middle term (*Mitte*) of Spirit (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 477). It reaches this stage in the form of moral consciences that reciprocally

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<sup>7</sup> *Jenenser Realphilosophie*, Vol. 1, p. 262

<sup>8</sup> For a systematic exploration of these themes, without special reference to Hegel, see Philip Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness*, 2nd ed. (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1969), esp. pp. 114ff.

recognize each other by negating the significance of the determinate being (*Dasein*) in which they appear to one another. This negation Hegel calls ‘forgiveness.’ In the ‘reconciling yes’ of moral forgiveness, which negates the opposition of consciousness between the individual moral ‘*Ichs*,’ ‘Spirit’ is present in its absoluteness. It is not, however, Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, because the medium in which these ‘*Ichs*’ are for one another is not merely transparent but void. It is the final stage in the process of negatively purifying the factors mediating recognition. This process explicitly began in chapter IV, when we, as readers of the *Phenomenology*, first came to see that the *Ich*, as self-consciousness, is actually constituted through its being recognized *as* an *Ich*, when we were first presented with the ‘concept of Spirit’ (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 140), and began to view the concept of ‘spiritual unity’ (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 141ff) as it developed through the movement of recognition, beginning with the radically non-reciprocal recognition of Lordship and Servitude and culminating in the negation of that act constituting all forms of servitude, the ascription of naturally determinate being to the essence of another self-consciousness.<sup>9</sup>

For Spirit to know itself as Spirit, this negative process undergone by Spirit must be complemented by a development through which the phenomenal *medium* of reciprocal recognition is retained, but purified of its natural determinacy and made into a pure receptacle for the generally arbitrary, but in each instance specific, *recognizability* of Spirit. Whereas the spiritual unity in chapter VI came to be constituted by the inward and subjective acceptance of the inner moral conviction of the other, spiritual unity in chapter VII is a unity in otherness (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 544). Here it is not naturally determinate being as such that is relinquished by consciousness, but rather nature as a form of being, which is known as Evil (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 544), as the absolute other of its own absolute ground. Since Spirit in the form of self-consciousness has come to experience the defect of naturally determinate being in the form of knowing, this evil character of its phenomenal world is capable of being overcome. But Spirit in the form of self-consciousness still knows itself by means of representations, it is for itself still “spiritual essence” (*geistiges Wesen*),<sup>10</sup> spiritual being from the standpoint of consciousness (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 526), spiritual unity as grounded in a beyond.

Erst nachdem es [consciousness] die Hoffnung aufgegeben, auf eine äußerliche, d.h. fremde Weise das Fremdsein aufzuheben, wendet es sich ... an sich selbst, an seine eigne Welt und Gegenwart, **entdeckt sie als sein Eigentum** und hat somit den ersten Schritt getan, aus der *Intellektual-welt* herabzusteigen, oder vielmehr deren abstraktes Element mit dem wirklichen Selbst zu begeisten (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 559 — bold emphasis added).

The end of the *Phenomenology* may thus be interpreted as that point when knowing in the form of consciousness reaches a *Gestalt* which is no longer a “determinate *Gestalt* of consciousness,” when knowing, as the result of its own immanent development, no longer reflexively posits an independent *Ansich* as the ground of its knowledge. It thus actualizes through the dialectical stages of its experience what was, for us at the outset, a mere thought-experiment, our ‘*weglassen*’ (*Phän* [H, 1937], p. 72) of all standards or criteria. As readers of the *Phenomenology*, we thereby come to see that we *are* the ‘*Wir*’

<sup>9</sup> It should also be noted that, before we were presented with the ‘concept of Spirit,’ the unity of consciousness, in chapters I–III, was mediated by us. See *Phän* [H, 1937], pp. 81, 85, 95, 103.

<sup>10</sup> For further explication of this important category in the *Phänomenologie*, see especially pp. 300, 415, 446, 532.

posited in consciousness's absolute beginning. In the resultant mode of knowing, pure knowing, nothing is determinate, because the reflexive determinations of consciousness have been suspended, and all is immediate, because the medium, the world in which spirit knows itself as spirit, is no longer postulated in an alien realm, but is discovered to be its own property (*GPR*, §§ 41 and 62). The indeterminate immediacy which the *Phenomenology* issues must not be understood as itself a 'we,' what might be called a transcendental intersubjectivity; but the end of the *Phenomenology*, conceived as "the deduction of the concept of science," is to be grasped as *resulting from* a unification into the 'Wir,' the *immediate* unity of spirit as opposed to the *absolute* unity of the *Ich*.

If the supra-individual shape of Spirit, that is, the *Volksgeist* with which chapter VI begins, were not susceptible of being resolved into pure knowing, Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, then the only appropriate scientific method for discussing the subject matter of a book about Spirit, e.g., the *Phenomenology*, would be the avowedly imprecise method of Aristotle's practical sciences. The foregoing exploration of our conjecture that the *Phenomenology* is a deduction has by no means 'proved' that the work actually carries out such a resolution; it has simply outlined a proof-structure suggested by the *Logic*, which would entail the resolution of spiritual essence into spiritual unity. If the implied reading of the *Phenomenology* also sheds some light on the beginning of *pure* science, "*das unbestimmte Unmittelbare*," then we might also be assisted in our effort to understand why Hegel regarded *science* itself as a freedom from all arbitrary, fortuitous or given determinations and how he comprehended the emergence of determination as a pure movement of "*die Sache selbst*," independent of all reflexive consciousness.

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